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CIS Official Reviews Results of Ashgabat Summit

LD2912231893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1355 GMT 29 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Dec—There is increased interest among the CIS states in collective security problems. A further strengthening of their military cooperation will be facilitated by a number of interdepartmental agreements which were signed at the December session of CIS heads of state in Ashgabat. This was stated today by Colonel General Viktor Samsonov, chief of the headquarters for coordinating military cooperation among CIS countries, at a news conference on the outcome of the Ashgabat meetings of CIS heads of state and defense and foreign ministers.

He stated that a further three states—Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus—acceded to the Treaty on Collective Security which had previously been signed by six CIS states. "The CIS countries can see for themselves that no single state is capable independently of resolving the issues of ensuring military security," Viktor Samsonov emphasized. "Not one of the CIS states," he said, "denies that collective armed forces will be created in the long term." Gen. Samsonov said that a prototype for these forces are the peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan, which include subunits from the armed forces of Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

In Gen. Samsonov's opinion, the abolition of the Main Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and the creation of the headquarters to coordinate the military cooperation of the CIS countries is one of the main results of the session of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers in Ashgabat. In the very near future, Viktor Samsonov said, the headquarters apparatus is to be reduced from 400 staffers to 250. The main subunits of the headquarters, he noted, will be formed on a coalition footing.

CIS Office Announces Upcoming Russia-Ukraine Meeting

LD3012091593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0848 GMT 30 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow December 30 TASS—Delegations of the Russian and Ukrainian Defence Ministries will meet in Kiev on January 5-6 to continue consultations on the order and terms of the transfer of former Soviet nuclear weapons deployed on the Ukrainian territory for elimination in Russia, TASS learned on Thursday [30 December] from the CIS Headquarters for the Coordination of Military Cooperation.

The source said that the January meeting is also to draft an agreement on military cooperation between the two countries which will be submitted for approval of the Russian and Ukrainian prime ministers.

A similar two-day meeting of the military delegations of the two countries ended on December 29 and the sides agreed to concentrate on fulfilling the already signed agreements.

The CIS headquarters said that military relations between Russia and Ukraine had been developing "dynamically" of late and the recent meeting of the defence ministers of both countries in Ashgabat gave an additional impulse to them.

It added that a "complete identity of views" had been reached between Pavel Grachev and Vitaly Radetskyy and quoted the Ukrainian defence minister as saying that his country will become nuclear free in the future.

The two defence ministers also pledged to begin a phased solution of the Black Sea Fleet dispute in the near future.

Black Sea Fleet Officers Urge Resolution of Status

LD3012020993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2005 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] The officers' assembly of the Kachinsky antisubmarine air regiment of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol today called on the governments of Russia and Ukraine to ultimately decide on the status of the servicemen of the Black Sea Fleet.

"The skyrocketing prices in Ukraine have brought the residents of Sevastopol to the brink of misery," according to a document passed by the assembly. "As for us, we found ourselves in an even worse situation. The supply of gas to our homes is cut off, while electricity is rationed by hours."

The officers state that the money of Russian taxpayers does not reach them. Many cannot buy indispensable food items for their children, let alone clothes and other commodities. Despite this, the regiment has performed and will perform its tasks, the officers said.

The assembly demanded that a mechanism to replace the existing system for financing the Black Sea Fleet be developed as soon as possible. The officers also asked to draw the attention of the competent bodies to the fact of missing money allocated for the Black Sea Fleet.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 30 Dec

LD3012063393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0624 GMT 30 Dec 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow December 30 (ITAR-TASS)—The ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI newspaper calls the coming debate on the draft of a new Russian civil code "a touchstone" for the new parliament. The code will be among the first, and may be the first, legislative acts to be discussed by the Federal Assembly (new parliament), the newspaper writes.

It will "turn into an instrument for testing the efficiency of legislators, their economic psychology, conduct and national responsibility, since the code is the second important document after the constitution".

The same newspaper devotes two pages to an analysis of the political, social and economic situation in Russia over the past few years. Tracing reasons for the victory at the elections to the Russian parliament by the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] and printing the biography of its leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the newspaper says at the end of the article that some politicians were too hasty, calling Zhirinovskiy "a fascist".

The newspaper claims that Russian nationalism which was hushed up for a long time "generated a qualitatively new phenomenon—national populism" in the economic conditions of the collapse of a unitarian state. ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI notes that its further transformation will depend both on Russian politicians as well as on the mass media, the degree of realism and social orientation in national economic and political programmes.

Under the headline "Why and What Bothers America", the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper carries an article by politology professor Peter Ordeshuk of California Technological Institute, voicing strong concern over the success of the LDPR at the general elections.

The professor expresses a wish that many Zhirinovskiy's supporters should understand where such people can lead the country. Analogies with Hitler are no overestimation, he adds.

Another article in the newspaper claims that the great success of "left-wingers and nationalists" at the elections made impossible the continuation of the previous course. "Cosmetics will not do this time," the newspaper stresses. "It will be necessary to revise the basics of the strategy of reforms."

The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA newspaper also discusses Zhirinovskiy's skyrocketing to stardom, calling parallels between the LDPR leader and Hitler discussed in the press as "extremely primitive".

The same newspaper, as well as TRUD, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, featured fully or in summary an address by Russian press workers to Premier Chernomyrdin, protesting at unaccounted consequences of decision No. 1233 of the Russian government on revaluation of Russian enterprises' fixed funds.

It follows from the address that the cost of printshops' services will rise six times, which will stop the output of virtually all newspapers and magazines.

A considerable part of materials in the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA daily is devoted to the 70th anniversary of the newspaper. In this connection, it runs congratulations from President Boris Yeltsin and Defence Minister Pavel Grachev.

In an interview with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, the Russian Minister of Environmental Control and Natural Resources Viktor Danilov-Danilyan describes the ecological situation in Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union as very disquieting.

However, the minister notes, the state of environment has not deteriorated over the past few years thanks to measures taken by the state since 1988 to establish a nature-protection system.

Reaction to Zhirinovskiy Conduct Abroad Reported

Foreign Ministry Aide Comments

LD2912174193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1510 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Any Russian citizen, when he is abroad, must respect not only Russian laws, but first of all the laws of the country he came to. Russia has nothing to do with the statements made by the Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and it does not share the ideas he voiced, Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Legal Department Yevgeniy Prokhorov told Interfax.

According to him, his ministry has not received official representations either from the Bulgarian leadership, or from the leaders of other countries in connection with sensational statements by the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party.

As Prokhorov said, Russia's Foreign Ministry never comments on statements by individual Russian politicians visiting other countries as private individuals. "Nevertheless, the ministry cannot overlook the fact that a Russian politician made statements running counter to the universally-accepted rules of politeness in a country Russia maintains close ties with," the diplomat said.

It's common knowledge that, during his visit to Bulgaria, Zhirinovskiy described President Zheliu Zhelev as "the leader of a period of transition which is drawing to a close."

"We used to have rather ridiculous rules of conduct for Soviet citizens travelling abroad," Prokhorov said. "Now Russian citizens can enjoy freedom of speech when travelling abroad. Nevertheless, the opportunity to exercise such rights must not entail the possibility to infringe on public morals, on the safety and health of people in foreign countries," he said.

According to Prokhorov, Russia's foreign policy must not be determined by the interests of domestic political struggle or intention to acquire personal popularity. "It's deplorable that members of Russia's new parliament begin to make far-reaching statements that might affect our relations with other countries even before they commence their duties," he said.

Russia's Ambassador to Bulgaria, Aleksander Avdeyev, got in touch with Zhirinovskiy, who is on an unofficial visit in that country, and warned him that it is inadmissible to make statements detrimental to bilateral relations, the diplomat said.

According to another high-ranking member of Russia's foreign ministry interviewed by Interfax, "it would be counter-productive to start building Russia's entire foreign policy around Zhirinovskiy." "The more we speak about this, the greater publicity the LDP leader will get," he said.

Russian diplomats "will have to help Zhirinovskiy out yet, if the authorities of some country take him into custody as a result of his latest demarche," said the Foreign Ministry official.

Romania Condemns 'Insults'

LD2912172693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1625 GMT 29 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Morozov]

[Text] Bucharest, 29 Dec—The avalanche of insults, threats, ultimatums, and revenge-seeking slogans, which Vladimir Zhirinovskiy has been coming out with of late, has recently concerned Romania too. The leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia went so far as to permit himself the most insulting kinds of appraisals such as "Romania is an artificial state, composed of Italian Gypsies who seized territories from Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia." Although such public expressions are more likely to be the result of a pathological rather than political conditions, they should in no measure be ignored since they could serve as a starting point for events with disastrous consequences for the states and peoples of Europe and mankind in general. This is stressed in a statement by the Romanian Government released today.

The Romanian Government resolutely rejects and condemns such opinions extracted from the propaganda arsenal which bloodied the whole planet 50 years ago, the statement points out. In the whole history of Romania no one has been permitted to insult the Romanian people in such an unheard of fashion. We have not and shall not permit anyone to offend our national dignity.

V. Zhirinovskiy's irresponsible statements are essentially an encroachment upon Romania's national security, the government pointed out. Other extremist declarations by him on a number of European problems are also provocative and threaten stability and security in the region and Europe. This fully justifies Romania's concern for the protection of its national security, including in the context of the coming NATO summit meeting.

At the same time the Romanian Government again stresses that Romania has supported the democratic process in the Russian Federation and President B. Yeltsin's program of reforms, and continues to do so. It is in their success that we see the guarantee of security and stability in Europe and the world. We are interested in the development of good relations with the Russian Federation. That is why we express [words indistinct] that the president and government of the Russian Federation will dissociate themselves with all clarity from Zhirinovskiy's position, including from his insulting attacks on Romania.

We express confidence, the statement notes in conclusion, that realistic, reformist political forces in the Russian Federation will prevail in the process of democratic

reconstruction, so as to set a barrier against extremism and ultranationalism, make possible a Europe of peace and mutual understanding, and continue the strengthening of traditional Romanian-Russian relations.

Romanian Official, Envoy Cited

LD2912231293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1730 GMT 29 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Morozov]

[Text] Bucharest, 29 Dec—We would like to see an improvement in our relations with Russia, Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu said at a news conference devoted mainly to relations between Russia and Romania. But certain factors independent of the Romanian side have damaged these relations at present, he said, pointing first and foremost to the "Ilascu case," which caused the reaction we all know about in Romania, and, second, to the statements made by Zhirinovskiy.

Our main principle is to develop cooperation and friendly relations with the Russian Federation, which we regard as a neighbor country in the broad sense of the word, the head of Romania's diplomacy stressed. But it is also true that such efforts require an encouraging "signal" from the other side, which we consider vital in relation both to the Ilascu case and Zhirinovskiy's statements. We are quite ready for such a dialogue and hope that it will be resumed.

As far as its modest capabilities allow, Romania supports reform and the democratic process in Russia, since these are in line with its national interests. Romania and Russia's democratic forces have common interests and the foundations exist for the development of very good relations between them. Standing in the way now of Russian-Romanian relations are secondary issues which are not matters of principle and which we hope are "ancillary incidents."

Ye. Ostrovenko, the Russian Federation's ambassador in Bucharest, was today invited for a talk at Romania's Foreign Ministry. The Russian ambassador said the statements made by Liberal-Democratic Party leader Zhirinovskiy, and reported by Romania's mass media, have nothing in common with Russia's position, the Russian ambassador said, and are no more than Zhirinovskiy's own personal view. Russia's foreign policy is determined by President B. Yeltsin and, as regards Romania, this policy is to promote friendly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

Austria Denies Visa

LD3012104093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0951 GMT 30 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspsondent Aleksandr Kuzmin]

[Text] Vienna December 30 TASS—Following Germany's suit, the Austrian Foreign Ministry instructed its embassy in Moscow not to take indepedent decisions on an entry visa to the country to Chairman of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party [LDPR] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the Neues Volksblatt newspaper reports on Thursday [30 December].

Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock said in an interview with the newspaper that Austrian authorities know what to do if the LDPR leader again requests an entry visa to the country. This is how Mock reacted to reports from Sofia that the LDPR leader planned to visit again Austria on January 5.

According to Neues Volksblatt, the Austrian Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed critical remarks that the Austrian Embassy in Moscow did not advise the ministry, in the first case, of its intention to issue an entry visa to the LDPR leader to Austria.

Need To 'Repudiate' Remarks Stressed

PM2912150193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Dec 93 First Edition p 4

[Maksim Yusin article: "Zhirinovskiy's 'Liberal Democratic' Diplomacy. LDPR Leader Says Bulgarian President Should Be Dismissed, Threatens World With a Superweapon, and Intends To Dispatch Five Russian Divisions to the Balkans"]

[Text] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's first foreign tour since the elections has been marked by a series of statements that have once again made the world look at Russia in astonishment: Could 25 percent of voters really have voted for such a politician?

During his trip to Austria, Germany, and Bulgaria, the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] leader has not only met with neofascist figures and a friend of his who is a veteran of the SS but has also found time to grant many interviews. In Austria, for instance, he stated that Russia has a top-secret weapon called "Elipton" many times more powerful than the atom bomb and capable of destroying all mankind.

Zhirinovskiy began his visit to Bulgaria by proposing that President Zhelyu Zhelev be "pensioned off" and replaced by his own "consultant on questions of the European economy," one Svetoslav Stoilov. This Stoilov, a Bulgarian businessman living in Austria, was introduced to journalists as the "future president of Bulgaria," no less.

The Yugoslav conflict has not been ignored either. Zhirinovskiy disclosed that he has elaborated his own plan that will put an immediate end to the bloodshed. Unfortunately, the world public has not been given details of the plan: Serbs, Croats, and Muslims will have to fight on for another few days at least until Zhirinovskiy gets back to Russia and sets out his initiative in full detail to the Balkan states' ambassadors. All that is currently known of the "Zhirinovskiy peace plan" is that it envisages dispatching five Russian divisions to the

Balkans. Vladimir Volfovich has clearly forgotten his election promises not to use troops outside Russia in any circumstances.

President Yeltsin and the Foreign Ministry have found themselves in a very ticklish position. How should they react to this flood of ludicrous ideas—indeed, should they react at all? On the one hand it is awkward and demeaning for reputable politicians to officially reject the LDPR leader's remarks, enter into a debate with him, and thereby descend to his level, as it were. But on the other hand, since 12 December, whether we like it or not, Zhirinovskiy has become a factor in international life, and anything he says casts a shadow over Russia and is seen as the position of the second biggest parliamentary faction.

The world reaction to Zhirinovskiy's latest outspoken comments is extremely revealing. Zhelyu Zhelev described him as a "frivolous politician." "I don't know what sort of a future lies in store for this politician, but I think he is to a great extent a misunderstanding," the Bulgarian president remarked. "Only someone who is feeble-minded can, even before he arrives in another country, demand the resignation of its president," an unnamed representative of the Bulgarian Government told a REUTER correspondent.

But at the same time very serious conclusions are being drawn from the visitor's remarks, adjustments are being made to policies, and attitudes toward Russia are changing. "I am grateful to Zhirinovskiy," Zhelev declared in a radio interview. "He has opened the eyes of those Bulgarians who thought our country should not look to NATO in the search for security guarantees."

Italy reacted immediately to the LDPR leader's remark about the terrible "Elipton." "The statements about a secret weapon capable of destroying the West are alarming, for all their implausibility," a Foreign Ministry communique says. "As cochairman of the CSCE, Italy intends to refer the question of Zhirinovskiy's aggressive remarks for discussion by the all-European forum."

Matters have taken a turn that is no joke. And in this situation the Russian president and the defense and foreign ministers should scarcely remain silent. Especially as Zhirinovskiy is trying to portray himself as virtually Yeltsin's main ally. REUTER quotes him as saying the following: "It will not be possible to solve anything with the current government. But if we manage to persuade Yeltsin, **with whom we are great friends**, we will form a different coalition government and everything will be absolutely fine."

Bearing in mind the reputation of the man who is thrusting himself forward as a friend of the president, Yeltsin's apparatus must not leave these remarks unanswered. Otherwise people abroad, especially Russia's neighbors, may have doubts: Has the "Zhirinovskiy factor" actually influenced Kremlin policy?

Last week's Ashgabat meeting of CIS leaders confirmed that the extreme nationalists' success in the Russian elections seriously worries Moscow's partners. The leaders of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia discussed the possibility of joint action in the event of a strengthening of Zhirinovskiy's position. According to news agency reports, Nursultan Nazarbayev expressed the fear that Russia may attempt to annex Kazakhstan's northern oblasts, while Islam Karimov suggested in conversation with Eduard Shevardnadze elaborating a plan of coordinated action in case the Russian Government, under LDPR influence, begins pursuing an aggressive policy regarding the former Soviet republics.

If some people are having thoughts like these, it is the duty of the Russian president and foreign minister to reassure our neighbors and reaffirm the continuity of our foreign policy course. We will have to get used to it: So long as the Liberal Democrats remain one of the most influential forces in parliament, the remarks of their leader will attract heightened attention abroad and undermine Moscow's position in the international arena.

Russia's reputation in the civilized world depends to a great extent on how promptly and cogently officials repudiate Zhirinovskiy's provocative statements.

Prospect for New Containment Policy

PM2912165493 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Dec 93 First Edition p 4

[Article by Stanislav Kondrashov: "The Adjustments Washington Is Trying To Make After the Russian Elections, and the Amendments That Are Beyond Its Powers"]

[Text] Foreign policy problems in what you could call their pure form did not play any marked role in the Russian election campaign, but the election results have created a problem for foreign policy practitioners and analysts in the West. The problem is that of a new, adjusted view of the dynamics of Russia's development and of the West's attitude to Russian reform. The problem is being discussed in an admirably meticulous and rational manner.

The need for a new view arises not from the fact that the constitution was adopted: Here everything is more or less clear—the electorate, the politically diverse electorate, though not by a substantial majority, voted for the idea of "order" and a strong statehood. Although, after counting the victories in single-seat districts, "Russia's Choice" has taken the leading position in the State Duma, the foreign observers' main attention is still directed to the results of the vote on party lists. It is that vote, giving the voter the choice not between individuals (as in single-seat districts) but between parties and blocs, that offers a picture of the people's political preferences and provides the most general view of their assessment

of what is happening in the country. The first free elections—that is the most representative and universal kind of public opinion poll.

And in this sense the success of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], Zhirinovskiy's party, is the most striking part of the picture. But although it "stands out," it does not overshadow, for foreign observers, another, equally important part—the defeat of "Russia's Choice." It was confident of victory, but on the party lists only one voter in seven voted for the people who personify reform in its present form.

This was the first thing to cause "perplexity" in Western capitals. In the elections the majority of Russian citizens, to put it bluntly, rejected the version of Russia's progress toward democracy and a market economy that was originally suggested by American advisers to Gaydar and by the recommendations of the IMF. It is no accident that the first practical reaction to the elections was the alleviation of IMF recommendations with regard to the permissible rate of reducing inflation.

In rejecting, on the basis of the first two years' results, the Western model for Russia's development, one-fourth of voters swung, in effect, in the direction of the nationalist, neo-imperial model, which basically exists at the level of feelings. This is what has disturbed the West most of all. If the Gaydarites are radical pro-Westerners, then the Zhirinovskiyites clearly have the potential for extreme nationalism. If that potential is not to consolidate and spread, the first extreme must be moderated.

Washington, no longer fixated on the radical democrats, is changing its former concept of opponents and supporters of reform and is now prepared to number among its supporters those who only yesterday it classified as conservatives. Of course, Russian nationalism in power in a weakened and disintegrated country is no match for the globalism of the Soviet superpower in the recent past, but it could be more dangerous, by virtue of its immature, unpredictable, suicidal knee-jerk reactions. The sense of national humiliation which many Russians feel and which is in some ways exacerbated by the spectacle of the model of a way of life imposed from outside, is fertile soil for ultranationalism.

This most dangerous scenario, for the West, of the development of events looks unlikely at the moment, but adding to the mistakes already made is playing with fire. Zhirinovskiy's apparently buffoonish nationalism could be followed by a more "serious" kind. As a well-known commentator writes in the LOS ANGELES TIMES, "President Yeltsin's advisers were suggesting a few days before the elections that Mr. Zhirinovskiy is just a clown. But that clown runs a parade in which lions, tigers, elephants, frogs, and monsters could take part."

Unlike his journalist compatriot ("Russia, you've been a fool!"), Strobe Talbott, until recently a commentator for TIME magazine and now the State Department's chief "coordinator" for the CIS, cannot permit himself such a familiar vocabulary with either his own or Russia's electorate. His definition of the election results is terser and more accurate: "A classic protest vote." His recommendation to the Russian leadership is formulated in the same style, but entirely comprehensibly—that it should take account of the "human misery index."

It is hardly fortuitous that Talbott publicly defined Washington's official stance for the first time just two days before Yeltsin's news conference on the results of the elections. The White House wanted the Kremlin to know what it was and take it into account in advance.

With Talbott as the mouthpiece, the Clinton administration admitted what hitherto it had ignored, what it had refused to admit: The reforms in the form in which they are being implemented at the present time are being accompanied by major failures, disorders, and misfortunes for the average citizen of Russia." "Adjustments and reappraisals" are essential.

And so the first lesson that Washington has now learned and which is being impressed upon Moscow is that the "social factor" must be introduced into the course of reform.

The second conclusion is much narrower for us, but it is interesting and important too. Official American representatives are not stressing it insofar as it concerns the prestige of the Clinton administration. Its prestige has suffered. Toward the end of his first year in office, the new U.S. President has portrayed the correctness of his course regarding Russia as the most important achievement in foreign policy which has been all the more precious because of the lengthening list of vexatious "setbacks"—in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti.

The responsibility of Clinton's team for the former dogged reluctance to notice the aforementioned "failures" and "disorders" in the reform and the "misfortunes" and "difficulties" of Russia's citizens has become obvious. After the elections, Washington retained its support for Yeltsin but it lost its former unconditional and unreserved nature. It was precisely these features in that support which had added to the Kremlin master's uncompromising stance and for a whole year served to exacerbate the polarization both in Russian society as a whole and also between the president and the Supreme Soviet. We all know how this ended. And the American line played a part in the election results even if one should not exaggerate the degree of its influence on Russian affairs.

Despite the initial calculations, President Clinton, in coming to Moscow in mid-January, just like Vice President Gore in December, immediately after the elections, will not be coming to a celebration by the radical democrats. A couple of days before he flies in, the new parliament will be opening, elected at the first really free elections. Its legitimacy will be fresher than that of the president. And so? In this, a scrupulously legitimate parliament, those whom it was customary in Washington to call reformers are in the minority and those who were

categorized as antireformers, conservatives, and worse still—the reds and browns—are in the majority.

The American democrats have once already stretched the concept of democracy to suit the Russians by including in it the bombardment of the parliament by tanks. What is to be done now?

Here we have reached another very important shift in Washington's stance. The unreserved support for Yeltsin has come to an end and the very concept of reformers has been adjusted and broadened. Talbott says: "U.S. policy will be geared not just to Yeltsin but to all the reformers in parliament too. And he said: The United States "supports...the process itself in which many people are participating." These people may not agree with each other and may have different interests, but "to a greater or lesser degree" they are reformers.

Democrats from various blocs still cannot reach agreement among themselves even when faced by Zhirinovskiy, but Washington has already resolved the problem for itself by certifying Yavlinskiy and Shakhray as reformers and by giving notice of its desire to cooperate with them. Under this new approach, it is thought that "Women of Russia" have a good chance of ending up in the category of reformers (or reformeresses?) and likewise the Agrarians, and why not Travkin (but in that case what should be done about Goverukhin?). Otherwise the government appointed by the president will not have a parliamentary majority.

Let us sum up the conclusions drawn by the West from the Russian elections. First, treat Russia more cautiously! The enthusiasm for liberal radicalism has engendered the danger of nationalist extremism, while disregard for the unique features of a vast state whose history spans a thousand years and which was a superpower until only yesterday creates the effect of a boomerang flying toward the West. Second, Washington's policy, which sets the tone for others, is pragmatically changing in line with the new circumstances.

And then third—the most important, the toughest, the most "imponderable." What can the West actually do? Not much. It could eliminate the excesses in policy which provoked the exacerbation of internal Russian confrontation, but how is it to find the lever, the fulcrum outside Russia which would make it possible to extricate it from the crisis? There is no such lever or fulcrum in sight. Furthermore, the Western leaders lack both the resources and the will to offer help which would indicate something tangible, noticeable, definite. The resumed talks on this issue evoke in Russia not hope but annoyance and derision because there is no point in making empty promises of manna from heaven time after time. And even if the question of foreign aid was raised during the election campaign, it was not by the democrats in power (they had nothing to show) but by Zhirinovskiy and other radical critics of the regime (who emphasized that there was nothing to show).

Since there is no likelihood of a "Marshall Plan" for Russia, the West is left only with the concept of small steps to help a sensible advance toward a market economy. They could be useful although, by dint of their insignificance against the background of the gigantic problems, they will hardly produce any political dividends in the struggle against that which worries Russia's partners most of all—ultranationalism.

In this event, it will be the military-political rather than the economic aspect that will again move to the foreground. The East European and Baltic states took advantage of the election results, using them as a weighty argument to advance their admission in NATO. This argument was to a certain extent reinforced by the hysteria and panic which developed in Moscow in the wake of Zhirinovskiy's victory.

Moscow is against NATO's expansion in the immediate future. Washington also seems to be against it and to be carefully considering Moscow's opinion, but the U.S. political elite has essentially already arrived at a consensus against giving Moscow the right to veto NATO's expansion. NATO Secretary General Woerner has already spoken to this effect, having met with Yeltsin during the Russian president's visit to Brussels.

Now Clinton is due to appear in Moscow immediately following the January summit meeting of NATO member states' leaders in Brussels. Judging by everything, he will "comply with" Yeltsin's request to delay bringing the world's sole remaining military-political bloc to the immediate vicinity of the Russian borders. The Russian leadership is also toying with the idea of ultimately joining this bloc, but what will happen then with China, which is following its own path toward superpower status? How will it react to NATO approaching—via Russia—the Chinese border?

But let us not stray too far beyond our topic. The general conclusion is: If Russia does not come to terms "with itself," if no foreign aid is to be found capable of bringing it to terms with itself, and if no balance of forces —as perceived by the West—is to be found to ensure the legitimate Russian interests in the geopolitical area of the former USSR, the West will be unable to avoid a new version of the "containment strategy."

Kozyrev Comments on Upcoming Clinton Visit

LD2912170393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1510 GMT 29 Dec 93

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

As Interfax learned from sources in Russia's foreign ministry, on Sunday [2 January] Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov will fly to Washington as part of preparations for President Clinton's visit to Moscow scheduled for January 12-15.

In an interview with Interfax a senior foreign ministry official said that no "large-scale" documents would be

signed during the next Russian-American summit. It is possible, though, that as a result of the upcoming meeting between presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton several joint statements, particularly on the present state of Russian-American relations and their prospects, as well as on the two sides' attitude to the problem of nuclear non- proliferation, will be issued, he said.

According to the diplomat, the program for Bill Clinton's visit to Moscow has not been coordinated yet. "It's not clear yet where the American president will stay and what audience he will address. It has not been decided where the top-level talks will be held, in the Kremlin alone or in Boris Yeltsin's out-of-town residence," he said. "In fact, Mamedov is going to Washington to coordinate these issues."

The head of Russian diplomacy, Andrey Kozyrev, told Russian journalists recently that the upcoming Russian-American summit would reflect the new level of partnership between the two countries. "The previous Russian-American summits bore imprints of the past in one form or another (problems connected with nuclear arms, confrontation in different areas of the world, etc.). The forthcoming summit is designed to outline the contours of bilateral cooperation and partnership for the time left before the next century," Kozyrev said.

Article Assesses Talbott's New Appointment

PM3012110793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Dec 93 First Edition p 3

[Vladimir Nadein article: "It Is Good to Share a Room With a Future President. Strobe Talbott, the 'Architect of Russian Policy,' Takes Up America's Number Two Diplomatic Post"]

[Text] Washington—The present administration's chief specialist on the affairs of the former Soviet Union has been appointed to the number two post in the State Department.

There is much that is unusual about S. Talbott's diplomatic career.

Two years ago, as a 45-year-old professional journalist working for TIME magazine in a position roughly equivalent to a "political observer" in our country, he was unexpectedly appointed to a post specially created for him at the State Department: ambassador at large.

Talbott's duties included the development, coordination, and practical implementation of the whole range of U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the collapsed Soviet empire: the countries of the former Union, the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, post-Soviet-U.S. relations, disarmament, nonproliferation, economic aid...

Talbott's main achievement was his unerring prediction of political developments in Russia. His accurate forecast made it possible to formulate and consistently implement a confident program which is supported by both main parties and the overwhelming majority of legislators. Perhaps Talbott's only error which caused a mild but short-lived commotion was his failure to predict Zhirinovskiy's success.

Talbott's main weakness according to his critics (although not according to Talbott himself!) is his excessively strong leaning toward Russia and his overestimation of its significance for the fate of this part of the world and the world in general. At a time of tight budget restrictions watched over by the U.S. Congress, Talbott is campaigning for increased material aid to Russia. "This is now more important than ever," he said a few days ago.

Talbott is disinclined to blame the Russian democratic leaders for the outcome of the recent parliamentary elections. Without denying their mistakes, which he prefers not to dwell on at length, he calls their activity "titanic." He was always very guarded about the prospect of early Russian presidential elections and, as I understand it, greeted with relief Boris Yeltsin's decision in the present situation to remain in office until the very end of his constitutional term.

Surely more than anyone else in the U.S. political establishment, Talbott understands that Russia's peacemaking efforts in this part of the world are indispensable. The crucial thing, in his opinion, is not the participation or nonparticipation of Russian servicemen in operations outside Russia but what kind of country Russia itself is going to be. If it is democratic then even such a complex problem as the plight of the 25 million Russians in the nearby foreign countries can be resolved. But if Russia reverts to Soviet imperialism the result will be its complete isolation in the world.

The personal friendship between President Clinton and Ambassador Talbott is no secret to anyone. They shared student accommodation at Oxford University. When Clinton, as governor of Arkansas, visited Washington he usually stayed at Talbott's home when the latter was chief of the New York-published TIME magazine's Washington office.

Preferring a man of ideas to people of experience, the Secretary of State hopes to turn him into his "alter ego." As a journalist Talbott certainly possesses a talent which Christopher, the academic and diplomat, patently lacks: the ability to put his opinions across in the mass media and in particular on television.

At the same time, when he was a student with Clinton at Oxford, TIME, which he began to work for as a freelance writer, commissioned him to translate *Khrushchev Remembers*—a book which the former Soviet leader dictated onto tape—into English and prepare them for publication.

Talbott earned universal recognition as the "architect" of America's policy toward Russia thanks to his bold—not to say impetuous [bezoglyadnoy]—policy, under

which President Yeltsin has been given comprehensive and swift political support. Such a risk would hardly have been permitted a diplomat of his former rank had he not had direct access to the president's office.

The latter fact, by all accounts, will stand Strobe Talbott in good stead.

'Far-Reaching Consequences' Possible

PM3012095593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Dec 93 pp 1, 3

[Own correspondent Vladislav Drobkov report: "Strobe Talbott on the Rise"]

[Text] Washington, 29 Dec—This time the "dead season," which is what the short period between Christmas and New Year usually is in Washington, has brought a sensation, albeit a small one. Warren Christopher, who is on vacation in California, announced yesterday that Strobe Talbott, until recently his assistant and ambassador at large, is to take up the number two post in the U.S. State Department. He becomes deputy secretary of state.

According to local press reports and the testimony of State Department and White House sources, Christopher himself chose Talbott to fill the vacancy that arose a few weeks ago with the not entirely voluntary departure of Clifton Wharton from the post. Moreover, the 47-year-old Talbott keeps the post of chief coordinator of U.S. policy on Russia—ranging from problems of nuclear disarmament to humanitarian aid.

Thus the "Russian direction" of U.S. foreign policy is gaining prio[illegible]atus, as it were, ahead of U.S. President Bill C[illegible]'s visit to Russia, which was officially announced [illegible]oscow and Washington the other day. This is extremely significant, especially when you recall that in the first months of the Clinton administration, problems of Russian-American relations were pushed into the background by the war in Bosnia, Washington's unsuccessful attempt to use force to resolve the conflict in Somalia, and the protracted crisis in Haiti.

Malicious tongues claim that the immediate reason why Russia has returned to the epicenter of U.S. diplomacy is the failure of the Washington-supported Russian reformers in the recent parliamentary elections, which was as unexpected here as it was obvious. According to THE WASHINGTON POST, Talbott's new appointment came after two weeks of upheavals for Washington's foreign policy vis-a-vis Moscow. The newspaper writes that the successful performance in the elections by the "nationalists and other antireform candidates...shattered confidence in reformist President Boris Yeltsin's ability to remain in power and the belief that exclusive U.S. support for him is a policy beyond question."

The emergence of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and his Liberal Democratic Party into the limelight on the Russian political stage caused such shock in the United States that people here have taken a fresh look at the erstwhile superpower and former potential enemy number one, which had virtually been written off as being of no account. So clearly Strobe Talbott has equally to "thank" for his current promotion both his old friend Bill Clinton and his scarcely close recent acquaintance Vladimir Volfovich....

Be that as it may, Talbott's promotion to the number two post in the U.S. State Department may have far-reaching consequences for Russian-American relations. Strobe Talbott is certainly one of the most gifted and experienced specialists on affairs in the "new independent states," or NIS, as the fragments of the Soviet Union, Russia included, are now called here.

Strobe Talbott's acquaintance with our country began back in senior grades at school in the sixties. Talbott had a passion for Russian poetry and even made it the subject of his dissertation at Yale. The able graduate of Yale and Oxford Universities (at the latter he not only studied with Bill Clinton but roomed with him) later became a well-known journalist specializing in international affairs, popular commentator, diplomatic correspondent, and bureau chief and editor of TIME magazine.

Judging by the many briefings and speeches by Talbott I have witnessed, he remains an advocate of giving every possible U.S. support to Boris Yeltsin and other Russian reformers. At the same time he makes no secret of the fact that this support, like the whole of U.S. foreign policy, is aimed at safeguarding the United States' own national interests. This is not "charity" toward Russia, Talbott has repeatedly argued to congressmen, who take an increasingly skeptical view of U.S. aid to foreign states. U.S. aid to Yeltsin and his government is now more necessary than ever, he declared the other day, commenting on the Russian election results. At the same time Talbott has often declared that the United States must support not specific individuals, but the reform process.

According to administration sources, Strobe Talbott takes quite a tolerant view of Russian claims to a special role in resolving conflicts in the former USSR republics, now independent states. He apparently does not share the misgivings increasingly often voiced here about a revival of "Russian imperialism."

Grachev Comments on Cooperation With NATO

LD2912153593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1440 GMT 29 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS observer Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Dec—"We treat with understanding each state's striving to choose independently its path toward ensuring its security. Joining military and political alliances can be such an option. However, we would not like eastern European and Baltic states to speculate on a mythical threat from Russia, and we do not comprehend their striving to find protection from Russia by

joining NATO." This is what Army General Pavel Grachev, defense minister, told an ITAR-TASS observer today regarding Russia-NATO relations.

The head of the country's military department stressed that Russia proceeds from the fact that "our relations with NATO should be stepped up and should develop across a wide range of interaction." Grachev said that during Boris Yeltsin's recent visit to Brussels, Grachev met the NATO leadership. "We agreed to set up a group of experts which is to submit in January a joint plan for military-political and military cooperation between Russia and NATO." Early in the year, Pavel Grachev went on, I am invited to visit NATO to explain to the top command provisions of the country's military doctrine. "If the Russian president instructs me so, I am ready to sign a relevant agreement on behalf of the government," the defense minister remarked.

BNS Cites Remarks

WS3012124393 Tallinn BNS in English 1604 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Moscow, Dec 29, BNS—Russia is going to withdraw its forces from Estonia and Latvia in 1994, in order to avoid the Baltics appealing for an early NATO membership because of military threat from the East, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said.

Grachev, speaking in a press conference today, said every country, including the Baltics, had the right to chose the means for ensuring its national security. He said one possible way of doing this was membership in military and political blocs.

Nevertheless, he said, "we wouldn't like that the countries of central Eastern Europe, but also the Baltics, speculated that a mythical military threat might come from Russia. We do not apprehend their strive to defend themselves against Russia with NATO membership," he said.

The Russian defense minister said his country welcomed the decision by a foreign ministers meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels on Dec. 3, 1993 to drop from the agenda the issue of possible NATO membership of the countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltics.

Grachev said Russia was favoring a path of development that would lead to a real all-European system of security. This means collective security, but not on bloc membership criteria, he said.

The minister said Russia in its actions was proceeding from the principle that its relations with NATO had to develop "on a wide spectre of inter-action." He said the process of Russia's moving closer to NATO had to go on at a quick pace. He added that also the countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltics could join in the process. Grachev said groups of experts from NATO and Russia were scheduled to meet to work out a plan for cooperation between NATO and Russia. An agreement on the issue is expected to be signed in Helsinki at the end of January, he added.

Conflict Zones Seen as Major Threat in Coming Year

LD3012131193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1218 GMT 30 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow December 30 TASS—"One of the principal threats to the current Russian authorities in the New Year will be the zones of conflicts in which Russia is involved economically and militarily," ITAR-TASS was told by nationalities policy expert, member of the Presidential Council Emil Pain.

"Inter-ethnic conflicts," he noted, "give rise to massive flows of refugees who, as a rule, dislike the present authorities. Moreover, they give rise to negative tendencies among the population. The Zhirinovskiy 'syndrome' should not be overlooked, too, because he makes political capital by speculating on the problem of geopolitical relations and the issue of Russians in the former soviet republics".

Proceeding from this, Pain recommends the Russian leaders to "pay special attention to the zones of conflicts", because, in his opinion, 1994 will return Russia again to the situation that existed in the country in 1991, when the problem of inter-ethnic conflicts was most acute. Pain's prediction is based on an analysis of a whole line of dangerously brewing conflicts.

"The greatest danger," he presumes, "may be posed by Tajikistan. The economic crisis and the continuing break-up of that state with its steady disintegrational processes arouse the population's dissatisfaction both with the Tajik authorities and with the CIS peacemaking forces. The armed underground resistance inside the country and the armed opposition outside it are gaining strength. I possess information that January and February may be marked by a growing wave of terroristic acts in that republic, and more attacks on borderguards may be expected in the spring. If no urgent measures are taken, the war may be resumed by summertime at the 1992 scale, when more than 50,000 people were killed in a matter of nine months.

Socio-economic relations may aggravate the inter-regional situation in Ukraine and in northern Kazakhstan," Pain believes. "The Russian authorities are unprepared to oppose this threat. They have no concept of preventive political measures or of reaction to various aggravations of the internal political situation in neighbouring republics. Everything that happens there, will without doubt, affect the interests of Russia, including economic, migrational, and military," the expert warns.

"The northern Caucasus and the Volga regions will remain the most painful problem inside Russia," he added.

Summing up the abovesaid, the expert arrived at the conclusion that "all the problems, arising from territorial disputes, should by no means be solved by recarving borders. There is quite a number of other ways to do it, including dual citizenship, establishment of zones with special economic regimes, etc. A new concept of the Commonwealth of Independent States could be offered for consideration, namely its transformation into a confederation, which would lead to a new, voluntary and apprehended integration of the former republics of the USSR. Be what it may, the situation with conflict zones is not fatal. It merely calls for more vigorous political action."

Need for Review of Policy Toward Neighbors Seen

MK2912121093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 52, 31 Dec 93 (Signed to press 28 Dec) p 7A

[Report by Sergey Rogov, deputy director of the Institute for Studies of the U.S.A. and Canada: "A Boomerang Effect]

[Text] The crushing defeat of "Russia's Choice" and the impressive success of Zhirinovskiy at the recent elections are attributable not only to economic and political destabilization inside the country. The situation has been compounded by the fact that our foreign policy has been exacerbating the internal political crisis. Here, too, attempts to engage in party politics, not to pursue a policy based on national consensus, have brought about results as bad as they have in domestic affairs.

The results of the two years proved to be somewhat mixed for Russia. At present it does not have enemies, but neither does it have reliable allies capable of giving it support in the hour of need. Promises of large-scale assistance by the IMF and the World Bank, which were cited to justify many painful internal economic measures, have in fact been reduced to purely token amounts. The prospects of NATO's expansion and the bloc's drawing closer to our western borders have also emerged.

Our partners have gradually ceased to pay heed to Russia's interests. More and more often we find ourselves isolated on the world scene. Russia risks definitively losing the status of a great power. But it could have hardly been otherwise: appealing to the feelings of generosity and compassion or to anticommunist rhetoric in international affairs is too shaky a ground for conducting foreign policy. If Russia itself has not gotten around to defending its legitimate interests, its partners will not take care of them, either.

Manifest violations of the Russian-speaking population's rights have gone virtually unnoticed by the West. Japan's territorial claims to Russia have not drawn protests from Western states. Nor has Russia been given any palpable assistance in its efforts to set up a barrier against Islamic fundamentalism in Tajikistan. Finally, the Western countries' stance with regard to Ukraine's unwillingness to recognize strategic nuclear weapons deployed on its territory as Russia's property appears fairly ambiguous.

The greatest setback occurred in Russia's relations with the newly independent countries. A "civilized divorce" has not come about. As a result Russia has found itself entirely surrounded by instability. Vital economic ties have been broken; this was a decisive factor in causing a downturn in Russia itself and bringing most other republics to the brink of a catastrophe. Bloody conflicts in the Dniester Region, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Karabakh, and Tajikistan could not be averted. Numerous matters concerning the splitting up of the Soviet "military legacy," including nuclear arms, have not been resolved. Instability in "the near abroad" is fraught with serious threats to Russia's own security. Hotbeds of conflicts have already emerged throughout the North Caucasus.

The foreign policy situation that has come about all around Russia by no means helps to lift the country out of the deepening internal political and socioeconomic crisis. Currently, one cannot but see clearly that the sluggish, ill-conceived foreign policy has been playing into the hands of the opponents of reform and democracy in Russia. It is this situation that Zhirinovskiy managed to exploit by appealing to the offended feeling of national self- consciousness and by resucitating imperial stereotypes.

Russia's revival requires an active defense of Russia's vital interests abroad. If this is to be achieved, neither the posture of eternal repentance nor a recurrence of imperial policies will do. At the same time, Russia will have to make certain economic concessions to its partners in the newly independent countries. Their dependence on Russian energy resources and raw materials should not be used as a tool to infringe on the newly independent states' national dignity. Our neighbors' economic collapse—whether in Ukraine, the Transcaucasus, or Central Asia—will leave Russian industry without suppliers and customers.

Unless we change our attitude to the CIS, with a view to creating an economic and military political alliance with the former Union republics in deed and not just word, the foreign policy boomerang will hit our internal affairs even harder by arousing the tide of nationalism that has already been sweeping the country.

We need reliable allies in both the near and far abroad. Russia cannot and should not be a "superpower," but in a multipolar world we can survive only as a center of power along with such centers as the United States, Germany, Japan, and China. Our country's geopolitical situation is unique because, unless we manage to overcome the centrifugal trends within a relatively short historical run, we may end up being an object of rivalry among those same centers of power.

Russia cannot tolerate matters it sees as crucial being decided without it or, moreover, against it. Such an approach will make it possible to cut the ground from under great-power chauvinism. To stop Zhirinovskiy, one does not need to go into hysterics, but it is time to learn not to mix up vital and secondary interests. To this end, it is essential to provide a broad multiparty support base for foreign policy; otherwise it will continue to destabilize the internal political situation in the country.

'Fairly Tough' Stance Promised To Protect Russians in CIS

LD2912204693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2022 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Russia will be pursuing a "fairly tough" economic and financial policy towards countries where the rights of Russian-speaking communities are violated, according to a draft document on Russia's social policy for 1994.

The draft, a copy of which Interfax received on Wednesday [29 December], does not explain that statement but says the government will take "every measure that is possible" to protect the rights and interests of Russian speakers in former Soviet republics.

The document contains a section on the migration of labor, which says a set of political, legal and technical measures will be carried out to provide reliable social security for Russians working abroad or returning home.

Measures are also planned to regulate labor migration into Russia and stop the illegal use of foreign labor to give more job opportunities to Russians.

The draft says all bodies dealing with transnational labor migration must be registered in 1994 and put under systematic control.

The number of working handicapped people has fallen in the past few years, the document says. Some 57 percent of the handicapped were working in 1992, as compared to 85 percent in 1982.

The document says about 3.5 Mn people are today working in conditions which fail to meet safety requirements. Another five million are working under deleterious conditions. As a result, 30 people die and over 50 are disabled at work every day. Every year, about 400,000 accidents occur at Russian enterprises.

Kazakhstan Said To Ban Registration of Russian Communities

LD3012071093

[Editorial Report] Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian at 0520 GMT on 30 December carries a recorded interview with Dmitriy Olegovich Rogozhin, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Congress of Russian Communities, by correspondent Svetlana Sokovnina, who asks Rogozhin about "an official report" the congress received from Kazakhstan.

Rogozhin says that this latest report states that the justice minister of Kazakhstan has signed order No. 31, abolishing the registration of all Russian organizations and all Russian communities in Kazakhstan, and that measures have been taken to ban any manifestations and any initiatives connected with the organization of the Russian population in Kazakhstan. He says there is alarming information that the Russians will be forced to defend themselves because of the banning of all these Russian organizations, Russian communities, and the Cossacks—which make up half of all Kazakhstan's inhabitants. Rogozhin says, "As they are capable of doing this, as they can do this, we are therefore coming up against the problem of a possible new hotspot emerging in the north of Kazakhstan."

Rogozhin says that unlike the official propaganda picture of the situation in Kazakhstan as being somehow idyllic and serene, with all peoples living in peace and accord, the situation there now is different. He says: "Now it is a situation which simply threatens, as I have said, an explosion, and in that case Russia, say, Omsk Oblast and Russian Siberia, will come up against a huge flow of refugees. Therefore, we cannot allow this to happen."

Kazakh Decree Dismissing Semipalatinsk Commander 'Illegal'

LD2912234793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2005 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Lieutenant General Yuriy Konovalenko remains in charge of the Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, test site, officials in the Russian Defense Ministry's Information and Press Department told Interfax. They described the Kazakh President's decree relieving the general from command of the Russian unit stationed there as "illegal."

Konovalenko, who is on leave in Moscow, told Interfax that the Kazakh military prosecutor's office accused him of "systematic abuse of power for selfish purposes" and harming that country. He flatly denied the charges. "As a general officer with a flawless record of 39 years in the Armed Forces, I am offended. I think that a more civilized way to resolve issues in the test site could be found," Konovalenko said.

The specific charges against him include selling old hardware and buildings and transfer of hardware to Russian units in Kazakhstan without clearing this with the Kazakh State Property Committee. Konovalenko emphasized that he did not have self-interest in mind and the property was Russian. Even though the test site had been declared Kazakhstan's property, no legal instrument to this effect has been forthcoming.

The Russian Prosecutor General's Office asked its Kazakh counterpart for access to the case against Konovalenko. A senior official in the Military Prosecutor General's Office told Interfax that the chief cause of trouble was lack of proper documents on the status of Russian servicemen and conditions of their stay in foreign countries. He said that "one cannot say for sure that a Russian servicemen who is out of favor with local officials will not end up behind bars outside Russia."

Estonia Said Reasserting Claims to Russian Areas

PM3012150593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Dec 93 First Edition p 6

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] According to reports from Tallinn a legal basis is being prepared in Estonia within the framework of so-called restitution for paying citizens of the republic, who were previously landowners, compensation for the land expropriated from them after 1940. In so doing the Estonian authorities intend to determine the value of land which is outside the Estonian state's jurisdiction—that is, to put it mildly, land which does not belong to this country.

The draft law, sent by the Estonian Government to the State Assembly, mentions Pechora and the land beyond the Narva River, which have been Russian since time immemorial and lie within Pskov and Leningrad Oblasts in the Russian Federation. It is not in essence a question of the Estonian Government's financial obligations toward those of their citizens who "suffered as a result of the Soviet occupation," as the Estonian side is trying to make out, but of the continuing claims for Russian land.

In the opinion of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the inclusion in this draft law of clauses concerning land belonging to another state can only be interpreted as an act running counter to international law and aimed at aggravating bilateral relations.

It is possible that in their future work on the draft law, common sense and an aspiration to stick to the obligations which Estonia undertook when it joined the United Nations, the CSCE, and the Council of Europe will nevertheless prevail among Estonian politicians. At least, experience has taught the people that it is possible to live without a brother but not without a neighbor. Is it worth fencing themselves off with an "iron curtain" once more?

Talks With Ukraine Marked by 'Understanding'

LD2912180793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1642 GMT 29 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Dec (ITAR-TASS)—A working meeting of delegations from the Defense Ministries of Russia and Ukraine on military cooperation between the two countries, which lasted for two days, ended today in Moscow. An ITAR-TASS correspondent has learned from the department of information and press of the Russian Defense Ministry that the Russian delegation was headed by Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Boris Gromov and the Ukrainian delegation by Deputy Defense Minister Col. Gen. Ivan Oleynik. The participants decided to finalize as soon as possible and to submit a draft agreement on military cooperation between Russia and Ukraine for signing by the heads of governments of the two states. The delegations agreed to continue consultations on the question of order and terms for the handing over of nuclear warheads by Ukraine to Russia in order to eliminate and utilize them in the future and to ensure nuclear security in Ukraine. Both sides agreed to concentrate their attention on modernizing the mechanisms for the implementation of documents that had been signed by Russia and Ukraine earlier.

It has been noted that, as a whole, the working meeting between the military ministries was held in the spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding.

Electricity Supplies to Abkhazia Resumed

LD3012100193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0601 GMT 30 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Rudolf Gladkikh]

[Text] Moscow December 30 TASS—Russia met the Abkhazian request and resumed electricity supplies to the rebel region of Georgia on Wednesday [29 December], TASS learned from Andrey Dzhergeniya, a personal envoy of the chairman of the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet who added that most Abkhazians view the resumption of electricity supplies as a New Year present of the Russian Santa Claus.

Russia introduced economic sanctions against Abkhazia after it violated the Moscow-brokered ceasefire agreement with Georgia and seized Sukhumi.

The electricity is now provided round the clock for that part of Abkhazia which stretches from the border with Russia down to Sukhumi. Earlier the supplies were occasional.

The part of Abkhazia east of Sukhumi receives electricity from the power plant on the Inguri river which is the border with Georgia.

Churkin Explains New Plan for Bosnia

AU2912200293 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Dec 93 p 5

[Djuro Bilbija report on interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin by unidentified correspondent "especially for BORBA"; place and date not given: "Sanctions Are Falling Even Before the Signature"]

[Text] Speculation about the contents of Moscow's new plan for regulating the Yugoslav crisis is still rife. Somehow it has "leaked out" that the plan's central points are: a formula for lifting the sanctions against the FRY before the signing of the peace plan for Bosnia, and an initiative for the normalization of Serb-Croat relations, leaving the problem of the political status of Krajina for later....

With this in mind, it would be natural to start the interview with Vitaliy Churkin, deputy foreign minister of the Russian Federation and Russia's special negotiator in the Yugoslav crisis, with the following question:

[Correspondent] What exactly does Moscow's new plan contain and what indeed does it bring?

[Churkin] We put forward some of our ideas, which I explained in Brussels, on how to arrive at a peace agreement for Bosnia and how to start implementing it as soon as possible. And also how to start the normalization of Serbian and Croatian relations. We hold the view that we should more profoundly and more aggressively exploit the provisions that already exist in the project of the peace agreement, for reviewing specific contentious problems that have not been regulated before the signing of the document at some later stage. Within this global framework there are several new elements. One of them, for instance, is the appeal to the FRY and Croatia to embark on mutual recognition and establish diplomatic relations, and at the same time declare that they will solve the problem concerning the political status of Krajina later. This implies that the most difficult problem would be temporarily and intentionally postponed. I would formulate another important element in the following way: If the Serbian side does not block efforts to achieve and sign the peace agreement on Bosnia, a formula should be devised first to "freeze" and then lift the sanctions against Yugoslavia. Of course, this would be preceded by firmly set clear conditions, which the Serbian side and the FRY would have to respect, while in return, the problem of the sanctions would be settled even before the peace plan for Bosnia were signed. There is another element that could be considered new. Russia takes the view that the Sanctions Committee, immediately after the signing of the peace plan for Bosnia, must meet all the humanitarian demands that it has hitherto blocked.

[Correspondent] How did Western Europe react to the possibility of sanctions being lifted even before the signing of the peace plan?

[Churkin] Naturally, Western Europe reacted differently. I know that some countries are not unsympathetic to this possibility, while others are totally opposed to it. We have now come up with this idea publicly for the first time. This is why I want to stress that its implementation must be followed by strict adherence to the conditions. If these are not consistently observed, sanctions could not be "dismantled." This means that this should not be taken casually, that sanctions would not be lifted just like that, and that life would not continue as if the sanctions never existed.

[Correspondent] Could you be more specific about the conditions that you mention?

[Churkin] I would not want to go into the essence of the problem at this moment, especially because the details of these conditions are yet to be elaborated. However, I can say that one of these conditions could be the withdrawal of the army of the Bosnian Serbs from certain territories that are under their control at present. This would therefore have to be some kind of initially unilateral peace normalization without waiting for the other two sides to agree with the project of the peace agreement, which is still at the negotiating table.

[Correspondent] Are you perhaps referring to some kind of separate Serbian-Muslim agreement?

[Churkin] This is not necessary at all. However, if a formal global solution is still absent after everything that has been done, a solution that would be signed by all the three warring sides, if this solution is absent for whatever reason, then one would have to start thinking about how to arrive at peace even without a global agreement. This is a general idea that will probably require further elaboration, checking, and consultations.

[Correspondent] How do you see Germany's position now that claims are coming from Bonn that the sanctions against the FRY should be lifted in two stages: Those imposed by UN Security Council resolutions should be lifted after the peace plan for Bosnia is signed, while those imposed by the European Community should be linked to the normalization of the situation in Croatia?

[Churkin] That opinion is Germany's business. If the European Union also reasons along those lines, then it is its own position and one on which I do not want to comment. Every country and association of countries has the right to define its attitude toward every situation, to decide with whom it will or will not develop economic ties. This should not be dramatized.

[Correspondent] Have the Geneva and Brussels talks changed anything? What promise do they hold for the continuation of the talks?

[Churkin] First, I hope that there will be at least something resembling a truce in Bosnia until 15 January. I hope that the interrupted negotiations will really be continued then, and that the peace agreement will finally be signed. However, to tell you the truth, the Brussels round caused me some concern because it showed that—and I said this to everyone there—there could be endless bickering over the remaining issues. I also said that I did not want it to go on for ever. That is why I want to say openly that the Serbian side has also not done all the things that it has to do for peace to be reached. It is extremely important, however, that the Serbian side has taken upon itself the responsibility to provide the

Muslim republic with 33.3 percent and the Croats with 17.5 percent of the territory. It is a shame that, during the negotiations between the Serbian and the Muslim sides that took place after talks with the 12 ministers, agreement was not reached on the said percentage for the Muslims as talks faltered over the last 0.4 percent. That is not much, but if the Serbian side wants its position to be completely convincing, then it has to give the 0.4 percent. All the more so as there are other disputes that could go on: Sarajevo, and Muslim access to the Sava River and the sea. My impression is that, if there is a real desire for peace, then the three warring sides are facing some very serious decisions.

[Correspondent] In that respect, how do you see the joint proposal put forward by Tudjman and Milosevic?

[Churkin] It was a very good and important step and it should help regulate the conflict in Bosnia and deblock Serb-Croat relations in general. That is why Russia has come up with the initiative that there should already be steps made toward regulating Serb-Croat relations, establishing diplomatic links, and mutual recognition between the FRY and the Republic of Croatia. The problem of Krajina should be left for future negotiations. These negotiations should begin with the signing of a lasting truce, through normalization of economic links, and then to regulating the political status of Krajina.

[Correspondent] Lord Owen has recently openly criticized Washington's "Bosnian line," almost accusing it of encouraging the Muslims not to sign the peace plan.

[Churkin] I have not heard such a statement by Owen. I know of another, which caused a great stir, but it was formulated differently. That is why I just want to say one thing: I came back from Brussels with another concern, as unfortunately it seems to me that the necessary degree of agreement and decisiveness has still not been reached by the international community to bring things in Bosnia to a close. There is still a kind of vagueness and disparity in the approach to the Bosnian conflict, which allows the warring sides to exploit it to their advantage and therefore continue to squabble endlessly over one and the same thing. So the world bears some responsibility for all this. Still, in my view the warring factions themselves are the ones to be mostly blamed for the continuation of the war, and not the international factors that are trying—some with more success, some with less—to bring the war to an end.

Europe Cannot Cope Without Russia

[Correspondent] Dr. Aleksey Arbatov, director of the Moscow Institute for Geopolitical and Military Studies, recently told BORBA that Russia should stand behind Serbia in the same way as the United States stood behind Israel, as that would give it the possibility to exert more of an influence on the policies of official Belgrade. What do you think about this view?

[Churkin] It seems to me that this statement carries hints of the view, which is typical of part of the Russian intelligentsia, that the Americans are some sort of a "model for imitation," in the following sense: Since that is how they behave in certain cases, Russia should behave the same way in others. However, I do not think that there are any conditions for such parallels. The conflicts that Serbia and Israel are involved in are completely different; they developed differently and in different international circumstances. That is why I do not think that Russia should study "the American experience in the Middle East," and base its Balkan policy on that. Our position is correct. It gives us the opportunity to have contacts with all sides. The fact that at some time or other all the participants in the conflict are angry with us shows that our position is correct. In my view, their anger is unjustified, as we act in a balanced and thoughtful way, keeping in mind primarily the interests of regulating the conflict itself. After all, despite the anger, we have managed to continue dialogue with all the sides, although I have so far been in Belgrade more often (10 to 11 times) than in Zagreb (five times) or Sarajevo (three times), and Mr. Boban has half-jokingly but persistently been criticizing me for not coming to Mostar. I was again convinced in Brussels that no serious European problems can or will be solved without Russia. Europe simply cannot cope without Russia, and it is a serious mistake to think that it should be distanced from Russia, and that a smaller Russia is the better for Europe. That would be the most essential mistake that would produce the most serious consequences possible for European security and even the continent in general.

India To Receive 4 Cryogenic Boosters for Rocket

LD3012121293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1135 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] Russia pledges to supply to India at least four more cryogenic boosters for a SLV-3 rocket, twice more than stipulated by the 1991 contract.

As the General Director of Russia's Space Agency Yuriy Koptev has told INTERFAX, an agreement on additional supplies has been reached at negotiations in Bangalore between Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) officials and Russian experts earlier this month.

In Koptev's words, India will get two more boosters as compensation for Russia's forced repeal of the additional agreements as incompatible with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), accords that provide for the delivery of cryogenic technology and equipment to Delhi and for Indian specialists' training.

Thereby, Koptev said, "Russia has kept virtually intact the volume of financing" envisaged by the contract and its addenda and estimated at $220 Mn. The first booster is to be supplied in 1995.

In Koptev's opinion, putting relations with ISRO on a footing in line MTCR, which Russia intends to join, has not had any adverse effect on bilateral cooperation, which is borne out by the two countries short-term plan to sign an intergovernmental agreement in the field.

Diplomat Dismisses Idea of Compensation for Afghanistan

LD2912171993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1510 GMT 29 Dec 93

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] As a great power, Russia will let no one use "the language of ultimatums and compensation" when speaking with it, said a senior member of the Russian Foreign Ministry in comments on a recent statement made by the Afghan Consul in Tajikistan, Mohammad Umar Asir. Precisely 14 years since Soviet troops were deployed in Afghanistan, the consul declared that his country had the moral right to demand that Russia pay a contribution to it.

"Russia has condemned the former Soviet Union for what it did in Afghanistan, but it has no intention of bearing material responsibility for what the previous regime did," the foreign ministry official said.

In his view, the Afghan consul must have made his statement just to impress the public.

According to the Russian diplomat, Afghan leaders, President Borhanoddin Rabbani for one, also speak in this vein sometimes. "However the Afghan side has never raised this issue in the course of official contacts with Russian officials," he pointed out.

He said "it is impossible to determine the scope of the damage done," and this is another factor which makes the very idea of compensation pointless. "The war in Afghanistan did not end with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from there in 1989, and now no one can say what damage was done by the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and what losses were inflicted by the war continuing between the various mojaheddin factions," the diplomat concluded.

Kuwaiti Premier Receives Naval Commander Gromov

LD2912172093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1559 GMT 29 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Refael Bikbayev]

[Text] Cairo December 29 TASS—Prime Minister of Kuwait Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah received Commander-in- Chief of the Russian Federation Navy Admiral Feliks Gromov today. The admiral is heading a squadron of Russian ships which is at present visiting the emirate.

Ways of developing cooperation in the military sphere between the two countries were discussed during the talks, according to a "SAWT AL-'ARAB" radio [as received] report. A meeting between Kuwaiti Defence Minister 'Ali Al-Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah and the russian admiral was also devoted to the same topic.

Admiral Gromov and the delegation accompanying him were present at the first joint Russo-Kuwaiti naval exercises "Rikka-1" now underway in the emirate's territorial waters.

Ambassador-Designate to ROK Views Korean Issues

SK3012132493 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean 1000 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Interview with Georgiy Kunadze, deputy foreign minister and ambassador- designate to the ROK, by Mikhail Kedov; place and date not given—recorded; from the "Focus on Asia" program Kedov's questions are read by announcer in Korean and Kunadze speaks in Russian with superimposed Korean translation]

[Text] [Kedov] Mr. Ambassador Georgiy Kunadze, how do you appraise the Russian-ROK relations?

[Kunadze] We can say that the Russian-ROK relations, based on a general set of values such as a principle for democracy and the market economy, are very positive. The three-year-long diplomatic relations have been based on stable experiences. We can say that these three years has been a period of getting out of a certain vain dream [kongsang] and excessive expectations. Our relations today are based not on temporary interests but on a long-term prospects.

We cannot deny that the diplomatic relations established in 1990 have brought considerable political benefits to both Russia and the ROK.

[Kedov] The situation on the Korean peninsula is complex. How do you think the issues concerning the Korean peninsula will be resolved?

[Kunadze] [Words indistinct] mean the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have maintained a very principled attitude toward the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Russia has absolutely objected to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is our principled position to absolutely object to the presence of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.

A certain guarantee is necessary to prevent the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. Strictly observing the direction [chisi] of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] will bring such a guarantee. Thus, we have held that all agreements reached between the DPRK and the IAEA should be strictly observed. No excuse should be allowed because of the circumstances of a nation. The conditions of the IAEA's demands should be equally applied to all countries.

First, the IAEA should strongly put forward very objective and detailed conditions for its demands. Second, the IAEA should absolutely support the declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula signed between the DPRK and the ROK.

We recognize that because the declaration of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was adopted, the North-South dialogue to resolve the nuclear issue will be held. The North-South dialogue will make the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons a more reliable process. The denuclearization of the Korean penninsula is a policy that can completely conform to the interests of the DPRK, the ROK, Russia, and other countries.

[Kedov] How should the nuclear issue be resolved?

[Kunadze] Speaking hypothetically, if a country violates the order established by the international body, the country should be subjected to appropriate measures immediately. In this sense, if the DPRK sticks to a hard-line position and goes against the international community, the international community should examine what additional measures should be taken. However, in real practice it is not merely decided by a hypothetical [word indistinct]. I think that it is still too early to impose sanctions on the DPRK.

Why should they be provoked on purpose? We can clearly guess the aftermath resulting from any sanction applied without an agreement of the countries in the world. Sanctions will end in failure, without any result. Therefore, I will not mention sanctions any further.

Russia's principled position is that Russia is not unconditionally against the international community even though it supports a certain country, unlike its past position. The age of such confrontation is gone. [Words indistinct] companions should not forget this position. When I say this, I have the DPRK in mind, above all.

[Kedov] When relations between the ROK and Russia improve, what happens to relations between Moscow and Pyongyang?

[Kunadze] It is besides the question for us to make a choice between the North or the South today. Russia is trying to establish friendly relations [sollin kwangye] with both Pyongyang and Seoul. It is true, however, that our relations with the DPRK are facing objective difficulties [kaekkwanjogin nangwan]. Russia and the DPRK still have ideological differences of opinion, above all [uson sasangjok uigyonchaga namaissumnida]. The differences, however, do not interrupt the improvement of the relations of partnership in economic, cultural, and other areas.

We also have to remember that Russia and the DPRK have signed a treaty on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance. The treaty will never damage the interests of any third country.

It is time for us to actively find a way to overcome the objective difficulties in relations between Russia and the DPRK.

[Kedov] What influence do Russia-ROK relations have upon the overall situation of Northeast Asia?

[Kunadze] First, we (?worry about) the situation on and around the Korean peninsula. It is no exaggeration to say that ROK-Russia relations play the key role there. In other words, relations between Russia and the ROK will become a positive factor in achieving security in this area. In particular, Russia-ROK relations will play a very positive role in coordinating relations between South and North Korea.

We will actively help in the dialogue between the South and the North and will make every effort to remove obstacles to the dialogue. It is natural that the South-North issue should be resolved by South and North Korea themselves. However, strong countries around the peninsula, responsible for its division, should not assume an indifferent attitude toward the development of the situation in the peninsula. They can create a critical atmosphere for the security of the Korean peninsula and stability of the overall situation of Northeast Asia by removing the remains of the past and improving relations with South and North Korea.

Agreement on Visa-Free Visits Signed With China

LD2912165793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1600 GMT 29 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Denis Perkin]

[Text] Moscow December 29 TASS—Representatives of Russia and China signed Russo-Chinese intergovernment agreements in Moscow on Wednesday [29 December] about the exchange of visits between Russian and Chinese citizens.

The agreements which will come into force in a month's time, were signed on behalf of the governments of the two countries by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov and Chinese Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Wang Jinqing.

Visa-free visits will be established for citizens of both countries who have diplomatic and service passports. People possessing general foreign passports must apply for visas to diplomatic offices and consulates regardless of the purpose of the visit.

This requirement does not apply to groups of tourists, for whom an intergovernment agreement on visa-free visits by groups of tourists of December 18, 1992 remains in effect.

Clarification Issued on Payment of UN Dues

PM2912130593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Dec 93 First Edition p 3

[Statement by Dmitriy Yudin, deputy director of the Foreign Ministry International Organizations Department; place and date not given: "Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Clarification: We Are Paying and Will Continue To Pay"]

[Text] In the piece "The United Nations Wants To Make Economies on 'Blue Helmets'" published by IZVESTIYA 15 December it is claimed that Russia "cannot pay" its dues to the United Nations "at all."

In reality the case is somewhat different. In 1993 alone we paid $234 million into the regular UN budget and the budget for UN peacekeeping operations.

The timetable for the payments stipulated by presidential and government decisions are being adhered to strictly. The capital we transferred to it in November and December 1993 actually saved the United Nations from bankruptcy and helped it to hang on until the new year when dues are expected from other countries.

Payments to the United Nations of more than $70 million are expected in the first quarter of 1994 and a timetable of payments for the remaining quarters of the year is being prepared. This is, of course, having to be done when the country is going through hard times and we have enough of our own internal financial problems. But Russia will carry out its obligations vis-a-vis the United Nations at the same time as trying to get outdated UN programs wound up and to secure a more efficient use of its resources.

[Signed] Dmitriy Yudin, deputy director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Organizations Department

Election Aftermath

Shumeyko Advocates Working With All Parties

LD2912123993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1135 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] The government must work with all political parties as long as they respect the law. "For this reason, we have to interact with the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP], too," Vladimir Shumeyko told newsmen in Moscow on Wednesday [29 December].

It's hard to say yet what form this cooperation will take, he said. Answering an Interfax question, he suggested that "LDP is, in fact, Zhirinovskiy alone, and how the 59 members of parliament from his party will behave is not clear."

He reminded journalists that the way Zhirinovskiy behaved at the constitutional conference was in sharp contrast to what he did at meetings. "He kept silent more often, and if he took the floor, he spoke constructively."

Shumeyko believes that the support for Zhirinovskiy's party voiced by many voters on December 12 revealed yet another factor: "the national idea lives on among people, which is very good because as long as it's viable, it's possible to continue developing the state. It's on the basis of strong statehood that a presidential party advocated by Boris Yeltsin should be set up."

In his opinion, not a single bloc can make up the core of such a party, but there is a social framework for it. A presidential party should derive from "presidency" as an institution rather than an administration party, he stressed.

The presidency must play a great role in advancing Russia as a state. It is necessary to encourage in society a belief that the presidency is at the center of statehood - Shumeyko said. "There must be a moral code of the presidency so that anyone would dread even the possibility of Zhirinovskiy to be president, Shumeyko remarked.

Filatov 'Uneasy' Over Forces in Parliament

MK3012094093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 30 Dec 93 p 1

[INTERFAX report: "Sergey Filatov Supposes That New Parliament Will Interrupt Work"]

[Text] Sergey Filatov, head of the president's staff, told an INTERFAX correspondent in the Kremlin on Wednesday that a break may be called right after the first plenary session of Russia's new parliament for purposes of familiarization with documents and for planning further work. He believes that at the moment only the first session of parliament has been clearly planned. "What is next," he said, "is so far incomprehensible." In the opinion of Sergey Filatov, head of the president's staff, an understanding should be clinched between the blocs in the first meeting so that, despite differences, speakers of the chambers, as well as heads of the committees and commissions, can be elected. Mr. Filatov is uneasy over the alignment of political forces inside parliament. "Party discipline is nonexistent," he said; "this can upset parliamentary equilibrium right from the start." In S. Filatov's opinion, economic questions are going to prove the most acute questions of the first plenary meeting and the first days of parliament's work.

Lobov Comments on Election Results, Economic Reform

BR3012114893 Paris LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS in French 30 Dec 93 p 9

[Interview with Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov by Alain Barluet in Moscow; date not given]

[Text] Oleg Lobov, who is close to Boris Yeltsin but hostile to any radical transition to a market economy, was the leader of the "conservative" or state interventionist wing of the government team—with the title of first deputy prime minister and economy minister. He was replaced by the "liberal" Yegor Gaydar and was appointed to the post of secretary of the Security Council, one of the key bodies of the Russian Government. He analyzed the situation in Russia following the 12 December elections for LE QUOTIDIEN and discussed the path which he thinks the economic reform should follow.

[Barluet] What did you think of the results during the recent elections by "Russia's Choice," the presidential movement?

[Lobov] If Boris Yeltsin had been personally involved in the election campaign, the results would have been markedly better. The deterioration in the economic situation had a major influence on the voters' choice. The main thing is that the Constitution has been adopted. In my view, the Duma will not be worse than the old Parliament. And the clash of powers will not be as critical for two reasons: First, the professionalism of the deputies seems greater, and second, the memory of the negative role played by the previous Parliament is still in everybody's mind.

[Barluet] The members of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal-Democratic Party are entering the Duma in large numbers and they could play the role of troublemakers, if not arbiters....

[Lobov] Zhirinovskiy already had more than 7 percent of the votes in the 1991 presidential election. He is using the problems which have arisen in the economic and political areas and the negative phenomena linked with the break-up of the USSR. An example is the 25 million Russians living in the republics of the former USSR whose position is sometimes difficult such as those in the Baltics. Zhirinovskiy is also making use of the mistakes made by the government. It launched reforms without taking into account some thresholds beyond which a

social explosion is possible. That is why our priority must now be to ensure supplies for the Russian people.

[Barluet] What other lessons do you think the government should learn from its relative defeat in the elections?

[Lobov] First, it now seems necessary to form a government or presidential party. Second, we must ease social tension by defending the poor, the military, and retired people. We must do so by extending and speeding up the reforms to halt inflation and price increases and to increase production.

[Barluet] Reviving production even at the cost of a further increase in inflation?

[Lobov] Inflation must be halted, but how? It is an illusion to try to stop it without curbing wage increases. At the same time, price increases are further accentuated by the fall in production. With the more rapid growth in wages, goods are disappearing from the shelves. What we are now observing in the stores is a lack of Russian-made products. Our second task must be to persuade the enterprises to invest not in wages but to revive quantitative and qualitative increases in production in order to make them more competitive.

[Barluet] What can be done to attract foreign investors who are still very circumspect about the situation in Russia?

[Lobov] In the current period of political instability, they prefer to stay away. We do not expect this trend to be reversed in the near future. However, cooperation must be continued in the scientific and humanitarian areas and through companies with joint capital. We will persevere in launching major projects like the Moscow to St. Petersburg high-speed train. We need these communication infrastructures to move closer to the Common Market.

[Barluet] But how can you break out of the vicious circle of continuing to use massive subsidies to finance companies which are unprofitable and hence less likely to attract foreign investors?

[Lobov] It is a painful problem because many of those enterprises are old. But many others have equipment which is the equal of the Western enterprises, not to mention their engineers, scientists, and skilled workers. Especially in the defense sector. Thanks to conversion programs, some are moving over to civilian production, especially in the transportation area. With regard to aluminum and nonferrous metals, our enterprises are in direct competition with those in the West. The latter is even having to defend itself by putting up customs barriers because their products are more expensive! The same is true in metallurgy. We could also mention equipment for missiles, civil aviation, and armaments. With regard to civilian industry, it is impossible to completely modernize in one or two years. We have already started, thanks to the privatization program. Many mistakes remain in the subsidy system. But their share of the GDP is less than in the developed countries. That is why we must not reduce them but redirect them rationally to the priority areas: conversion of the defense industries, science, transportation, agriculture, and space....

[Barluet] Do you think that Russia should take the market economy as a model?

[Lobov] Russia is surviving with its people, its science, and its culture. It is liberating itself from the distribution system imposed by the Bolsheviks. A British member of parliament stressed that his country achieved democracy in 500 years—and that ours had covered the same ground in five years! In Russia, the reforms will take at least 10 or 15 years.

[Barluet] What contribution can France make?

[Lobov] Interest in the French language must be developed in Russia. There are already good contacts in tourism, construction, oil, and now a marked interest in gas extraction. We have not forgotten that at a time when the United States imposed an embargo on us, especially with regard to gas extraction equipment, France broke that blockade and supplied us with the equipment we needed.

Discord Over Site of New Parliament Continues

MK2912103093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Dec 93 p 1

[Report by Ivan Rodin under the "Parliament" rubric: "Deputies Want To Be in White House. According to Russia's Choice Count, Duma's Majority Will Comprise a Coalition of Communists, Agrarians, Democratic Party of Russia, and Civic Union"]

[Text] As is known, all future State Duma factions have asked the president for assistance in returning the White House of Soviets, the citadel of Russian parliamentarianism. At the same time, these same factions are trying to stake out work space in the Kremlin, obviously thinking that whichever of the two decisions is made, both are sufficiently satisfactory. At any rate, it is up to Boris Yeltsin to decide, and it would be easier for him to give away the Kremlin, in which case Viktor Chernomyrdin would hardly object.

According to many sources, he is not going to give back the White House. In the opinion of one newly elected Duma deputy who attended to the White House problem professionally, the reason for this unwillingness may be simple: The reconstruction of the building has at the moment overrun cost estimates. Remarkably, this overspending surfaced after the repair work on the six-story wings of the palace where the "current" owners of the White House so like to locate their premises. Of course, it is not the money that the government grudges, but the comforts created.

Many new deputies are confident, however, that the premier will have to give up the house. Incidentally the greatest confidence in this for some reason is shown by parliamentarians of the presidential-governmental bloc. They also state that accommodating such a serious organ as the Federation Council in the House of the Russian Press appears to be an insult, plain and simple: This is the same as accommodating a ministry in a barroom. None the less, seats for the State Duma are already being assigned in the building of the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. According to information received by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA from a reliable source in the Duma, it is impossible to create normal conditions for the work of deputies and their staffs because there is no way to seat them there together.

Perhaps owing to the squabbling over accommodation, rumors persist that after the first inaugural meeting the Federal Assembly will be given time for organizational work—between one and two months, according to various information. The factions mainly welcome a small organizational pause, realizing that it is hard to get interaction going within the brief period before parliament goes into session. There seems to be no one who wishes to go through an adjustment period with the Duma already working. However, in the opinion of Vladimir Isakov, State Duma deputy of the Agrarian Party, this is happening anyway. According to his observations, new parliamentarians act in the same way the former ones did at the start of their career: They make noisy and histrionic speeches, toying with their own numerous ideas that they will be implementing via parliament with no difficulty, as they say, because they think of themselves as being loyal to the president. Mr. Isakov thinks that the Duma will be either dissolved very soon or, on the contrary, will last its allotted two years, perhaps to repeat the fate of the Fourth State Duma of 1917. Vladimir Isakov confirmed to your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent the forecast about a coalition of Communists and Agrarians, and also perhaps of the Democratic Party of Russia. He also noted that the president had already begun to "wipe his feet" on his own constitution, having lately passed edicts that invalidate the provisions of a number of laws, to which he has no right. Mr. Isakov advised that he understands the president's objective to give the Duma as much work as possible so it does not become distracted by the Constitution and forming the government, but he does not share this objective.

One perhaps should consider Vladimir Isakov's opinion because he most probably will be responsible for lawmaking in a broad-based left of center coalition (Agrarian Party of Russia, Communist Party of Russia, Democratic Party of Russia, and Civic Union) which Russia's Choice itself thinks would get approximately 195 seats—while the "democratic" blocs (Russia's Choice, Yabloko, and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord would have as little as 174 seats. This was told to your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent yesterday by Boris Zolotukhin, who resigned the day before as deputy chairman of the Commission for Legislative Proposals under the president. Incidentally, Vladimir Isakov agreed that he had a chance to become, at the minimum, deputy chairman of the Legislation Committee, because such positions are supposed to be given to the opposition.

Further on Dispute

PM3012111693 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Dec 93 First Edition p 1

[Aleksandra Lugovskaya report: "The Accommodation of Russian Deputies Becoming a Political Problem"]

[Text] The problems concerning the accomodation of the State Duma and the Federation Council could not only overshadow the opening of the Federal Assembly's session in the Kremlin, but also create a sharp conflict between the president and the newly elected deputies. It is indicative that all parliamentary factions of the legislative organ have now unanimously sided with the "special opinion" conveyed to the president by six electoral blocs at the initiative of "Russia's Choice" even before the elections.

The deputies' commission for the accommodation of the Federal Assembly, having inspected City Hall and the Russian Press House, has concluded that neither of these buildings is suitable for accommodating the State Duma and the Federal Assembly for technical, functional, and organizational reasons. The factions are becoming increasingly convinced that the actual discussion of the question of "where to put parliament" is damaging not only "the revival of the prestige of Russia's legislative branch" but also all Russian branches of power.

When answering the question about the extent of readiness to accommodate the Federal Assembly's corps of deputies, the presidential functionaries responsible for accommodating the chambers display amazing feats of political versatility. Yu. Sorokoumov, chief of the Administration for the Utilization of Administrative Buildings, believes that the former City Hall is "both technically and functionally suitable for use." At the same time, however, people who have seen it for themselves claim the opposite: Since the October events, several storeys are still undergoing structural repairs. While seats equipped for voting are being installed in the gigantic conference hall, the few narrow offices, crammed with "other people's old furniture and an unbelievable quantity of unwashed crockery," present the pitiful sight of a temporary bolthole.

Federal Assembly Apparatus Leader B. Podoprigora has confirmed what Yu. Sorokoumov said: So far the president's administration has indeed not given any order to "occupy" the Press House. And even though organizational equipment for the deputies has been purchased and bundles of documents for each deputy, ranging from reference material to draft laws, have been typeset, all apparatus services are still located on Novyy Arbat. The

Supreme Soviet Library is located at the Parliamentary Center. The administration is in a lather, while deputies live out of suitcases.

G. Musaelyan, general director of the Russian Press House, had nothing new to say: "I am sitting on top of a volcano, just as before." Commissions from the administration visit almost daily, demanding that the building be vacated without offering anything in exchange. Or rather, offering a few storeys in the building on Novyy Arbat. The promised building at Vozdvizhenka No. 4 has vanished without any sensible explanation. All 37 editorial offices in the Press House have dug in without any intention of leaving it. There are also protests from the commercial structures which fund the publication of all newspapers, including those for children, invalids, and veterans. Chief Engineer Yu. Pyshkin, who is constantly dealing with "technical experts," has reported their "terrible impression"—the building is unsuitable for the Federation Council.

On top of everything else, there are no approach roads to the building on Pushkin Street, and its underground garage can take only 35 cars. The installation of the electronic voting system in the 500-seat hall will reduce the number of seats to 200. There will be no room for the press and foreign representatives. The lack of large offices suitable for the deputies' work will require the building's reconstruction. And since "it is all hollow inside," in other words without any load-bearing walls, this work will take the best part of a year. The roof is leaking, and the low-capacity power supply system, which is already 10 years old, will also require considerable expenditure. To put it briefly, Yu. Pyshkin concluded, it would be disgraceful to house the elected organ in such a building. It is for the poor press—we love it and we are gradually improving it.

Finally, one last call—at the White House. Yu. Samotayev, chief of the Administration for Utilization of Russian Federation Government Buildings, announced that repair work is almost completed and the government is scheduled to move into the White House in early January. Being a specialist, he admitted that a problem does exist as regards providing accomodation for deputies, but "our job is to run around with brooms and wrenches, to supply the building with water, heat, and lighting."

There is no doubt that State Duma deputies, politically organized in factions, will insist that the chambers be housed either in the Kremlin or in the White House. "So that the Federal Assembly can function normally," as the address sent to the president even before the election said. Having been chosen by the people, they can now take a different tack: Look up in the Supreme Soviet Library the law which prescribed that the Kremlin is to be the Russian Federation president's official residence. And, for their part, adopt a law on their own accomodation.

Yeltsin Ready for 'Political Decision'

MK3012095093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Dec 93 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "In Brief" rubric: "Who Takes Over the White House?]

[Text] According to Arkadiy Murashev, Duma deputy of the Russia's Choice bloc, the government is starting after all to move into the former House of Soviets on Krasnopresnenskaya embankment on 1 January despite the fact that all elected deputies of the State Duma proposed that the building be returned to Russia's new parliament. The government's services have already been given orders to move. According to information from circles around the president, it has transpired, however, that Boris Yeltsin is in principle ready for a political decision to meet the deputies' request, but Viktor Chernomyrdin's consent to that has not been received yet.

Factions Discuss Selection of Duma Speaker

MK3012110093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Dec 93 p 1

[Ivan Rodin report under the "Parliament" rubric: "Search for Duma Speaker Continues. What Is Important Is Not Candidates, But the Principle of Nominating Them"]

[Text] Yesterday, deputy certificates were handed to candidates who were elected to the State Duma in the joint federal district. Virtually none of the leaders of the electoral associations that entered the State Duma were present except for the chiefs of the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR), the Democratic Party of Russia [DPR], and "Women of Russia"—Mikhail Lapshin, Nikolay Travkin, and Alevtina Fedulova respectively.

Nikolay Travkin confided to journalists the State Duma's main problem—an imperative mandate received by deputies who were elected on party tickets. According to Mr. Travkin, the idea of an imperative mandate is not shared by all. This is why he believes that faction leaders cannot conduct fruitful talks about forming coalitions or nominating agreed candidates—they do not have guarantees that all deputies will vote similarly when it comes to a vote. Achieving this will be altogether impossible if the vote to elect a State Duma chairman is held, according to the rules of procedure, by secret ballot, said Arkadiy Murashev, a State Duma deputy from "Russia's Choice."

Arkadiy Murashev also lifted somewhat the veil of confidentiality regarding talks between the so-called "Big Four," including "Russia's Choice," APR, the Russian Federation Communist Party, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. According to Mr. Murashev, "Russia's Choice" was left in a minority as it stood by the idea of electing a State Duma speaker from among members of small factions. Other members of the "Group of Four" deemed it to be more appropriate to

agree on the speaker's candidacy among the Duma "pillars." Mr. Murashev said that the Agrarians, Communists, and Liberal Democrats appear to have agreed on the candidacy of Ivan Rybkin from the APR. "Russia's Choice" has its own official candidate, Sergey Kovalev, although it is clear that in the current situation his chances are slim. In Arkadiy Murashev's view, there is also a positive side to the fact that "Russia's Choice" was left in a minority: in this event, small factions will become its natural allies. Moreover, "Yabloko" will apparently even become "Russia's Choice's" coalition partner.

APR leader Mikhail Lapshin, who was directly involved in the "group of four" talks, edited Mr. Murashev's remarks somewhat. In his words, Mr. Rybkin's candidacy is only one of several possibilities. Most important, however, is that a preliminary agreement was still achieved whereby the speaker should represent a large faction. Mr. Lapshin said that "Russia's Choice" also had to accept this, although it reserved the possibility to return to the idea of electing a speaker from minority blocs if the talks prove unsuccessful. Mikhail Lapshin emphasized, however, that even an alliance between "Russia's Choice" and small factions on this specific subject will not produce a majority of votes. The hypothetical "Group of Four" does have a majority of around 330-340 votes, though.

Apparently, no definite decision on the candidate for the post of State Duma chairman will be made at the 31 December meeting in the Kremlin. Nonetheless, Mikhail Lapshin promised that regardless of the negotiations' outcome participants would make a statement for the press explaining their stances.

Duma Commission Chairmen Named

LD3012100793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0800 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] Anatoliy Lukyanov has been elected chairman of the commission for organizing the functioning of the political groupings in the State Duma. This was reported by Vladimir Podoprigora, head of the Russian parliamentary staff at a meeting of the organizing committee in charge of preparing the first session of the Federal Assembly.

Viktor Sheynis has been elected coordinator of the commission in charge of the agenda for the first session; Grigoriy Bondarev is the coordinator of the commission in charge of working out the standing orders of the State Duma and the status of deputies; Mikhail Mityukov coordinates the work of the commisson in charge of forming the State Duma's committees; and Vladimir Podoprigora will coordinate the work of the commission in charge of the premises for the working bodies of the Federal Assembly. Podoprigora said it was planned to set up 18 commissions of the State Duma. Their names and main directions of legislative activities are currently being worked on.

Adamishin, Volkogonov Likely To Refuse Duma Seats

LD2912154993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1409 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] First Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin, elected deputy to the State Duma on the federal party ticket from the Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc, has decided to reject his deputy's mandate and continue his duties in the foreign ministry. It has become known to Interfax Adamishin has submitted a relevant application.

The president's military adviser Dmitry Volkogonov, elected to the State Duma from the Russia's Choice bloc, also intends to give up his mandate, reports Interfax.

Adamishin Said To Reverse Decision

LD3012154793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1344 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] According to information available to Interfax, Russia's First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin, who was elected to the State Duma from the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc, has suddenly reversed his decision to give up his mandate.

In his first statement on this matter Adamishin motivated his decision with the desire to focus on his work in the Foreign Ministry.

On Wednesday evening he notified the Central Election Commission that he was giving up his post in the Foreign Ministry to work in the State Duma. The same day he sent to President Boris Yeltsin his request for resignation.

On Thursday Adamishin was presented the card of State Duma member.

As Interfax learned, Adamishin reversed his decision in connection with the circumstance that consultations had been stepped up between the Russia's Choice bloc and smaller factions in Russia's new parliament concerning a mutually-acceptable candidacy for the post of State Duma speaker.

According to Interfax's sources, Adamishin has greater chances to get the post of State Duma speaker, since, as first deputy to the head of Russian diplomacy, Andrey Kozyrev, one of those who founded Russia's Choice, he is likely to be backed not only by the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc, but also by Russia's Choice and by smaller factions.

The same sources believe that the chances of Vladimir Lukin, another representative of the Yavlinsky-Bodyrev-Lukin bloc, who has repeatedly announced his intention to resign as Russian Ambassador to Washington after being elected to the State Duma, are slimmer.

Interfax's sources are inclined to believe that Lukin's likeliest successor to the ambassadorship in Washington, which has always been viewed as of key importance, is Russia's present Ambassador to the U.N., Yuly Vorontsov.

Duma Factions' Plans Assessed

MK2912120093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 29 Dec 93 p 2

[Article by Dmitriy Kuznets under the "Designs" rubric: "Communists Plan to "Repeal the Constitution." LDPR May Help Russia's Choice Uphold It"]

[Text] First consultations between Duma factions seem to have outlined the future parliament's work. At least in the first, organizational stage, decisions will be made by the "big four," the faction of Russia's Choice, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR], the Russian Federation Communist Party [RFCP], and the Agrarian Party. The remaining factions are supposed to back all the fruits of the "consensus" reached in conferences of the "big four."

According to Russian Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov's claim, "agreement between even three big factions will suffice to resolve a question the first time." The first consultations of the "four" have graphically shown that given an almost total absence of differences between the Communists and the Agrarian Party, the LDPR's position may prove decisive. In order not to be left in splendid isolation, Russia's Choice would be forced to look for support to Zhirinovskiy's party. Should such support be secured, the scales may be tipped in Russia's Choice favor.

Some persuading of the LDPR has to be done already on the first question of the consultations—the elections for speaker of the Duma. The "four" have been discussing this problem for two days now. So far, Gennadiy Zyuganov says, only three understandings have been reached—the speaker should be a "nonconflict figure" and should not head any faction. Owing to the LDPR's fence sitting, no majority was won in the first day of conference of the "four" by either the candidate of the Agrarian Party of Russia and the RFCP (according to some lights, he is an Agrarian, Ivan Rybkin), or by Russia's Choice candidate (Russia's Choice will most probably nominate Yabloko's Vladimir Lukin to this position). In the meantime, INTERFAX reported that the Agrarian Party of Russia, the LDPR, and the RFCP agreed yesterday to "jointly solve" the speaker question.

What will result in this case was shown by the elections for chairman of the temporary commission for coordination of Duma factions' activities. Members of the commission elected as their chief Anatoliy Lukyanov, one of the RFCP leaders.

It is no accident that Gennadiy Zyuganov described as the main task of the Communist Party at the start of its parliamentary activities "organization of the Duma's work." The Communists and Agrarians, if they win the LDPR's support, may count on a majority of elective positions in the commissions and committees.

The opposition's next step, according to the RFCP's plans, will be a "revision of the outcome of the voting on the draft constitution." Viktor Ilyukhin, member of the Communist Party's Central Executive Committee, argues that "the RFCP has irrefutable proof of juggling of the referendum results." Besides, Mr. Ilyukhin regards as illegal the popular voting itself because "it was not conducted in line with the law but in line with a provision in the shape of a presidential edict." In any event, the RFCP insists that "parliament should rescind the coming into force of the new Constitution and continue the constitutional process." By their own admission, the Communists are ready to go back to the idea of radical democrats and to reorganize the Federal Assembly into a constitutional one. The Constitution worked out either by this parliament or conference, according to the RFCP, "should place the executive branch under control of the representative branch." The RFCP also announced that it regards the new parliament as "functioning in parallel with the Supreme Soviet." The Federal Assembly, which, in Mr. Zyuganov's view, has a "fresher legitimacy" than the president's, should "restore legality."

These designs of the "left-wing opposition" may run against opposition not only from Russia's Choice but also the LDPR, which backed the draft Constitution on 12 December precisely because of the provisions that increase presidential powers. Besides, one should not forget that the Federation Council can veto Duma decisions. Having in fact "lost" the lower chamber, the pro-president forces may count on strong positions in the upper chamber—many of the heads of administrations reporting directly to the president have become senators. The appointment of Vladimir Shumeyko as chairman of the organizing committee to prepare the first session of the Federation Council looks logical in this light.

CPRF Plenum Discusses Election Results, Future Plans

PM2912102393 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Dec 93 p 2

[Valentina Nikiforova report: "Not Giddy With Success. Communist Party of Russian Federation Central Executive Committee Plenum Held Last Saturday, 25 December"]

[Text] To say that its participants summed up the results of an incredibly difficult election campaign would not be telling the whole story. And it would probably be not entirely right to claim that they determined the direction of the party's development in the immediate future and short term. There were 20 speakers and as many who were unable to speak. Despite the tough standing orders about five-minute limits, some spoke far longer and were not interrupted—the auditorium was interpreting the

problems of the very complex situation in which the country, the party, and all working sectors of the population find themselves. The overall state of Russia is such that the situation could change within months [izmenitsya v mesyatsy], Central Executive Committee members V. Koptyug and A. Pomorov warned. What will the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF] do under these conditions, what are its immediate goals?

For the first time the words "if the party wants to become a vanguard party" were heard once again at the plenum. And they prompted neither amazement, criticism, or irony.

"The main result of the election campaign was that the party has come through a test of its strength," the report by G. Zyuganov, chairman of the Central Executive Committee Presidium, said in his report. "The Communist Party of the Russian Federation has proved its ability to work under the most difficult conditions. It has acquired invaluable experience in organizing unified partywide action on an all-Russia scale—with all its pluses and minuses."

Analysis began at the plenum. Yes, the Communists' electoral program met with support for its simple, realistic, and comprehensible goals. Yes, the party's moral position of not hiding past mistakes and current shortcomings but, equally, of not besmirching history was attractive. Yes, the party has now become organizationally open, and this is probably the most important point of all.

In planning their congress, Russia's workers turned to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation for help. There were 20 workers on the party list of the party's election association. This openness impressed the intelligentsia most of all. After obtaining the Central Executive Committee's phone number, a PRAVDA writer said with amazement: "I had such a good talk with Valentin Aleksandrovich Kuptsov. I'm taking my material over there now. But how can they work there?! It's chaos in the presidium's two rooms!"

A good answer would be that all the work is done at local level—Moscow is just the headquarters, the nerve center. Although even this statement requires clarification—ways to develop are currently being sought in primary party links and in regional committees. And that quest is no less intensive and no less effective. G. Sergeyev, the leader of Fryazino's Communists, pondered on the fact that 2,000 voters in the city voted communist—that was the size of the city party organization until August 1991. But those who voted were mainly nonparty people! A candidate or doctor of science at a famous scientific research institute who has been forced to run his own stall or transport goods in his ancient "Moskvich" has nothing in common with the nouveau-riche parties. And he preferred to vote for a party which had once refused to allow him to join. Did he believe that it was a different party?

"No, it is more of an advance payment, which we are duty bound to justify in order to warrant people's trust," V. Zorkaltsev, deputy chairman of the Central Executive Committee, self-critically admitted. "First and foremost, we need to support labor collectives. To all intents and purposes we betrayed the miners in 1989—we did not side with them or support their demands against the government. And this was by no means the only case of the Communist Party failing to be resolute in supporting labor collectives."

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation does not yet have any clear-cut stance on relations with the corps of directors, a considerable proportion of whom are taking part in the squandering of property that belongs to all the people. Almost 80 percent of directors are proponents of the Gaydar and Chubays policy. There are leaders who have dismissed one-third of their collectives, neglected social, cultural, and consumer services, and cut back on production. Opposition has begun at these enterprises, and the workers have started to fight for their rights. But this is happening in a sluggish and disorganized fashion. About 10 days ago there was a conflict at the Kalinin Plant in Moscow—now a joint-stock company. It was a conflict between the work force and management. Their action committee turned for help to...the press. Why not to the party? Because last year during a similar conflict at Moscow's "Frezer" Plant the collective, which had been counting on help from the Russian Communist Workers Party, failed to receive it. And now this attitude is being automatically transposed to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

And nobody makes any allowances for the fact that the party is only just getting started. In fact, the Communists do not expect any. The party's analysis group has already prepared a lot of important material for the work of the deputies' faction in the Federal Assembly. It was decided at the plenum that the faction would operate autonomously—as a Communist Party of the Russian Federation organization, subordinate to plenum and congress decisions. Doctor of Juridical Sciences Professor V. Kovalev, now a State Duma deputy, familiarized the plenum participants with just a few of these decisions.

"First, we intend to propose our own version of the law on labor collectives," he announced. "After all, not everyone has noted that this component of constitutional legal relations has disappeared from the current Constitution. It was in the Soviet constitution, and labor collectives were given a wide range of constitutional rights—the right to participate in state and social activity, the right to run production, and the right to resolve cadre issues and distribute material resources. The new Constitution contains none of this—and that is impermissible. All the more so as it contravenes international constitutional experience. In particular, the preamble to the 1958 French Constitution enshrines the rights of labor collectives."

So the new test for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation is to work inside and outside of parliament. And it is hard to say which of these is more important or more responsible. It is so important that one should supplement the other! And this is a new stage which we will have to get over in by no means comfortable conditions. Clearly, it is no accident that the issue of a party congress came up. It was possible to agree with those who insisted on immediate reports and elections to party organizations and the holding of a party congress in early 1994—there is indeed a need for one. But there will be elections to organs of local self-administration in March—is it sensible to be diverting resources to intra-party matters just now? And it is necessary to interpret what Communists have achieved over the past year. How are relations to be built and cooperation organized with Russia's other communist parties? There is a need to define a stance vis-a-vis the Union of Communist Parties-CPSU Political Executive Committee, which has been making demands and issuing not always justified instructions that often tear party organizations apart. There was one other point mentioned at the plenum: A program for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation—for a qualitatively new party—is needed. But what kind of program?

"Work needs to be done on a long-term program, and key issues need to be discussed with the broad masses of people—seminars and conferences must be held. At the same time, in the space of a month we should draw up an action program for the party," Academician V. Koptyug, member of the Central Executive Committee, advised. "And we should invariably include in it those things without which Russia will not be revived."

V. Koptyug's proposal to postpone the party congress to the fall and to hold a party conference in the spring—in February-March—also met with support from Leningrad Communists. And it became part of the plenum decision.

Zyuganov Addresses Plenum

PM2912114093 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Dec 93 pp 3-4

["Extracts" from report presented by Gennadiy Zyuganov, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, at committee's 25 December plenum: "Mandate From the People for Difficult Work"]

[Text] Two months ago, having weighed all the "pros" and "cons," the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF] Conference adopted one of its most complex and fundamental decisions of recent times—to participate in the 12 December 1993 referendum and elections.

We can now sum up the results of the work that has been done and have to determine our tasks in the situation which has developed since the referendum and the elections.

But first a few thoughts about the characteristics of the current political situation.

"The first democratic Russian elections," so extensively hyped by the semi-official press and state television, yielded results which were the direct opposite of what their organizers had expected. What influences were at work here?

First and foremost **the state of shock in public awareness** resulting from the October carnage in Moscow. In complete conformity with their anti-people doctrine, which postulates the "slave-like nature" of the Russian soul, the authorities believe that a show of brute force—routing the opposition and firing on parliament from tanks—would prompt most voters to side with the "victors," irrespective of their real political sympathies. It was assumed that a transition to a "firm hand" regime would be automatically supported by a population weary of dissension, irrespective of who personified that regime and its actual political content.

Reality proved the complete untenability of these expectations. Henceforth political struggle must inevitably take account of the real mood of the masses and proceed from the presence in Russians' national character of fundamental values which are not susceptible to suppression by violence and efficient propaganda brainwashing.

The second factor was **the limited duration of the election campaign.** Some parties and movements which, like ours, only joined in the election struggle at the end of November were left in practice with no more than two or three weeks to communicate with voters. The president's analysts probably assumed that the chaos in the public consciousness caused by the suppression of the opposition in October and the organizational difficulties faced by those subjected to persecution and prohibition would not enable them to "find" their electorate given the savage time pressures. In this instance too they manifestly underestimated the staunchness of the mass consciousness in Russia and its ability to rapidly adapt to any extreme conditions.

Another feature was **the artificial narrowing of the pre-election party spectrum.** The banning on a fabricated pretext of participation in the elections by centrist patriotic parties whose platforms contained slogans of national revival (the National Salvation Front, the Russian All-National Assembly, the Cadets) had the objective of depriving patriotically inclined voters of the opportunity to cast their vote for those who they really like. The calculation was that, forced to choose between "Zyuganov's Communists" and "Zhirinovskiy's falcons" or Yavlinskiy's and Shakhray's "opposition democrats," voters dissatisfied with the authorities would choose the "opposition democrats." This scenario was overtly and shamelessly played by the Party of Russian Unity and Accord [PRUA], which included in its television campaign advertisements specially designed references to "the greatness of the state" and "Russia's special path."

In reality the architects of this plan underestimated the depth of voters' opposition to the current regime. Nobody was fooled by the cosmetic patriotism of the "democratic opposition." The timely shift of CPRF ideology into the sphere of state patriotism prevented our party being turned into an "extremist bolshevik" bogeyman, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia's [LDPR's] competently and purposefully organized election campaign won over many of those who in a different situation would have voted for Baburin, Prokhanov, or Astafyev. The result was a serious defeat for the democrats, a success for the Communists, who proved their ability to develop in line with the emerging situation, and an unplanned first place for Zhirinovskiy in the election race.

Finally, the **absence of clear and detailed election programs** played a part. There were several reasons for that.

First, the democrats do not and simply cannot have any programs which could appeal to the voters. In the economic, domestic, foreign, and nationalities policy spheres the kind of program provisions which might win the support of the bulk of society are in principle unacceptable to the democrats because they require a renunciation of the unbridled "Westernization" of the country and of the slogan "the market at all costs!" and presuppose reliance on the distinctive characteristics of Russian life.

Second, by regarding the people as a mob the stage managers of the pro-presidential blocs' election campaign thought it completely unnecessary to offer society any cogent justifications for their policy. It was felt that the overwhelming majority of voters would not try to understand the essentials of the matter but would vote for a "symbol"—they would place their cross against a symbol that they understood, be it the president, a well known politician, or a popular singer. To a certain extent that was right but the "symbols" chosen by the democrats for their banners had the opposite effect of alienating the tired and disillusioned voter.

Third, the ludicrously brief election campaign period, beginning right after a mighty political cataclysm which demanded from many parties a radical change in their tactical program guidelines, simply left no time for the intelligible formulation of programs. In conditions such as these, concise, comprehensible, and easily remembered slogans on whose basis the voters could make a reasoned choice assumed exceptionally great importance. As we saw, Zhirinovskiy proved to be adept in this regard and this to a considerable extent predetermined his ultimate success.

There are similar reasons for the lack of direct debates among the leaders of the various political blocs during the election campaign. Nevertheless, it may be assumed that in the future this form of election struggle will be one of the decisive ways of winning votes. Consequently, **it must be taken into account that generally speaking a package of election programs must unfailingly contain the following:**

—a program of economic transformations;
—a program for the social protection of the population;
—a program to combat crime;
—a program on nationalities and religious policy;
—a program of state [gosudarstvennyy] (national) [derzhavnyy] building;
—a program of foreign policy activity;
—and a national security program.

In the Central Executive Committee Presidium's opinion, the main result of the campaign was that the party passed the endurance test, demonstrated its ability to work in the most trying conditions, won public and international recognition, and became an influential political force in Russia. Some party organizations worked better than others but they all worked. Priceless experience was gained in conducting a single action by the whole party on a Russia-wide scale. The experience is not only positive but negative, too. It must be analyzed comprehensively.

To what extent was the party's election strategy adopted by the conference politically valid and organizationally supported?

As is well known, its central point was to persuade as many citizens as possible to take part in the vote and reject Yeltsin's draft Constitution by a majority of votes. I stress: We were campaigning for an unambiguous rejection of the Constitution, not the wrecking of the referendum through a failure of the voters to turn out.

It has to be acknowledged that this aim was not accomplished. The voters' turnout compared with the April referendum fell considerably—by a full 10 points—to just 54.8 percent. Here are the general results of the voting as a percentage of the total electoral register: 31 percent voted for the Constitution, 23.8 percent voted against or spoiled their ballot papers, and 45.2 percent did not vote.

As a consequence of these results it is being claimed that the tactic of **boycotting the referendum was more realistic and politically more expedient.** In fact elementary calculations show that to wreck the referendum a further 4.8 percent of the electorate—that is, around 5.1 million people—needed to stay away from the polling stations. But for the Constitution to be rejected by a majority of votes it was necessary to persuade a further 7.2 percent or 7.6 million voters. So the question is—which is easier: To dissuade 5 million people from taking any part at all or to encourage 7,500,000 people to register an active and clear protest? Clearly the former is the easier option.

But I want to ask a different question. What is politically more expedient and farsighted for a party which claims to be the vanguard of the working people: To gamble on vigorous activity even if it does not entirely achieve its set aim or achieve its aim by relying on passivity? The

answer is passivity because our conclusion was right: In today's actual conditions there will be no active boycott, all that you will do is put yourself out of the running. Of course, the supporters of the boycott wanted it otherwise but objectively what actually happened was encouragement for public passivity in conditions when passivity is dangerous for the whole country anyway.

Ultimately the vote on 12 December produced an interim result: The Constitution did not secure either an absolute or a sufficiently impressive relative majority in its favor such as would have enabled it to be considered adopted if not "in law" then "in essence": At the same time the opposition obtained fairly solid representation in both the Duma and the Federation Council which means that it must be taken seriously.

The Central Executive Committee Presidium regards the result achieved by the CPRF in the elections to the Federal Assembly as entirely satisfactory. We obtained 32 seats in the Duma on the federation-wide list and a further 18 members of the CPRF were elected to single-seat districts.

Eleven members of the CPRF have become Federation Council deputies.

Consequently in the Federal Assembly there will be a total of 61 deputies whose nominations were directly supported by our party organizations. In addition, several dozen more party members have been elected to the Duma and the Federation Council who stood as independent candidates or were on lists of allied electoral associations, which is due to certain characteristic features of the election campaign which, as is well known, we entered very late for reasons beyond our control.

I should like to make special mention of the success of the party's candidates in a number of regions. For example, at the State Duma elections in Mordovia and in Kursk, Tambov, and Tver oblasts the communists won all 100 percent of the seats. The same result was achieved at the Federation Council elections in Amur Oblast.

The millions of votes cast for the CPRF mean that the party is finally established as a serious political force enjoying broad recognition in the country and abroad.

Now for the general election results.

The results of the voting for the party lists, especially if you compare them with the referendum results, paint a complex and contradictory **picture of the political moods** and sympathies of Russians.

A preliminary quantitative and qualitative analysis makes it possible to establish the following approximate ratios.

Some 58 percent of those who voted showed varying degrees of **pro-opposition** feeling ranging from moderate discontent and a general desire for change to a sharp rejection of everything. Amongst others the LDPR polled 23 percent of the votes, the CPRF 12 percent. This category also includes the 4 percent who voted against all the lists, in other words, those whose pro-opposition tendencies developed into obstructionism.

Some 35 percent of the voters supported the present government course to one extent or another and voted for associations identified with that course in the public consciousness ("Russia's Choice," Yabloko, the PRUA, and the Movement for Democratic Reforms).

Seven percent of those who voted expressed intermediate, centrist sympathies.

What do these results show?

First, they indicate a clear defeat for the radical democrats and the causes of that defeat should be sought not in the lack of coordination and unity among them but in the utter bankruptcy of the extremist course of "shock therapy" which also caused the present split in their ranks.

Second, the results show that the opposition forces lack a clear and precise alternative program capable of uniting the majority of the population in the face of the socio-economic catastrophe into which the radical democrats have plunged the country: Disorder and vacillation prevail there, too, and the LDPR did not fail to exploit that.

And third, one of the political results of the elections, difficult though this may be to admit, was the discovery of a considerable contradiction between our party's leadership and the leadership of other communist parties—the VKPB [All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks], the Russian Communist Workers Party, and the Russian Communist Party.

The essence of this contradiction is their leadership's reluctance to recognize the existing realities (which does not necessarily mean consenting to those realities) and its disregard for the main contradiction in present-day Russia. The majority of rank-and-file members of the aforementioned parties went against the decision of their central organs on boycotting the elections, and cooperated actively with our party's primary and rayon organizations.

The political structure that has emerged in our country as a result of the September-October coup d'etat and the 12 December elections is notable for its extreme instability, because it is built not on the firm foundation of the law, but on the shifting sands of lawlessness and tyranny. There is not one branch of power in the state today whose lawful right to exist is not subject to serious doubt. The president, who took an oath of loyalty to the Constitution, himself flagrantly flouted it. The Federal Assembly emerged as a result of elections called in defiance of the Constitution and held undemocratically. The independence of the Constitutional Court has become a bitter mockery after the blatant blackmail that silenced it. For three months the country has been living

in conditions in which all the key political questions are resolved by edicts drawn up by nobody knows whom, or else by threats.

In theory, there are only two ways out of this situation: either full-scale civil war with unpredictable consequences for the whole world, or else complex and painstaking work to restore order and the rule of law on the basis of the renunciation of violence and the quest for a mutually acceptable balance of public interests.

Will the Constitution whose draft Yeltsin submitted to the referendum help us to find and establish that balance? It is our profound conviction that it will not help. This is further confirmed by the fact that the draft did not receive the majority of votes that is stipulated in law. On the contrary, this Constitution seeks to consolidate the imbalance that arose as a result of the coup d'etat. The drastic shift of the center of gravity toward the executive structures generates a constant threat that the ship of state will be capsized.

The majority of citizens who voted for the draft in the referendum were guided by the consideration that you cannot live without a Constitution—there will be no order. However, they will very soon see that this is not a Constitution of civil peace, social and legal guarantees, and democracy, but a Constitution of confrontation, social and legal defenselessness, and dictatorship. And that applies not only to ordinary voters. As long as Yeltsin's committed supporters envisaged no one but Yeltsin himself as president, they welcomed the draft. But as soon as they caught a glimpse of Zhirinovskiy in the president's seat, even the most zealous radical democrats sounded the alarm. One of the "mothers" of the Constitution, Galina Starovoytova, whom nobody could suspect of opposition sympathies, said the other day on the Voice of America that she had felt unable to risk voting for the draft, and had taken her ballot paper away with her.

In today's political system a "triangle" has emerged which is familiar from the history of prerevolutionary Russian parliamentarianism: an autocrat (czar, president) who is not accountable to or under the control of a people's government; a government appointed by the autocrat, which again is not under the control of representatives of the people; and last, a two-chamber parliament (under the czar it was the Duma and the State Council; now we have the Duma and the Federation Council) whose lower chamber is vested with very limited legislative (in essence, legal consultative) and budgetary rights and is entirely without executive or control functions. The autocrat may dissolve parliament, but parliament has no power to influence either the autocrat or the government.

At a time of economic and political crisis on the eve of the February [1917] Revolution, that system demonstrated its incapacity to take the situation under control. Attempts by the majority in the Duma (the so-called "Progressive Bloc," whose recent parallel was "Russian Unity") to persuade the czar to renounce the services of the court clique headed by Rasputin and entrust the Duma with the formation of a government did not meet with success...

It is well known that nobody learns from history, and the same archaic system was revived in Russia after the establishment of the post of president, and immediately gave rise to the very same imbalances and contradictions which contributed to a decisive degree to the tragic denouement.

It is now being reproduced in an even more rigid and inveterate form, which brings the threat of an even more devastating explosion.

As before, all the contradictions are tied into the question of parliament's real power, the right of the parliamentary majority to form and control the government and really to influence the political and economic course.

All the factions in the new Duma that seriously intend to participate in running the state, will soon realize—if they have not already realized—that within the framework laid down for the Duma by the draft Constitution, this is impossible in principle. Even today it seems that the presidential structures have decided much behind the backs of the deputies, who have yet to assemble. The parliamentary apparatus has been set up, the Duma standing orders have been written, and a plan for legislative work has been drawn up, which looks more like a plan to gild the cage in which democracy is imprisoned. And the president's administration has openly hinted that the Duma's only chance of getting along with the president is to accept these and other similar "initiatives" without a murmur.

A dilemma has arisen: Either the Duma becomes an impotent, purely decorative appendage to the presidential dictatorship, or else it finds within itself the strength to play a more positive role in society and help to restore the rule of law and a democratic system of state administration and find a way out of the disastrous socioeconomic situation. In the event of the latter choice, very broad scope opens up for cooperation among the majority of deputies' factions, and we intend to propose a formula for such cooperation.

On the basis of the main provisions of the CPRF's election platform, we consider the Duma (and the Federal Assembly as a whole) to be an organ with no legal right to succeed the disbanded Congress and Supreme Soviet. Legally, the Duma exists not instead of them, but alongside them. In view of this, it is most expedient to begin our work with all the factions, parties, and movements in a "roundtable" framework, especially since deputies have already received, through the vote, a mandate to represent virtually the whole spectrum of society's interests. The experience of "roundtables" in a number of countries indicates that this system is fairly effective in crisis situations. It is also worth recalling that our present opponents at one time themselves urged this very idea.

The Duma, mindful of its state responsibility, should raise, discuss, and resolve the following questions.

First. It is necessary to give a political assessment of the events of 21 September to 4 October this year. A competent commission should be set up to investigate the circumstances of the bloody Moscow tragedy and the factors that gave rise to it and to identify its organizers and perpetrators. Until this matter is totally clear and until effective measures have been adopted against the possibility of a repetition, there can be no question of building a rule-of-law state, and no citizen can feel secure.

Second. It is necessary to evaluate, from the point of view of the law, the legitimacy of interpreting the results of the 12 December referendum as constituting the legal adoption of a new Constitution of the Russian Federation. Here it should be borne in mind that under the 1978 Constitution, with the subsequent amendments and additions, the president does not have the right to call a referendum, and that the vote and the formulation of its results were carried out with gross violations of the Law on the Referendum. The final verdict on this matter can only be passed by the Constitutional Court, which should be restored to activity with its original composition.

Third. The Duma must define its own legal status and the sources, extent, time scale, and limits of application of its possible powers. In our view, the rights of the Federal Assembly, as a special representative organ in the exceptional conditions of a vacuum of legitimate power, are derived not from presidential edicts or decisions of the Central Electoral Commission, but from the right and duty of any citizen or group of citizens to uphold the law, and also from the trust placed in the deputies by their voters. In these conditions it must constitute itself and assume specific constituent, legislative, and executive powers, with the stipulation that these powers operate for a certain transitional period and are valid only insofar as they are directed toward restoring order and the rule of law.

Fourth. The fulfillment of the foregoing demands will make it possible to move on to the principle—generally recognized in civilized democratic states—that the government is formed by agreement with parliament and that the executive power is accountable to and under the control of the legislative. No verbal statements of the willingness of executive structures to collaborate with the Duma can be satisfactory as long as this remains a matter of desire and goodwill, rather than a norm firmly enshrined in law.

The Communists' faction will raise as one of the first and most important questions in the Duma the question of the immediate abandonment of "shock therapy" and the replacement of the course of reforms. Let me remind you that our election program demands, in this connection, the use of state regulation measures to end the decline in production and combat inflation and unemployment; the ending of the unrestrained growth of prices and the mass impoverishment of the people; the restoration of the population's living standard and the safeguarding of the working people's basic socioeconomic rights; priority material support for families, mothers, and children; the protection of the country's intellectual potential, and so forth.

All these tasks should be tackled by a government of competent administrators consistently upholding national and state interests and formed on the basis of the consent of the majority of the Duma. The Duma itself must provide a legal basis for the government's activity and carry out general monitoring of compliance with the new course, without interfering in the handling of operational questions.

In foreign policy, more resolute actions are needed, aimed at protecting the security of Russia's national and state interests and stopping the further plundering of its natural resources. We continue to advocate the restoration of a single union state, not by means of violence, but exclusively on a voluntary basis and on the basis of the common interests and historical destiny of the brother peoples.

These are the immediate steps that the Communists intend to take on the basis of the Duma's work. And we are convinced that our program offers a real possibility of a peaceful solution to the crisis. In order to realize this possibility we will cooperate in the Federal Assembly with all factions that share our concern for the fate of the Fatherland, because the main conflict at this point in history is the conflict between antisocial, antistate forces that rely on comprador capital and pursue a policy of ruining Russia, and state-patriotic forces which are only just forming an alliance. Unless this conflict is resolved in favor of the patriotic forces, it will be inconceivable even to talk about the socialist revival of our Motherland.

Work in the Federal Assembly will demand of Communist deputies a high sense of responsibility, organization, and conscious discipline. A CPRF parliamentary faction will be formed, and will operate as one of the party's organizations, autonomous in resolving internal and tactical questions, but pursuing the general line defined by party congresses, conferences, and plenums of the Central Executive Committee. In this connection it is proposed to continue to hold these forums, with the participation of the deputies elected from the CPRF.

On the eve of the opening of the Federal Assembly's first session, planned for 11 January, it is important once again to convey the working people's demands to deputies and to appeal to their sense of state responsibility. In the first 10 days of January it is proposed to hold an All-Russia Action of left-wing patriotic forces for the restoration of the rule of law and civil peace. In different regions this could involve meetings, voters' instructions, pickets, and assemblies, which will adopt and send to the

Duma, or to its various factions, appeals expressing the main demands of our election platform.

At the same time it is necessary to begin preparing for the elections to local organs of power, which in most regions will be held in March. Here the experience accumulated in the recent election struggle will come in useful for all of us. At the same time, broader scope will clearly be opened up for collaboration with other communist and left-patriotic forces, for the creation of unified blocs, and so forth. It is necessary without fail to achieve more substantial success in the local elections than in the parliamentary elections.

I think we are all well aware that the votes cast for the Communist Party in the elections were given on credit, and it is our duty to work off this credit and justify people's confidence. We will not be granted it a second time. Therefore I ask you to settle down to complex and painstaking work. Still more difficult and responsible tasks await us in future.

Zyuganov, Communists Hold News Conference

LD2812201593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1941 GMT 28 Dec 93

[Text] The Communist deputies in the State Duma, the lower house of the new Russian parliament, will propose forming a commission for investigating the reasons for, and evaluating the social and economic consequences of, the Belaya Vezha agreements, which in December 1991 sealed the end of the Soviet Union and gave birth to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), said Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov.

He told a news conference in Moscow on Tuesday [28 December] that, as their next step, the Communists might demand the abrogation of the agreements.

The Communist Party also insists that another commission be formed to investigate the events that took place in Moscow late in September and early in October of 1993.

In addition, the Communists planned to propose a large package of laws, including legislation on economic reforms and foreign capital investments.

"The Communists won't stand for foreign investors playing the master in Russia," Zyuganov said. "We are not against (foreign) investment, but it must be regulated by legislation, not by presidential decrees and directives," he said.

The Communist deputies would also propose legislation on crime and corruption, Zyuganov said.

Answering questions about possible candidates to the post of State Duma chairperson, he said that "Vladimir Isakov is the most gifted lawyer and parliamentarian." But the four principal State Duma groups that the Communists had consulted had not yet come to a final conclusion on the matter, Zyuganov said.

He said a candidate should not be one of those whose candidacy might provoke a "confrontation" and should not be the leader of any of the parliamentary groups. The four major groups should reach a consensus and nominate the same candidate, Zyuganov said.

He said his party had not yet formed its "shadow cabinet."

Zyuganov severely criticized Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. "Russia has no foreign policy as such," he said. "He (Kozyrev) has done his best to have Russia surrounded by a cordon sanitaire of unfriendly countries."

Zyuganov rejected the possibility of cooperation between the Communists and Russia's Choice. "We cannot form a bloc with those who pursue policies harming the people and who are unable to change them," he said.

Zyuganov Rules Out Alliance With Nationalists

BR2812130093 Milan PANORAMA in Italian 31 Dec 93 p121

[Interview with Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, by Francesco Bigazzi in Moscow; date not given: "Holding the Balance"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Bigazzi] The last Soviet parliament was dominated by the alliance between communists and nationalists. The elections were won by those two parties. Will the previous opposition to President Boris Yeltsin be repeated?

[Zuyganov] We have nothing in common with those who seek expansion for Russia as far as the borders of the former Soviet Union. We are realistic in our policies. We do not intend to seek any form of alliance with the nationalists, because we are in favor of an alternative policy grouping together all the left-wing forces.

[Bigazzi] After setting aside the classic concept of "dictatorship of the proletariat," your party took up a stance against Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's reforms: To do that, it was prepared to cooperate with all sorts of people on the extreme right, whether their ideas were nationalistic, religious, or even monarchistic.

[Zyuganov] We are opposed to the reforms which have impoverished our country. We are against violence, however, and our aim is to form broad alliances so as to be in a position to influence the reforms. In Russia there is room for a party trying to save whatever can be saved from the dissolved Soviet Union: We do not wish to bring back the Russian empire, we simply want to prevent the system of links which held together the peoples of the Soviet Union from being scattered in the wind.

[Bigazzi] Your party garners votes from what is left of the CPSU's 30 million members. In the new situation would you be prepared to form an alliance with the Yeltsin reformers?

[Zyuganov] I would not rule out cooperation a priori, as long as the platform is clearly defined and there are changes in the economic reforms. The greatest danger today is from the extreme right: We must form a coalition to prevent the country from being plunged into civil war. Russia needs reforms, but it also needs a social policy in favor of the weakest sectors of the population.

[Bigazzi] Your party survived and was able to take part in the elections because, unlike the other communist parties, it had the good sense not to get mixed up with the supporters of the armed rebellion...

[Zyuganov] In this period of profound change we are opposed to all forms of violence. Indeed we believe that there is room for debate on the reforms and we are convinced that, once the nationalist inebriation is past, the Russians will wake up to the fact that economic problems are their daily bread. We want the reforms, but one can certainly not repudiate everything about the former Soviet regime.

Zhirinovskiy To 'Stay Away' From Press

LD3012122493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1156 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] The leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who returned to Moscow from Bulgaria on Wednesday, prefers to stay away from the press.

Zhirinovskiy was expelled from Bulgaria for statements that were regarded as intervention in the internal affairs of that country. The German Federal Chancellor gave instructions to the embassy in Sofia not to grant an entry visa to Zhirinovskiy, as the Russian political leader was planning to visit Germany after Bulgaria.

The journalists who were waiting for Zhirinovskiy outside his headquarters were told on Thursday morning that the leader of Liberal Democrats was extremely busy and would hold a conference with his staff. The meeting with the press was postponed until the beginning of next year.

Profile of LDPR Voters Outlined

PM2912182993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Dec 93 First Edition p 4

[Article by Vladimir Shokarev of the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Social and Economic Questions: "Who Voted for LDPR"]

[Text] Two polls conducted by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Social and Economic Questions (one 10 days before the elections, the other immediately after) among Russia's urban population make it possible to pinpoint the process of the increase in the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] electorate and the situation as of the moment of the elections. Whereas at the first stage Zhirinovskiy's supporters were mainly young men (aged 25-40) later their proportion declined. At the very last moment older people (their proportion in the electorate increased 50 percent) decided to vote for Zhirinovskiy's party; the number of people with education below secondary level also increased.

We have at our disposal figures which make it possible to outline the socioprofessional portrait of the LDPR supporters of the "first draft."

Over two thirds of Zhirinovskiy's supporters work and only 10 percent are pensioners. To judge by the increase in the proportion of the older age group, the number of pensioners has increased. Approximately half of Zhirinovskiy's supporters work at state enterprises. Some 43 percent are employed in industry. One third of the LDPR electorate consists of workers.

About one third work at medium and large enterprises. The Zhirinovskiy supporters considered their enterprises' main problem to be the leaders' wastefulness. The second most important problem is the state of labor discipline. At these enterprises conflicts between the administration and the workers were twice as frequent. Over the past three months there were mass layoffs of workers at the enterprises of every fifth Zhirinovskiy supporter, which is 50 percent higher than average. For all this 41 percent of those who voted for the LDPR are completely dissatisfied with the size of their wage, which is 11 percent higher than the average for the entire working population.

It must be added that from the outset, since October, Zhirinovskiy's party has been actively supported in small peripheral cities (up to 70 percent of the electorate). As of the moment of voting the correlation had changed somewhat—44 percent in the large cities, 56 percent in the small cities.

The results of our studies make it possible to conclude that the people who decided to vote for Zhirinovskiy cannot be called pessimists. What does draw the attention is that a sense of fear and nostalgia is not characteristic of them. But their own mood and their assessments of their own situation are at odds. They note 50 percent more often that the situation in their city is "very bad." Actually, those who vote for the Communists give this same assessment exactly twice as often. One third assess the situation in Russia as very bad, outstripping even the Communists, whose position on this issue makes them virtually no different from the remaining population—about 20 percent.

If you discount the three main problems perturbing supporters of all electoral blocs—the rise in prices, the rise in crime, and the state of the economy—then "the weakness of state power" can be considered the number one problem perturbing Zhirinovskiy's supporters. That

is characteristic only of this electorate. The second problem is "corruption and bribery." In this instance those who voted for the Communists were in solidarity with the LDPR. Another feature of Zhirinovskiy's electorate is also obvious—the high level of consolidation. Even in those cases where the importance of a problem is the same for the population and for Zhirinovskiy's supporters, the number of LDPR supporters who named this problem is usually higher than for other voters.

The influence of the mass media is borne out by the fact that the LDPR supporters noted two to four times more often than others that it was television, radio, and the newspapers which changed their initial voting intentions. About 32 percent also said that the mass media drew their attention to the elections. Among women who voted for Zhirinovskiy's party over 40 percent made their decision either a week before the elections or at the polling place itself. It may be added that about one-fourth of those who voted for the LDPR did so on an emotional impulse. For comparison, among the supporters of the "Russia's Choice" blow the figure was 9 percent, among supporters of the Yabloko group it was 8 percent and among supporters of the Russian Federation Communist Party 3 percent.

Most likely Zhirinovskiy's electorate was formed as follows. First, under the influence of the vigorous campaign part of the young and active population (men aged 25-40) is drawn into the LDPR orbit. Then older age groups are drawn in and, at the last moment, women vote for the LDPR.

The results are that the backbone of the LDPR electorate consists of the active, able-bodied section of the population. Its dissatisfaction with the reforms is most likely caused not by the deterioration of its own material base but by the growth of disorder and anarchy. By resolving this problem, the problem of chaos, it is possible to reduce the LDPR's base, otherwise it will increase.

Zhirinovskiy's Link With Dutch Company Examined

MK2912104093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 29 Dec 93 p 1

[Report by Mikhail Leontyev in the "Dividends" column: "GMM Has No Problem With Russia. As a Result, Russia Has Problems With Zhirinovskiy"]

[Text] For some time the airwaves and the pages of "expensive" newspapers have been filled with commercials of a certain Amsterdam-based "trust" company, GMM, promising fantastic hard currency dividends to domestic depositors. Quite recently, however, our unlucky viewer could watch yet another advertising campaign promoted by the same organization, except that instead of the dollars which "are working for you 24 hours a day all around the world" it portrayed a far less esthetic, very talkative, and absolutely unconvertible Nazi Zhirinovskiy. It turned out that both advertising campaigns coincided not only in scale but to a very considerable extent also in sources of funding.

The dividends promised by GMM as a result of operations on the Western financial market cannot be obtained in any other ways except criminal. It is clear even to a baby that GMM conducts its financial speculative operations inside Russia, subsequently transferring hard currency proceeds abroad. Interestingly, this "trust" company not only has no banking license to conduct its typically banking operations, but no license to do anything at all. Our immeasurably patriotically minded Central Bank under Mr. Gerashchenko (incidentally, the sole absolute winner in the elections) is paying no attention whatsoever to GMM's peculiar and rather noisy activity although this is part of its immediate duties, while the Finance Ministry is making futile attempts somehow to bridle the insolent financiers.

In Russia it is possible not only to kill bankers and priests with total impunity: Against the backdrop of the state's impotence organized bandits have turned into the sole and final legal body. What is more, they need as much political power as they have economic power. Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party brilliantly satisfies their demands through its high-liquidity deputies. On one hand, Zhirinovskiy himself with his crazy foreign political projects is causing direct damage to Russia's foreign economic interests, eliminating possibilities for any long-term investments and provoking capital flight. On the other, the party, which is openly concentrating on attracting cadres from the "power" structures and, generally speaking, was directly initiated by them, is forming a most solid cover for criminal activity. These guys are simply making fun of everybody: A perfectly "leftist" corporation is publicly pumping money out of Russia and, overseen by all the relevant bodies, directs the proceeds to finance a Nazi election campaign, moreover, openly including into its election slate a 24- year-old "adviser" of a sub-criminal foreign economic structure, Aleksey Zuyev. Hypocrisy is the last refuge of one's conscience: After all, it would have been so easy not to expose themselves quite so openly. But with things being what they are, it is probably reasonable to put the trademark "kike Dutchman" on the Russian TV official news program as a logo. And nothing will happen.

Prospects of 'Right-of-Center' Parties Evaluated

MK3012101093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 30 Dec 93 p 2

[Gleb Cherkasov report under the "Outsiders" rubric: "'Right-of-Center' Parties, Although They Lost This Time, May Be in for a Good Future"]

[Text] A tight schedule and tough conditions of the 1993 election campaign prevented some fragments of the Russian political spectrum from being represented in parliament and left them on the margins of big politics. For instance, virtually all electoral associations that see themselves as "right-of-center" could not overcome the

stage of signature gathering and presently have to prove their right to exist in the country's political life. Parties that can be referred to as members of this group include the Consolidation Party and the "Fatherland" electoral bloc, set up on the basis of the Socialist Workers' Party, the Union of Russia's Revival [URR], and the Union of Oil Producers.

The above electoral associations were characterized by a great number of overlapping provisions in their programs. At least, sharp criticism of the Chernomyrdin-Gaydar government, the Foreign Ministry's inconsistent course, and calls on the current Russian authorities to leave the political scene were present in their leaders' statements in one way or the other. As for the so-called "right-of-center" parties' views on fundamental subjects, only a very sophisticated observer would be able to distinguish between "spirituality and community" professed by the Consolidation Party and "national values" defended by the "Fatherland" bloc. Provisions concerning administrative measures to create social safety nets for ordinary citizens and to protect the interests of the nascent domestic business are virtually identical in all the associations.

Characteristically, both "Fatherland" and "Consolidation" relied on the regions' support and their own unfamiliarity to the broad public. They bet on the idea that voters, particularly in the provinces, having gotten sick and tired of "talking heads" and will give their backing to hitherto unknown politicians.

Their principle of compiling electoral lists holds particular interest. It is worth noting that organizations on whose basis the electoral associations were set up (the URR, the Consolidation Party, the Youth Organization) were in fact little known outside the Moscow political fistfighting. In order to give their electoral lists an air of respectability, they included in them either fairly well-known politicians (Viktor Stepanov, "Fatherland") or famous entrepreneurs (Valeriy Neverov, "Consolidation"). Aside from that, however, the blocs' lists were replete with names of people from the oil and gas sector; moreover, if the Oil Producers' Union chairman ranked fifth in the "Fatherland" list, his deputy was No. 6 in "Consolidation."

Judging from statements by some people who claim to stand to the right of center, their close ties with the oil producers have survived the electoral fiasco test. In this case, both the URR, on the basis of which a federal movement will probably be set up in the near future, and the Consolidation Party will find it easy to put up with the absence of their representatives in parliament and not to vanish from the political horizon for good before the next elections.

Skokov Said Preparing for Future Elections

PM2912150793 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Dec 93 p 3

[Report by Vasiliy Nelyubin: "Has Yuriy Skokov Began Preparing for Presidential Elections?"]

[Text] Krasnoyarsk—Yuriy Skokov stressed a dozen times—from the rostrum, in the lobby, and in interviews—that the Federation of Commodity Producers Congress was not of a political nature. But the atmosphere in the hall itself, the speeches of delegates, the presence of Arkadiy Volskiy and politicians of a slightly smaller caliber, and many other details suggested the reverse: That Yuriy Skokov has begun preparing for the future presidential elections and came to Siberia in order to create a new party.

Only a month ago "Civic Union" was rushing toward Russia's political Olympus with the power and reliability of a Central Committee "limo." But on 12 December the respectable limousine was left on the shoulder of the political dirt track.

"We made the mistake of staking everything on enterprise leaders: It turned out that the interests of directors and workers today are different," the "Civic Union" chief admitted to journalists.

Yes, the times when a director could boldly declare "Behind me stands a collective of many thousands" are a thing of the past. The elections also showed that lobby groupings—such as "Civic Union" effectively proved to be—should hardly expect success at the next elections. A powerful, full-fledged party is needed, and the majority of congress deputies expressed in one form or another a desire to take part in creating such a party in the very near future. However, the potential leader of the industrialists' party and present chairman of the Federation of Commodity Producers was traditionally cautious in his words. In his hour-long report Yuriy Skokov avoided emotions, nevertheless evaluating the course of reforms being implemented by the government on the whole negatively: "An environment has been formed in Russia that is inimical to domestic commodity producers, wherever they work...."

Skokov's colleagues, on the contrary, were completely definite in their pronouncements: The course of reforms must be changed and their own economic policy elaborated; mechanisms for putting pressure on the Kremlin should be created. The debate revolved around how this should be done. It was proposed to set up not only cartels and syndicates, but also a shadow government and, naturally, their own party.

...All the same Skokov's party did not emerge in Krasnoyarsk. On the other hand, the registration of the structure calling itself the Federation of Commodity Producers was completed. Obviously, this is only a first step.

Political Issues

Gaydar Interviewed on Year's Events

LD2912132493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1135 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] First Vice Premier Yegor Gaydar will not resign so long as he "feels we are pursuing a sensible course." He told a group of journalists in Moscow that he saw no signs indicating the reverse.

In reply to an Interfax question, Gaydar quoted Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin as saying at a recent meeting that there would be no revision of the government's program.

In Gaydar's opinion, the main tasks of the first stage of reforms had been accomplished by the end of 1993. This year market relations were gradually coming into shape. Yet, the progress was slow, fluctuating between a tougher and softer courses of reforms and destabilizing the economy.

Gaydar noted that relations with CIS members would be streamlined by January 1, 1994, as the unlimited subsidizing of their economies had already been stopped. Russia now has convertible currency and a large private sector, though its economy is still characterized by financial instability and the dangerously boosted differentiation of incomes.

Today we have two alternatives. On the one hand, we can continue the reforms, gradually creating favorable conditions for growth. This means a new system of financing and stimulating investments, gradual redistribution of budgetary allocations from support for businesses to support for social programs and encouragement of small and medium business. If we embark on this course, we will reduce the inflation rate to 5% or 7%, stop the industrial recession and stabilize the economy.

On the other hand, we can take the road of inflating the economy still more, paying lip service to support for industrial development and social programs. In this case the new year will be a repetition of the past year and will be a "categorical mistake".

Gaydar said that though the present government was a coalition, it did understand that the general course must remain unchanged. "I'm strongly against having opponents of the government's course (not Russia's Choice policy) in the government. They can stay in Parliament if they chose."

Impact of Gaydar's 'Slip' About Chernomyrdin Viewed

MK2912112093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Dec 93 p 1

[Report by Vitaliy Marsov under the "Upside-Down" rubric: "A Slip of the Tongue That May Cost Gaydar Too Much. Mr. Karaulov Could Not Withstand the Temptation"]

[Text] On Monday night Yegor Gaydar was speaking in Andrey Karaulov's "The Moment of Truth" program. The program was not live, that is to say, its author had every chance to delete the first deputy prime minister's slip of the tongue that may become fatal in relations between Gaydar and Chernomyrdin.

The dialogue was evolving approximately as follows (the key phrase is given exactly as it was said):

[Karaulov] Well, Zhirinovskiy's falcons will come to the government...

[Gaydar] With Chernomyrdin's falcons I... (At that point both Gaydar and Karaulov realized that something wrong had been said, something absurdly funny and at the same time pointedly symbolic in the current context. Gaydar, of course, corrected himself.)

Given that relations between the two heads of government, who have to "cohabitate" within one, are, to put it mildly, far from the best, Gaydar's slip of the tongue, which was impudently made public by Mr. Karaulov on the air, may prove to be the last straw that may trigger what already amounts to a government, not personal, crisis. Karaulov could not but realize that, but he gave in to the temptation to make public so sensational a verbal faux pas by Gaydar. It is already well known that the effect was achieved.

This is how powerful television is.

This is how helpless and unprofessional our leaders' press secretaries are, for Gaydar's aide should have done his utmost to keep the phrase from coming on the air. That's it.

Gaydar himself, who is a more than tough politician, as we have already seen, is indeed a soft intellectual in day-to-day life. I think he was simply embarrassed to say to Karaulov after the interview was recorded: "Of course, you will delete my unfortunate phrase," thus giving the journalist an opportunity to resolve this problem on his own, which is actually what has been done. In the worst possible fashion, however, given the situation.

There are already too many things in our politics that are decided by behind-the-scenes, dirty struggle. If Gaydar lost and has to go, this at least should be decided in a fair political single combat, not by taking him at his word.

As far as birds are concerned, Mr. Karaulov acted not like an eagle, but, rather, like a woodpecker...

Security Personnel React to Reorganization

PM2912152193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Dec 93 First Edition p 2

[Editorial office feature: "Provincial Specialists Await Coded Messages From the Center"]

[Text] Let us suppose that the views which the head of the Federal Counterintelligence Service expressed on the front page of this issue of IZVESTIYA with regard to the future of the service which he heads are still unknown to the overwhelming majority of his as yet unrecertified subordinates in the department's central apparatus and provincial apparatuses. What do people in the provinces think about what is happening? IZVESTIYA's own correspondents report on this.

Vologda—Officers of the Security Ministry Administration for Vologda Oblast comment highly sparingly on the edict abolishing their ministry, and even then on the obligatory condition that they remain incognito, Viktor Filippov reports. They are all soon to be faced with recertification, and it is better to take care, just in case.

To sum up everything I have heard, the following picture is taking shape: The administration continues to fulfill its functions, although operational work is being carried out in by no means the previous volume. The mood is somber owing to the unclear future and the rumor of a 50-percent reduction in personnel, which has filtered through from Moscow.

"By his edict the president is pushing us into Zhirinovskiy's embrace," one young officer in the former Ministry of Security said. "If I am dismissed, of course I will not go and serve racketeers. I will not go along with businessmen either. It is also naive to hope for worthy work in the militia because of our organization's long-standing complex relations with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. One thing will be left—to offer my services to the power structures of Zhirinovskiy's party. This politician inspires hope that, if his party becomes the ruling party, then the state will treat people of our profession with greater respect than it does today."

Samara—On the basis of a verbal directive received from Moscow by the chief of the investigative department, the investigation into all current proceedings has been suspended in the Samara Administration of the Ministry of Security, Eduard Kondratov reports. According to General V. Bolshakov, chief of the abolished Security Ministry Administration, however, no official order for this has been received. Nevertheless, a heap of files has been set aside.

What do ordinary "chekists" think of the situation?

"We are soldierly people and will fulfill the functions assigned to us by the state—our boss. Within the designated framework: from here to here." "It is stupid for a specialist to fear the future nowadays: We will always come in handy for the security services of banks and commercial structures and for private investigation." "No authority can manage without a secret information service. The authorties must definitely know about processes which change society, about actions of a serious nature that are being prepared, and about fascist and fanatical groups and societies which are arming themselves and which pose a threat to the country. The United States has the FBI in addition to the CIA. We too will have something similar. We will not be left out of work...."

Khabarovsk—Boris Reznik reports that Khabarovsk chekists took the news of the elimination of the Ministry of Security perfectly calmly. This is by no means the first reorganization of the "organs" [colloquial term for intelligence and security institutuions] in the career of even the youngest staffers, in the course of which signboards have been changed but not the essence of their activity. Even now they are not very concerned for their fate.

Security Ministry staffers, particularly young ones, were greatly offended that the president at his recent news conference summarily called all of them the last fragments of a totalitarian system. Incidentally, I also spoke with an elderly Security Ministry staffer who greatly dislikes the fact that they are "blamed for everything" and are accused of sins committed by their predecessors. "Why," he asked, "do Yeltsin and Yakovlev believe that they are capable of restructuring themselves and changing their guidelines in life, while denying that others are?"

Nor did Gen. Vitaliy Pirozhnyak, chief of the Security Ministry Kray Administration, avoid commenting. He believes that the president's decision is essentially correct: "New organs, freed from the past bad legacy, must stand guard over the new constitutional system." In the general's opinion, they must have clear-cut areas in their activity, but our power structures are not yet in any hurry to define them.

Yekaterinburg—In the opinion of local Security Ministry staffers, Aleksandr Pashkov reports from Yekaterinburg, they have built up substantial material on organized crime, and the question now arises: In what capacity, in fact, will they continue their activity?

"It is hard to understand from the edict how particular services not mentioned in the document will function," A. Grigoryev, staffer of the administration's press group, said. "It also is not clear who will conduct the certification process and according to which criteria. Will it be according to professional attributes, the principle of loyalty to the president, or something else?..."

To judge from statements by the administration's staffers, there is no panic in their ranks, but there is a sense of definite alarm. They do not understand the edict's ideological thrust or the absence, to this day, of the concept of Russia's security service.

As we can see, the presidential edict which has decided the fate of the Russian Ministry of Security has been given quite a calm reception in the department's regional subunits. Everyday work governed by the statute on the security service, which has essentially already been repealed, is continuing. True, investigation has been curtailed in some places.

The two-week deadline set for the Federal Counterintelligence Service to draw up a statute on itself runs out during the first days of January. We would like to believe that the leaders of the Federal Counterintelligence Service have been told, at least verbally, about the views of the country's leadership on its upcoming activity. As well as, incidentally, about the possible prospects for those staffers of the former Ministry of Security whose qualifications and convictions oblige us to keep such professionals if not to catch spies then in any case to combat terrorists, mafiosi, and major corrupt elements.

Just one thing is clear at present—the problem of the structure and the cadres of the former Ministry of Security will inevitably require several more presidential edicts and decrees by the state's top executive structures.

Commission Discusses Anti-Crime Measures

LD2912194993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1805 GMT 29 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow December 29 TASS—The Russian National Security Council's commission for intensifying struggle against crime and corruption met today to discuss a state programme for 1994-95, which it is planning to submit to the committee soon.

The commission was reorganized recently, and its new members include the deputy prosecutor-general of Russia, the deputy ministers of internal affairs, education, transport, railways, health care, social insurance, economics and foreign economic relations, as well as the leaders of the state customs committee, the federal migration service and the tax police department. This enlarged composition will enable the National Security Council of the Russian Federation to draw on the coordinated position of these agencies in considering ways of protecting the state and society from encroachments of criminal forces.

The commission has been entrusted with working out strategic and tactical priorities in the field of combatting crime and corruption. It will draft proposals for combatting crime and corruption and ensuring law and order in the country and submit them for consideration by the National Security Council and the president.

Chairman on 'Legal Uncertainty' Around Constitutional Court

LD2912213193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1828 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] The situation of "legal uncertainty" has shaped up around the Constitutional Court, chairman of the Constitutional Court Nikolay Vitruk told Interfax.

At present the Court consists of 13 judges. The powers of Valeriy Zorkin and Viktor Luchin are suspended by the Court decision accusing them of political connections.

According to the new Constitution, the Court must have 19 judges. The presidential decree of December 25 orders by-elections, with candidacies to be proposed by the nationwide congress of judges to open on March 31.

The presidential decree of December 24 cancels some laws contradicting the new Constitution, including the former law on the Constitutional Court.

"We believe that this corresponds to the transitional provisions of the new Constitution and that the former law on the Constitutional Court operates to the limit that it does not contradict the new Constitution. The presidential decree places this in doubt," said Vitruk.

Vitruk also proposed that the question on by-elections could be solved by the president before March 31. "The Constitution offers the president the right to propose candidates to vacancies in the Constitutional Court and he may use this right," said Vitruk.

As to the powers of Zorkin and Luchin, the meeting of the Court judges decided to continue discussion January 10, Interfax was told by Valeriy Zorkin.

Military & Space Issues

Defense Minister Grachev Holds News Conference

Details Strength of Armed Forces

LD2912144593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1340 GMT 29 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS observer Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Dec—The strength of the Russian Army today stands at 2,300,000. It has been reduced by nearly half a million over the last 18 months. In the coming year the reduction in the strength of the armed forces will be inconsiderable, by about 100-150,000.

These figures were given today at a meeting with journalists by Russian Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev. He said specialists favor the army's strength at being over 2,000,000, not 1,500,000, as the country's former parliament had determined.

Grachev told journalists that over the past year about 640,000 military servicemen; over 30,000 tanks and armored vehicles; 9,000 artillery pieces; over 4,000 planes and helicopters; 46 divisions and 64 brigades had been withdrawn from the countries of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Mongolia, Lithuania, and Cuba had been completed. Grachev stressed that such an immense amount of work had been carried out in an extraordinarily short time.

Whereas there were, in practical terms, no problems with the withdrawal of troops from Germany, he said, with regard to Latvia, Estonia, and Moldova there were

fundamental differences regarding legal questions of the planned withdrawal of Russian troops from the these states' territories.

Grachev also cited the following information: the Russian Army, in terms of sergeants and below is over 70 percent up to strength. Last year 120,000 men were taken into service on contract. According to Grachev, however, only a small number of "contractees" have joined combat sub-units. They are showing much more interest in rear and administrative jobs.

Says Army Favors 'Stability'

LD2912151193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1424 GMT 29 Dec 93

[ITAR-TASS observer Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Dec—"The Russian Army wants only one thing—the maximum accord in society. We do not want new shocks or unexpected turns in politics. Servicemen advocate stability and continuation of reforms in our society, first and foremost, economic ones." This is what Russia's Defense Minister Pavel Grachev told journalists today.

He noted that in the past year the Russian Army had played an important role in maintaining the country's integrity and security. During the tragic October events, it prevented a civil war in Russia, having displayed unity and understanding.

Grachev expressed dissatisfaction over the fact that certain political groupings are trying to split the army. It was precisely for this reason, in Grachev's opinion, that there had been so much talk about the results of the recent voting by servicemen. Grachev stressed at the same time that references are being made to the Central Electoral Commission. He presented journalists with the Central Electoral Commission's reply: "In connection with your inquiry we report that the Central Electoral Commission is not in a position to single out from the overall results of the elections the results of the voting by servicemen for the federal constituencies. No information about this has been presented by the Central Electoral Commission to the media."

As far as the closed polling stations in the former USSR are concerned, Grachev stressed that, together with servicemen, who were in the minority, people voting there were Russians residing in that particular area. There was no question of the military favoring any particular candidate or bloc.

Reviews Lessons of Past Year

PM2912204793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Dec 93 p 1

[Aleskandr Pelts report: "Army Has Done the Main Thing: It Has Prevented Civil War"]

[Text] Yesterday Russian Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev held a routine meeting with journalists of the central Russian and foreign mass media. It was devoted to the results of the Russian Federation Armed Forces' activity in 1993.

In a short introductory speech the defense minister stressed that the year now coming to an end was extremely difficult for the Russian Army from every point of view: politically, economically, and in terms of morale. The lessons of the year require the most serious reflection. But it can be stated unequivocally that the Army this year played an important role in preserving Russia's integrity and security. The troops confirmed their lofty purpose and demonstrated their unity. The main thing, Pavel Grachev stressed, is that the Armed Forces averted civil war, of which Russia had stood on the very brink.

Then the defense minister dwelled on the most important questions of military organizational development, the problems of conversion, and also the routine activity of the Armed Forces. The figures for the systematic reduction of the Armed Forces and their financial provision and social protection elicited great interest from journalists.

Many questions were also asked on the results of the recent elections. Unfortunately, Army General Grachev commented, speculation on this theme in certain mass media continues unabated. He stressed once again that all figures or any other data whatsoever appearing now in once place, now in another, are inventions which have no real basis to them. Pavel Grachev made public the official reply of Aleksandr Ivanchenko, deputy chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, that "The Central Electoral Commission does not possess the ability to isolate the results of servicemen's voting in the national federal electoral district from the overall results of the State Duma elections. Any information on this subject appearing in the mass media was not provided by the Central Electoral Commission."

P.S. Read in more detail about the press conference in the next issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

Defense Ministry To Reduce 'Political Commissars'

LD3012111293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1003 GMT 30 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow December 30 TASS—The Russian Defence Ministry decided on Thursday [29 December] to radically reduce the number of Army generals responsible "for the work with the personnel", i.e. former political commissars—a heritage of the soviet system.

TASS learned from sources in the ministry that its leadership had decided to transform the main department for the work with the personnel into an ordinary

department which will result in a radical reduction of positions filled in by generals.

There are 40 such generals in the ministry at present.

Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev criticised the department on Wednesday saying that the "educators abide by old approaches in new conditions" and are mostly concerned by preserving their high positions.

But the minister praised the rank-and-file educators who deal directly with privates and sergeants. He said the reform of the department will not affect them.

Grachev's Future Assessed

MK3012100093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 30 Dec 93 p 1

[Dmitriy Kholodov report: "Did You Ever Hear the Rooks [grach] Sing? How Many Legs Are Left Under the Defense Minister's Chair?]

[Excerpts] After his public execution of the Security Ministry Boris Yeltsin is in no hurry to crack down on another power department—the Defense Ministry, rumors about whose reformation are rife.

So far, in the president's words, "measures are being taken" only with respect to the Main Personnel Directorate, which did not justify the pre-election hopes. Admittedly the army is always loyal to the authorities and therefore should have voted "better." Now the Main "Anti-Personnel" Directorate is to be reorganized as a simple directorate and reduced by 40 generals.

Yet the expected sensation—separation of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff—has not happened so far. In the president's immediate entourage, however, there are influential supporters of the idea of turning the ministry into an administrative body with troop control functions being transferred to the General Staff. Pavel Grachev, who was smiling on TV screens for two days in a row following the release of the pilots captured by gunmen, on Tuesday told "Vesti" with irritation that attempts are being made to destroy the army. [passage omitted]

We asked Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov to comment. In the marshal's opinion, so far there has been no substantial progress in the army reform but even so he would prefer to democratize the army in a traditional way: by accelerating professionalism, adjusting technical policy, and expanding glasnost. There should also be a single control branch. If there are two branches, this will inevitably lead to conflicts and duplication of functions. [passage omitted]

"I am for the Western model," Dmitriy Volkogonov, the president's military adviser, told us. According to Volkogonov, however, that is suitable only for a politically stable country. Russia cannot count on such a system until two years later.

Pavel Grachev is not the most influential opponent of such reorganization. Only a month ago his name was identified with the upcoming reshuffles and downsizing in the General Staff. But that did not happen.

On the other hand, the department headed by Grachev has been "successful" in setting everybody against itself. The latest such success story has been the scandalous mobilization of secondary vocational and specialized school students this last fall, which has annoyed the intelligentsia. A fairly strong "opposition" to Grachev took shape in the government itself. Some are unhappy with the general's foreign policy activity, which is sometimes nothing short of a failure. Many see a danger in an "armed military industrial complex" and would like to strip it of its troop control function in the face of the upcoming mass closure of defense industry enterprises. And finally, Pavel Grachev's popularity among the officers and even his dear paratroopers has long been close to zero. Reformers have never been liked. Grachev knows this himself: In response to a MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS proposal to establish the rating of military leaders, the Defense Ministry said that this is unethical with respect to Pavel Grachev.

But the main thing is that Boris Yeltsin has none of his previous feelings toward Pavel Grachev after the 3 October events when the president all but arrived at the minister's office accompanied by the Alpha group to issue orders to the army.

Boris Yeltsin's procrastination is attributed not only to the impossibility to reform the two power departments simultaneously.

Indeed, there is no need to hurry. First, Article 83 of the newly adopted constitution says that the Russian Federation president "appoints and removes the top command of the Russian Federation Armed Forces." There is no mention of parliament here. Under Article 5 of the Law on Defense, the Russian Federation president "approves the Statute on the Russian Federation defense minister and the Russian Federation General Staff of the Armed Forces." President Clinton, who is due to arrive in Moscow, can only dream about such freedom of action.

Addressing a press conference devoted to the "results of the year's performance" (which took place immediately after his inadvertent comments on "Vesti") Pavel Grachev assessed publications on reforms in a traditional way: "Someone stands to gain from this."

The issue of the army remains open. Pavel Grachev is seeking to show his self-confidence. Only two weeks ago, however, the Security Ministry was demonstrating its self-confidence without even thinking that before the New Year it will be abolished.

Defense Security Commission Holds First Meeting

LD2912201293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1921 GMT 29 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Moscow December 29 TASS—The Russian Security Council's interdepartmental commission for defence security gathered in its first meeting at the Defence Ministry today, a ministry spokesman told TASS.

The commission is the main working body of the Russian Security Council set up to ensure the country's defence security. Under a presidential decree, First Deputy Defence Minister Andrey Kokoshin is appointed chairman of the interdepartmental commission. It also includes First Deputy Economics Minister Valeriy Mikhailov, Deputy Interior Minister Anatoliy Kulikov, First Deputy Chief of Staff Vladimir Zhurbenko, Border Troops Commander Andrey Nikolayev, senior officials of other ministries and agencies.

During its first meeting, the commission outlined and discussed possible ways to fulfil the functions conferred on it, above all those related to working out proposals and recommendations for the Security Council to be used in shaping the main directions of the defence security policy.

Defense Ministry Lacks Funds To Settle Debts

PM2912171993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Dec 93 p 1

["Own information" report: "Yet There Were Instructions. And Very Strict Ones"]

[Text] Despite instructions from Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin and Government Chairman V.S. Chernomyrdin and repeated appeals from the Defense Ministry, as of now the ministry, like many other departments, has still not received funds for settling accounts with enterprises supplying military equipment.

There are also large debts for deliveries of fuel and lubricants, clothing allowances, food, municipal services, and so forth. The state's debts to enterprises (as of 25 December 1993) for deliveries of arms and military equipment alone was approximately 870 billion rubles.

Defense Industry's Future, Arms Exports Eyed

PM2912170793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Dec 93 First Edition p 4

[Sergey Leskov article: "The Defense Industry Has Seized the Monopoly in the Refrigerator Market but Dreams Most About Arms Export"]

[Text] The Russian Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry unites eight of the nine former ministries which until recently formed the all-powerful USSR military-industrial complex. No matter how much the political and economic situation may change in the country and in the world, the Russian defense sector, with over 2,000 enterprises, remains the fulcrum of the national economy.

There are still 70 closed plant-cities in the country, as your IZVESTIYA correspondent was told at the Russian Committee on the Defense Sectors of Industry, mainly specializing in the production of munitions and chemical agents. In all, the defense industry employs around 4 million people, 800,000 of them scientists. Both figures are much higher than the indicators for other sectors.

The picture has not been altered even by the fact that in the past two years around 30 percent of the specialists have left enterprises in the military-industrial complex. Since the average wage in the defense industry is now two-thirds the average in civilian industry this process is hardly likely to be slowed down in the near future. There can be no doubt that in 1994 the people most likely to leave the military-industrial complex will be the highly skilled and young workers. And if so far there not been a noticeable "brain drain" from our defense sector to other countries the year ahead could have surprises in store. It was only by chance that a group of missile specialists bound for North Korea was recently stopped. According to certain information a settlement is currently being upgraded in South Korea to house 300 Russian defense specialists.

Directors may complain about conversion but in view of the catastrophic reduction in the defense order and chronic nonpayment by the Defense Ministry for output already supplied, the transition to civilian products is the main hope for plants' survival. In the words of Viktor Glukhikh, chairman of the Russian Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry, "civilian" output accounted for 80 percent of the military-industrial complex' total output volume in 1993. The participation of enterprises in the military-industrial complex in the production of domestic appliances is particularly evident: It accounts for 90 percent of the refrigerators produced and 100 percent of TV sets. In 1993 the military-industrial complex put into production 800 types of textile equipment. The military-industrial complex is paying less and less attention to its main purpose: In two years the volume of military output has fallen by 48 percent.

Virtually the main argument used by those who advocate that the defense sector should retain its particularly military bias is the prospect of earning hard currency from the export of armaments. But the unprecedented activity at all kinds of shows in 1993 did not yield Russia any great dividends. Exports have already fallen by 70 percent since 1991. Assessments suggest that our earnings in this respect, even if they do exceed $1 billion, will not do so by very much.

It cannot be ruled out that the defense sector's exports will follow a different and unexpected track. Some 300

joint ventures have already been created in the sector, which produced output worth $500 million. In 1993 the export of civilian output from military plants rose by 35 percent. During [U.S. Vice President] A. Gore's recent visit 30 joint conversion projects were signed with the United States and a further 45 are ready for signing. Nevertheless, the Russian Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry is confident that Russian arms exports will increase soon—in 2-3 years' time this export will net the exchequer over $2 billion. In the world market that figure is not great. In 1993 the United States increased its arms exports by a further $15 billion, to a considerable extent due to our own mistakes.

Around a quarter of enterprises in the military-industrial complex have already been privatized. And even though some specialists believe that conversion and privatization cannot occur simultaneously, this process will continue in 1994. But a structural reorganization could happen in the central apparatus, too: The Russia Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry is anxiously awaiting the promised reorganization of the government. According to rumors, one option features the transformation of the committee into a small department at the Ministry of the Economy.

Perhaps the strategic idea is valid but in a critical situation yet another administrative revolution threatens to make the Russian defense industry permanently unmanageable and bring about its swift and irreversible collapse.

Defense Industry Designers Discuss Future

LD3012005493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2145 GMT 29 Dec

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow December 30 TASS—Managers of Russia's defence-related industries are greatly concerned over the future, which was proved once more by yesterday's meeting in Moscow of principal and chief designers working in these industries. As people always seeking non-typical solutions to most complicated problems, participants in the meeting concentrated on possible ways out of the crisis currently facing the Russian defence industries. However greatly their opinions differed, the designers were unanimous in pressing for keeping at any cost the present effective coordination of the defence complex' functioning. According to Rostislav Belyakov, principal designer of the MiG aicraft-manufacturing complex, the community which has formed within the framework of the Russian Committee for Defence Industries is unprecedented in the world. This mixture of designing and engineering experience should be preserved, he stressed.

Academician Yevgeniy Fedosov expressed concern over somewhat upset ties between arms and military equipment producers and the Defence Ministry. As a possible solution to this problem, he suggested using more actively the possibilities of the Security Council under the Russian president. Participants also stressed the need for a special regulation on principal and chief designers to govern their activities. A draft regulation had been submitted to the president last January, however it has not been approved officially so far.

During the discussion, the designers moved a lot of interesting ideas and proposals which are now to be summarized and forwarded to the Russian government.

Space Agency Chief on Status of Baykonur Cosmodrome

LD2912172793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1630 GMT 29 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow December 29 TASS—Head of the Russian Space Agency Yuriy Koptev came out in favor of Russia's leasing the Baykonur space launch area from Kazakhstan. Commenting at today's news conference on the memorandum signed by the Russian and Kazakh prime ministers on December 25, he described the cosmodrome as a unique infrastructure constituting "an integral part of space activities". Baykonur is the only space center from which some rocket-boosters may be launched, in particular a "Proton" rocket- booster. Therefore, an attempt to transfer Baykonur's functions to another cosmodrome, for example the Plesetsk one, will not only cost Russia large sums for installation of necessary equipment, but also take from 8 to ten years.

According to the space agency chief, Russia is going to rent not the entire area of the cosmodrome, covering 4.5 mln hectares of so-called fall zones and 394 thousand hectares under the space center itself and the town of Leninsk. "The areas now occupied will be considerably reduced", since many types of modern space equipment do not require so much room for their operation.

Koptev gave a high assessment to the memorandum, which calls for gradual and well-considered demilitarization of the cosmodrome, the same as the earlier plan by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev providing for the status of an open joint-stock society for Baykonur. At the moment, withdrawal of Russian military from the space center would amount to termination of its functioning, since the 28,000 servicemen presently deployed here fully ensure the proper operation of the cosmodrome.

Media Issues

Yeltsin Congratulates Paper on 70th Anniversary

PM3012092193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Dec 93 p 1

[Congratulations message to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA from President Yeltsin under the general heading "Congratulating Us": "President of Russia"]

[Text] I cordially congratulate the editorial collective of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and its readers on the 70th anniversary of the publication of the first issue of the newspaper.

Historically it has turned out that since the first people's volunteer detachments and, after them, the creation of the first regular forces, the army in Russia has always been, and remains, a people's army in the highest and most noble sense of the word, an army whose main task was and remains the reliable protection of a peaceful life.

Your newspaper is read in wartime and in peacetime. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's frontline correspondents have included Andrey Platonov, Ilya Erenburg, Konstantin Simonov, and Vasiliy Grossman. Many of the works of Mikhail Sholokhov, Aleksey Tolstoy, and other outstanding Russian writers first appeared in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA won glory not simply as a "newspaper for soldiers"—it has become a truly national, people's newspaper which performed a great deed: It united society in the struggle against the enemy and inspired in people a belief in victory.

In the present situation when political and economic changes of historic significance are taking place in society and when Russians have approved the new Constitution your newspaper faces a most crucial task: to explain intelligibly to Russians the essence of the military and civilian reforms that are taking place.

The president of the Russian Federation and the Russian Government have every reason for believing that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will remain at the very center of this important work.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's motto is: "Telling the Army about society, telling society about the Army." Today, on the eve of the newspaper's jubilee my wholehearted wish to its illustrious collective is this: Stand firm!

I wish health and prosperity, dear friends, to you and your families, personal happiness, and new creative achievements for the sake of our fine multinational motherland's future.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin
[Dated] 28 December 1993.

Grachev Sends Congratulations

PM3012090993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Dec 93 p 1

[Congratulations message to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA from Defense Minister Grachev under the general heading "Congratulating Us": "Russian Federation Defense Minister"]

[Text] Seventy years ago, on 1 January 1924, the first issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA appeared. For seven decades the central military newspaper's editorial office has lived for the work and cares of the Army and Navy and shared their fate, joys, and pain.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War KRASNAYA ZVEZDA staff honorably fulfilled their military, professional duty, sparing neither effort nor life in this cause. By their vivid and brilliant articles they inspired soldiers and commanders to believe in victory over the enemy and formed a bond of truth between the front line and the rear.

In the postwar period, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA contributed its utmost to the strengthening of the Armed Forces, to the creation of the motherland's reliable nuclear missile shield and military-strategic parity, to patriotic education, and to the preparation of young people for military service.

Today, too, the main priorities for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA are the informed and balanced coverage of the course of military organizational development, the reform of the Armed Forces, and the struggle to enhance the combat readiness of the Army and Navy. The newspaper consistently defends the rights and social status of the motherland's defenders and the prestige of military service. Reports from the "hot spots" tell readers the truth about the courage and lofty nobility of the Russian soldier and officer and their steadfastness and loyalty in the execution of their military duty.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was and remains truly a people's newspaper. Its activity is based on inculcating in our fellow countrymen a high spirituality, true patriotism, love for the fatherland, and readiness to defend it. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has a large and grateful readership. It is known and loved by army and navy servicemen and veterans of the Armed Forces. The newspaper also has a good many friends among those who have never worn military uniform but who cherish the fate and future of the Russian state.

I congratulate you, dear comrades, on your noteworthy jubilee. I wish you new creative successes for the good of Russia and its Armed Forces. Good health and prosperity to you and your near ones.

[Signed] Army General P. Grachev, defense minister of the Russian Federation.
[Dated] 28 December 1993.

Shumeyko: Government To Support 10-15 Publications

LD2912232993 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 29 Dec 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Vladimir Shumeyko said today at a meeting with journalists that 24,000 newspapers are published in our country at the present time. He believes that this is even too much for Russia and therefore there is no question of the press' survival. At the same time he said that the government intends to give financial support for only 10-15 publications. Among them are RABOTNITSA

[FEMALE WORKER], KRESTYANKA [PEASANT WOMAN], and OGONEK [SMALL LIGHT].

Editors Warn Chernomyrdin of Possible Closures

LD2912234193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2005 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Twenty-four Russian newspapers and periodicals may not come out in the period from January 10 to 17, 1994, the first week of the new Russian parliament.

Their editors and the heads of five associations of journalists have written a letter to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin protesting against a government resolution of November 25 on the re-evaluation of the fixed assets of industrial enterprises.

The enforcement of the resolution would raise the cost of the fixed assets of printing houses several times over, causing their services to go up six-fold, the letter says, proposing that "his blow at freedom of speech be averted either by special subsidies or by special regulations on the enforcement of Resolution No. 1233 in the printing industry, the post, communications and paper production."

Otherwise "the constitutional right of Russians to receive complete information about all aspects of the life of their country and the entire world will be grossly violated, and the dialogue between authority and the people, something without which no society can exist, will cease," says the letter, signed by chairman of the Journalists' Union Vsevolod Bogdanov, president of the Association of Chief Editors and Publishers Ivan Laptev, chairman of the Committee for the Defense of Freedom of Speech and the Rights of Journalists Pavel Gutiontov, editors of the newspapers Izvestiya, Trud, Argumenty I Fakty, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Rossiyskiye Vesti, Za Rubezhom, Moscow News, Segodnya, et al.

Yeltsin Edict on RIA NOVOSTI Published

PM3012120193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Dec 93 First Edition p 4

["Edict of the Russian Federation President on Ensuring the Activity of the NOVOSTI News Agency" signed by President B. Yeltsin and dated 23 December 1993]

[Text] With a view to providing information and analytical support for Russia's domestic and foreign policy and creating a favorable image of the Russian state and in development of the Russian Federation president's edicts No. 1371 of 15 September 1993 "On the Russian Information Agency NOVOSTI" and No. 1598 of 7 October 1993 "On Legal Regulation During the Period of Stage-by-Stage Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation," I decree:

1. The Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government is to ratify the charter of the Russian Information Agency NOVOSTI (RIA NOVOSTI) as a state information and analysis agency in the form of a state enterprise.

2. Russian Federation ministries, state committees, and departments are to send to RIA NOVOSTI as a matter of priority official documents and materials intended for dissemination in the mass news media.

3. As from 1994 in elaborating drafts of the Russian Federation republic budget the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance is to make provision for funding RIA NOVOSTI's expenditure as a separate item, including expenditure on development of the material and technical infrastructure, capital construction, the implementation of social programs for the agency's collective, operational needs, maintenance of a network of correspondents, payments for communications services, and information services to the Russian Federation President's Administration, the Russian Federation Federal Assembly, the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government, and other central organs of federal executive power.

4. The Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property is to:

assign to RIA NOVOSTI full economic charge of the buildings and installations on Russian Federation territory and abroad that are on its balance sheet;

ensure that RIA NOVOSTI retains leased buildings and installations that are within federal ownership.

5. In 1994 RIA NOVOSTI is to be exempted:

from paying customs duties on materials and technological equipment exported from the Russian Federation's customs territory for purposes of ensuring the information activity of the agency's information centers, bureaus, and offices abroad;

from paying value-added tax and customs duties on materials and technological equipment intended for the collection, processing, and transmission of information purchased with funds from the Russian Federation republic budget or with RIA NOVOSTI's funds and imported onto the Russian Federation's customs territory by the agency in question.

6. Within one month the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government is to decide questions of material and technical support for RIA NOVOSTI and social and everyday support for the agency's labor collective.

7. Within one month the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government Currency Economic Commission is to examine according to established procedure the question of exempting RIA NOVOSTI in 1994 from the compulsory sale of a proportion of the hard currency proceeds from the dissemination of information and services and to submit proposals to the Russian Federation president.

8. In 1994 the Russian Federation Ministry of Transport is to transport on Russian Federation territory foreign specialists working under agreements and contracts with RIA NOVOSTI on the basis of non-hard currency exchange and also transport their freight with expenditure being paid in rubles according to the tariffs in force for Russian citizens.

9. It is recommended that organs of executive power of the republics within the Russian Federation, krays, oblasts, autonomous formations, and cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg charge for the stay of foreign citizens coming to the Russian Federation to work under agreements and contracts with RIA NOVOSTI on the basis of non-hard currency exchange, in rubles according to the tariffs in force for Russian citizens.

10. The Russian Federation Ministry of Communications is to:

provide RIA NOVOSTI with special permits (licenses) in the communications sphere in accordance with Section 12 of the Temporary Statute on Communications in the Russian Federation approved by the Russian Federation president's edict No. 810 of 31 July 1992 "On Communications in the Russian Federation";

grant the chairman of the RIA NOVOSTI board and his deputies the right to send telegrams bearing the seal "government communication";

levy from RIA NOVOSTI, including subsidiary enterprises, organizations, and offices, payment in rubles for all types of services provided by communications enterprises at the regulated state prices and tariffs approved for budget-financed organizations.

11. The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to provide RIA NOVOSTI with visa support and also official passports, including for persons working abroad.

12. As from 1 January 1994 the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs is to include RIA NOVOSTI on the list of special-purpose facilities.

13. The chairman of the RIA NOVOSTI board is permitted to have five deputies, including one first deputy, appointed by the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government.

14. The terms for social and everyday support and medical services laid down for leading personnel of Russian Federation ministries are to be extended to the chairman and members of the RIA NOVOSTI board.

15. The present edict is to be submitted for examination by the Russian Federation Federal Assembly.

16. The present edict enters into force the moment it is signed.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin
[Dated] The Kremlin, Moscow, 23 December 1993, No. 2278

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI Drops Name of Founder

MK2912140093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 29 Dec 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Valeriy Kucher Removes Founder"]

[Text] The newspaper ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI came out yesterday without the name of its founder—the Russian Federation Council of Ministers. Chief editor Valeriy Kucher said that he had been guided by the law on the press because the government, in accordance with the president's edict, is being reorganized and, in line with the law, it has no right to act as a founder of mass media. Thus has materialized the dream of RV's chiefs to become a nongovernment press organ. The reaction of the official authorities is so far unknown.

Economic Issues

Yeltsin Edict on Fourth Quarter Budget Indicators

PM2912124193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Dec 93 First Edition p 6

[Presidential Edict No. 2234 "On Amending the Indicators of the Republic Budget of the Russian Federation for the Fourth Quarter of 1993," signed by President B. Yeltsin and dated Moscow, The Kremlin, 21 December]

[Text] Taking into account the need to immediately amend the indicators of the republic budget of the Russian Federation for the fourth quarter of 1993, and on the basis of Points 2 and 3 of edict No. 1598 of the Russian Federation president dated 7 October 1993 "On Legal Regulation During the Period of Stage-by-Stage Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation," I decree:

1. With a view to containing the deficit of the republic budget of the Russian Federation for 1993 within the limit of not more than 10 percent of GNP, the expenditure in the republic budget of the Russian Federation for the fourth quarter of 1993 is set at 22.2468 trillion rubles [R], based on the amended forecast of total revenue amounting to R15.2367 trillion.

2. The maximum amount of the deficit of the republic budget of the Russian Federation for the fourth quarter of 1993 is set at R5.510 trillion, taking into account the fact that revenue amounting to R1.5001 trillion from foreign credits granted to the Russian Federation will be channeled to partially cover it.

3. The Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government must adopt for execution the amended expenditure of the republic budget of the Russian Federation for the fourth quarter of 1993, as listed in Appendix 1.

4. The amount of funds transferred in the form of reciprocal settlements from the republic budget of the Russian Federation to the budgets of components of the

Russian Federation in order to equalize the level of the population's social security will be set in line with Appendix 2.

5. The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance must ensure that the amended expenditure of the republic budget of the Russian Federation for the fourth quarter of 1993 is financed as budget revenues are received, taking into account the credit line of R4,660 billion allocated by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation in line with edict No. 1515 of the president of the Russian Federation dated 1 October 1993 "On Granting the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government Credit To Cover the Deficit of the Republic Budget of the Russian Federation in the Fourth Quarter of 1993," as well as the sale of gold via the issue of gold certificates in line with decree No. 980 of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government dated 25 September 1993 "On the Sale of Gold Via the Issue of Gold Certificates 1993" and the issue of short-term Russian Federation loan bonds to a total of up to R850 billion in line with the Russian Federation Law "On the Russian Federation's State Domestic Debt."

6. This edict is to be submitted for consideration by the Russian Federation Federal Assembly.

7. This edict comes into force from the moment of its publication.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin
[Dated] Moscow, The Kremlin, 21 December 1993

Appendix 1: Amended Expenditure of the Republic Budget of the Russian Federation for the Fourth Quarter of 1993

	Billions of rubles Fourth Quarter 1993
Expenditure (total)	22,246.8
of which	
1. Financing of the national economy (total)	2,958.8
including:	
a) state subsidies (total)	1,368.3
of which	
subsidies to the agro-industrial complex	416.6
subsidies to the coal industry (including expenditure under the wage rate agreement)	810
offsetting 50 percent of the cost borne by state air transport enterprises for aviation fuel used to carry passengers on regular domestic routes in 1992	1.8
subsidies to river transport enterprises for passenger shipments on interoblast routes and other measures	0.9
granting concessions on the transport costs incurred by low-income citizens living in regions of the Far North and similar areas	40.7
compensation for the declining revenue of oil refining and petroleum product providing enterprises resulting from the continuation during the spring field work period of supply and marketing mark-ups on petroleum product prices in effect on 1 March 1993	48.1
compensation payments to low-income internationalist servicemen or those on the waiting list for improved housing to cover the increased cost of cooperative housing construction begun prior to 1 January 1992	15.3
other state subsidies (total)	35.8
including:	
to the Federal State Postal Communications Administration	8.4
for the production of literature for higher educational institutions and general education schools, including schools for numerically small peoples	9.5
for the publication of geodesy and cartography training manuals	0.2
to cover losses incurred by peat-extracting enterprises' housing and municipal services	0.8
to maintain social sphere facilities in northern sea ports	0.9
subsidies to pharmacy institutions of the Russian Federation Ministry of Railways system and other ministries (departments)	0.8
for the upkeep of nurseries of laboratory animals and other individual installations of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences and the Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences	0.3
to the Russian Federation State Committee for Cinematography	4.7
b) targeted spending from the centralized amount of land tax and leasehold payments	21
c) spending on the reproduction of the minerals and raw materials base	200
d) making good the interest-rate differential on soft loans	460.1

	Billions of rubles Fourth Quarter 1993
of which for loans granted to enterprises in the agro-industrial complex	430.9
e) spending on the introduction of state insurance for agricultural enterprises	27
f) operational costs of organizations of budget-funded ministries and departments (total)	248.3
of which:	
forestry protection and forestry restoration measures carried out by the Russian Federal Forestry Service	61.8
forestry protection and forestry restoration measures carried out by organizations not belonging to the system of the Russian Federal Forestry Service	0.05
the financing of measures for the grading and testing of agricultural crops, the quarantine of plants, fishery protection supervision, costs connected with the fight against especially dangerous plant pests, the prevention and elimination of animal diseases (anti-epizootic measures) and other costs as well as the cost of maintenance of the interfarm irrigation network and other budget organizations belonging to the system of the Russian Federation Ministry of Agriculture and Food	40.2
maintaining the fishery protection service of the Russian Fisheries Committee	6.7
maintaining the agrochemical laboratory and the social infrastructure of scientific towns, financing veterinary and health measures and land management work aimed at the radical improvement of lands carried out by organizations of the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences [Rosselkhozakademiya]	0.1
maintaining military construction detachments and military construction schools	26.2
hydrometeorology work and environmental monitoring	22.3
the maintenance of inland waterways and shipping safety inspectorates	19.9
water management and water conservation measures	2.7
the upkeep of the hydrographic enterprise and reservoir subdivisions of the State Maritime Special Service [Gosmorspetssluzhba], the rescue coordination service, and the COSPAS-SARSAT satellite system	3
topographical and geodesic work	9.9
measures in land management, the management of the Land Registry, and other measures to support the land reform	11.2
the implementation of measures in the operation and restoration of communications facilities	5.7
financing state reserves and regional and special inspectorates of the analytical monitoring service of the Russian Federation Ministry of the Use of Nature and Environmental Protection	2.9
backup for the information activity of ITAR	2
spending on the patenting of inventions	0.3
financing state grain inspectorates responsible for overseeing the observation by grain products enterprises of the reception of grain and other grain products	0.4
maintaining standardization and other metrology centers	0.3
financing organs supporting the use of air transport and air traffic control	11
f) other national economic costs (total)	127.4
of which:	
financing the program of measures to ensure the Russian Federation's transition to the international system of statistics	2.9
compensation paid to individual agricultural enterprises for costs incurred in the payment of grants to women working in rural locations	1.7
budget loans issued for the purspose of the remodeling and modernization of oil-refining enterprises	15.8
reimbursing to the "Gazprom" Russian joint-stock company of part of its expenditure on the payment of interest on credits for the pumping of natural gas into underground reservoirs	8.2
payments for the chartering of foreign tankers during the 1993 shipping season	4.3
reimbursement of expenditure incurred by the Russian Federation Committee for Geology and the Use of Natural Resources in interest payments and the repayment of loans granted by the Bank of Russia in 1992	4.9
financing the design of plans for the development and placement of production forces, planning, surveying, and design work	2.1
resources reserved for the amendment of state spending in connection with the prognostic approach to the definition of the index of price increases and the volume indicators of sectors funded from the republic budget of the Russian Federation	83.2
2. Financing sociocultural measures (total)	1,372.9

	Billions of rubles Fourth Quarter 1993
including:	
a) public education and the vocational training of cadres	754.5
b) culture and art	52.9
c) the mass media (total)	130.5
including:	
the periodical press	21.6
television and radio broadcasting	108.8
d) health care (total)	405.5
including:	
the Russian Federation State Committee for Health and Hygiene Inspection	50.2
From the total amount of expenditure on health care, to finance federal targeted programs:	
"Family Planning"	3.4
"Anti-AIDS"	1.6
"Development of the Russian Federation State Sanitary and Epidemiology Service in 1993-1995"	2
e) youth policy measures	0.2
f) physical culture and sports	8.8
g) social provision (total)	19.3
including financing the "Disabled Children" targeted program	6.2
3. Payment of bread subsidies to low-income citizens	294
4. Financing fundamental scientific and technical research and state scientific and technical programs of the Russian Federation	500.2
5. Financing state programs and investments (total)	3,628.5
including:	
a) state investments (total)	2,100
including the agro-industrial complex	526.4
b) financial support measures for northern regions	558.3
c) programs for the elimination of the aftermath of the disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station, the nuclear discharge in Chelyabinsk Oblast, and the long-term effect of nuclear testing in the Semipalatinsk test range on the population of certain regions of the Russian Federation, and other radioactive contamination	301.4
d) financing of defense complex enterprises undergoing conversion	159.1
e) support programs for peasant (private) farms	21.3
f) the Enterprise Support Fund	12.8
g) the program for seed production, pedigree stockraising, the improvement of the gene pool, and the development of artificial insemination	23.6
h) the program to ensure environmental safety	2.8
i) package of priority measures to improve the ecological situation in Samara Oblast's city of Chapayevsk	1.1
j) financial support fund for power generation and electrification	267.5
k) state long-term migration programs	75.8
l) program for the resettlement of Russian Germans from CIS member states to Russia	4.8
n) program for the financial restructuring and closure of mines	100
6. Defense spending	4,476.4
7. Expenditure on benefit payments to the dependants and children of servicemen	16.6
8. Implementation of ratified international treaties on the elimination, reduction, and limitation of armaments	27.4
9. Upkeep of law enforcement organs (not including the courts)	1,103.8
10. Upkeep of organs of state power and administration, the courts, Prosecutor's Office organs, and Russian Federation missions abroad	395.2
11. Expenditure on social guarantees for Russian Federation people's deputies of the 1990-1995 convocation	18.4
12. Expenditure on servicing state domestic debt	1,204.2

	Billions of rubles Fourth Quarter 1993
13. Financing expenditure on foreign economic activity	1,303.1
14. State credits to the governments of states being former republics of the USSR	400
15. Payment of compensation to rehabilitated victims of political repression	95.7
16. Renovation and restoration of objects from the cultural legacy of the peoples of Russia transferred to religious associations	3
17. Spending on financing interstate coordination structures within the framework of agreements between CIS member states, and on the Russian Federation's share in the implementation of joint programs within the framework of agreements with CIS member states	16.8
18. Provision of financial aid to the Republic of Armenia for eliminating the consequences of the Spitak earthquake	0.8
19. Elaboration and implementation of federal programs for the maintenance of interethnic peace and the national revival of the peoples of the Russian Federation	1.2
20. Spending on the Russian Federation State Committee for Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Elimination of Natural Disasters system	46
21. Spending on maintaining capacities, property, and installations with a mobilization role	35.9
22. The upkeep of organizations for the approval and branding of articles and alloys, and the upkeep of other similar organizations	1
23. The upkeep of the aero sports organizations of the Russian Defense Technical Sports Organization	0.9
24. The upkeep of special-purpose installations	47.2
25. Backup for work and expeditions for eliminating the consequences of the accident on the nuclear submarine Komsomolets	0.7
26. Spending on the holding of elections for the Russian Federation Federal Assembly	170
27. Spending on the holding of the 12 December 1993 referendum	82.7
28. The Russian Federation president's Reserve Fund	15.2
29. Financial resources from the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Fund for Social Support for the Population used to render assistance to children's institutions	2.5
30. The Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government Reserve Fund (total)	139.1
including the Russian Federation Government Reserve Fund for eliminating the consequences of emergency situations	108.9
31. Fund for eliminating the consequences of the attempted armed coup d'etat in the city of Moscow	60
32. Funds for ensuring supplies to meet state needs in the first nine months of 1993	1,450.6
33. Subsidies to the budgets of national-state and administrative-territorial formations	205.5
34. Subsidies to the city of Moscow in connection with its function as capital of the Russian Federation	276.2
35. Subsidies to the budgets of closed administrative-territorial formations with facilities of Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy sited on their territory	8
36. Funds transferred to the budgets of national-state and administrative-territorial formations in the form of recirpocal settlements to compensate for spending associated with the implementation of decisions adopted by federal organs of power (taking into account the budgets of closed administrative-territorial formations of Russia's Ministry of Defense)	1,786.6

Appendix 2: Volume of Funds Transferred in the Form of Reciprocal Settlements From the Republic Budget of the Russian Federation to the Budgets of Components of the Russian Federation To Equalize the Levels of Social Security for the Population

	Million rubles
Northern Region	
Arkhangelsk Oblast	24,837
Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug	6,344.5
Vologda Oblast	22,397.4
Murmansk Oblast	3,788.2
Republic of Karelia	9,708.6
Republic of Komi	43,231

	Million rubles
Northwest Region	
City of St. Petersburg	29,701
Leningrad Oblast	13,876.1
Novgorod Oblast	29,023.5
Pskov Oblast	31,562.1
Central Region	
Bryansk Oblast	24,737.3
Ivanovo Oblast	18,059.5
Tver Oblast	35,699.1
Kaluga Oblast	14,427.3
Kostroma Oblast	19,525.1

	Million rubles
Moscow Oblast	60,023.4
Orel Oblast	29,214.8
Smolensk Oblast	1,749.7
Volga-Vyatka Region	
Kirov Oblast	16,458.7
Republic of Mariy El	62,719.2
Mordovian SSR	37,463.4
Chuvash Republic	25,238.3
Central Chernozem Region	
Belgorod Oblast	1,268.9
Kursk Oblast	400.6
Tambov Oblast	16,009
Volga Region	
Astrakhan Oblast	18,173.7
Samara Oblast	77,862
Penza Oblast	10,883.9
Saratov Oblast	227.3
Republic of Kalmykia	35,777.9
North Caucasus Region	
Krasnodar Kray	56,556.2
Republic of Adygea	17,781.8
Stavropol Kray	54,098.8
Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic	27,526.5
Rostov Oblast	19,718.2
Republic of Dagestan	149,600.3
Kabardino-Balkar Republic	47,073.1
North Ossetian SSR	41,630.6
Ingush Republic	22,282.4
Chechen Republic	31,197
Urals Region	
Kurgan Oblast	7,075.2
Orenburg Oblast	57.4
Perm Oblast	17,215.8
Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug	20,275.8
Sverdlovsk Oblast	632.2
Chelyabinsk Oblast	19,674.1
Udmurt Republic	2,471.7
Western Siberia Region	
Altay Kray	73,764.1
Republic of Altay	31,227.3
Kemerovo Oblast	342,668.5
Novosibirsk Oblast	16,268.3
Omsk Oblast	143,890.4
Tomsk Oblast	32,166.9
Tyumen Oblast	29,672.2
Eastern Siberia Region	
Krasnoyarsk Kray	337.9
Republic of Khakassia	10,780
Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenetsk) Autonomous Okrug	16,691.1
Evenki Autonomous Okrug	12,593.7
Irkutsk Oblast	25,390.6
Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug	21,477
Chita Oblast	32,620.4
Aginskiy Buryat Autonomous Okrug	10,651
Republic of Buryatia	74,303.2
Republic of Tuva	39,722.9
Far Eastern Region	
Maritime Kray	73,155.4
Khabarovsk Kray	32,996.1
Jewish Autonomous Oblast	20,137.6
Amur Oblast	37,946.9
Kamchatka Oblast	49,788.7
Koryak Autonomous Okrug	63,803.3
Magadan Oblast	20,127.8
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	53,098.1
Sakhalin Oblast	57,152.5
Kaliningrad Oblast	2,977.3
Total	2,600,664.8

Government Issues Decree on Budget

PM2912164593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Dec 93 First Edition p 8

[Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government decree "On the Amendment of the Indicators of the Russian Federation Republican Budget for the Fourth Quarter of 1993"]

[Text] In execution of the Russian Federation president's 21 December 1993 edict no. 2234 "On the Amendment of the Indicators of the Russian Federation Republican Budget for the Fourth Quarter of 1993" and with a view to overcoming crisis phenomena in the economy and curbing the growth of the budget deficit in 1993, the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government decrees:

1. That the amended expenditure of the Russian Federation republican budget for the fourth quarter of 1993 be adopted at 22.2468 trillion rubles [R] proceeding from the amended predicted volume of revenue of R15.2367 trillion and the maximum deficit—R5.510 trillion.

2. That the Russian Federation Ministry of Finances ensure the financing of the amended expenditure of the Russian Federation republican budget for the fourth quarter of 1993 as revenue enters the budget, taking into account the credit of R4.660 trillion allocated by the

Central Bank of the Russian Federation in accordance with the Russian Federation president's 1 October 1993 edict no. 1515 "On Granting the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government Credit to Cover the Russian Federation Republican Budget Deficit in the Fourth Quarter of 1993" and also the sale of gold through the purchase of gold certificates in accordance with the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government 25 September 1993 decree no. 980 "On the Sale of Gold Through the Issue of 1993 Gold Certificates" and the issue in accordance with the Russian Federation law "On the Russian Federation State Internal debt" of other short-term bonds of the Russian Federation to the total sum of up to R850 billion.

3. That in partial alteration of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government 30 September 1993 decree no. 985 "On the Approval of the Excise Duty Rates for Individual Types of Goods" the following excise duty should be confirmed:

	(as percentage of cost of goods at wholesale factory prices)
Vodka, liqueur, and spirits	90
Ethyl alcohol made from edible raw material apart from that produced for the production of vokda and liqueur and spirits, drinkable spirit, and wine making produce	90

That it be established that the excise duty rates envisaged by this point be applied for payments for output dispatched since 27 December 1993.

4. That the Russian Federation Committee for the Food and Processing Industry, the Russian Federation Committee for Fishing, and the Russian Federation Committee for the Chemical and Petrochemical Industry in conjunction with the Russian Federation Ministry of Finances submit proposals for the establishment in 1994 of excisde duty for nonalcoholic drinks, individual types of confectionery, sturgeon and salmon roe, delicatessen foods produced from valuable types of fish and seafood, and domestic chemical goods.

5. That for the purpose of preventing tax evasion the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance and the Russian Federation State Taxation Service, together with the Russian Federation Committee for the Food and Processing Industry, are to submit to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government proposals on amendments to the procedure for levying excise duties on produce manufactured from customer-supplied raw materials.

6. That the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, together with the Russian Federation State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry, shall within two weeks present to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government proposals on raising the export tariff on the schedule of goods manufactured by enterprises and organizations of the Russian Federation State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry with a view to using the subsequent revenue to finance scientific research and experimental design work connected with national defense.

7. That the Central Bank of the Russian Federation shall:

before 25 December 1993 redeem the debt to the republic budget of the Russian Federation for the subsidizing in 1993 of interest rates on bank credits issued in 1992-1993 to kolkhozes, sovkhozes, peasant (private farm) holdings, other forms of agricultural commodity producers, and enterprises and organizations in the agro-industrial complex;

use the 1993 estimated profit to subsidize interest rates on bank credits issued in 1993 for the early export of food, fuel, and consumer goods to regions of the Far North and equivalent locations.

8. The government commission on questions of credit policy is to examine the question of deferring the redemption of a portion of the credits issued to enterprises in the fuel and energy complex with payment at the Russian Federation Central Bank's discount rate.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation

Yeltsin Issues Edict on State Spending for 1994

LD3012115793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0900 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin today issued an edict on financing state expenditure of the Russian Federation in the first quarter of 1994. The edict envisages, inter alia, that the Central Bank of Russia is to grant credit amounting to 7.5 trillion rubles to the government, for financing the expenditure of the republican budget.

Government Session on Socioeconomic Development Postponed

LD3012085893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0843 GMT 30 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow December 30 TASS— The session of the Presidium of the Russian Government, planned for today, has been postponed until the next week, a spokesman for the government press service told ITAR-TASS.

Today's session was to focus its attention on the forecast of the socio-economic development of Russia for 1994. According to the forecast, by the end of 1994 the inflation rate is expected to be reduced to 5-7 per cent a month, ITAR-TASS learned. In general, prices will grow by 4.8 times in 1994 as against ten times, which was

expected in 1993. It is planned to reduce the consolidated budget deficit to the level of 5-6 per cent of the gross domestic product. The reduction of the gross domestic product may stand at 5 per cent as against 12 per cent in 1993. Industrial output will be reduced by 6 per cent as against 16 per cent in 1993. Cargo traffic will be reduced by 6 per cent as against 29 per cent in the current year. Agricultural output will be reduced by about 5-6 per cent in 1994, the same as in 1993. Stabilisation or a small reduction of output is expected in the oil refining and gas industries, power engineering and the food industry (no more than 1-2 per cent). In the investment-intensive industries, such as machine building and the building materials industry, the reduction of the output will be slowed down to reach 5-7 per cent. The reduction of output in the light industry will be slowed down from 23 to 7 per cent.

Today's session planned to discuss the forecast of the socio-economic development of the country, prepared by the Ministry of Economy. According to the forecast, in 1994 the real volume of incomes of the population will be reduced by 3-5 per cent. The reduction of the inflation rate, a slower pace of reduction of the agricultural output, the development of individual farms, personal subsidiary holdings and small business, the revival in the industries working for the consumer sector and the implementation of measures, aimed at enhancing social protection of the population, will result in the stabilisation of living standards of a major part of the population by the end of 1994. One should expect smaller differentiation of people's incomes. The correlation between the incomes of the richest people, which account for 10 per cent of the population, and people in the lowest income bracket will be no more than 11 times. The middle class will probably face the biggest reduction of real incomes. The average per capita incomes of about 33 per cent of the population (30-33 per cent in 1993) will be smaller than the subsistence income.

Poll Shows Improvement in Economic Expectations

PM3012115393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Dec 93 First Edition p 1

[Report by Grigoriy Pashkov of the "Mneniye" Service: "Good Mood Despite Everything"]

[Text] It is only natural that, on the eve of the New Year holiday, sociologists would like to determine the mood in which people will celebrate it. The "Mneniye" [Opinion] Sociological Service (leader—Gr. Pashkov) conducted a telephone poll of 1,180 respondents on 22-24 December with a view to identifying this important factor. The choice of respondents is representative in terms of sex, age, education, and basic occupation. If your mood on New Year's Eve leaves something to be desired, the poll results might help improve it....

Tell us, was the past year good or bad for you personally and for your family?

	Dec 1991	Dec 1992	Dec 1993
Good	34.1	25.1	35.5
Bad	39.8	53.6	43.2
Hard to tell	26.1	21.3	21.3

What do you think, will the economic situation in our country improve, remain the same, or deteriorate next year?

	Dec 1991	Dec 1992	Dec 1993
Will improve	22.3	15.5	23.1
Will remain the same	16.7	25.8	35.2
Will deteriorate	43.3	46.1	26.0
Hard to tell	17.7	12.6	15.7

What about your family's material situation—will it improve, remain the same, or deteriorate?

	Dec 1991	Dec 1992	Dec 1993
Will improve	12.6	16.1	20.3
Will remain the same	18.9	34.9	41.0
Will deteriorate	51.4	37.0	23.0
Hard to tell	17.1	12.0	15.7

It will soon be two years since the introduction of "free prices." What do you think: Should free prices be abolished, or should this not be done?

Should be abolished	27.9
Should not be abolished	37.9
Don't know	13.7
Other answers	20.5

What do you think: Should the former USSR republics reunite, or is this impossible?

Should unite	17.4
This is impossible	23.2
Should unite, but not all of them	38.6
Other answers	8.8
Don't know	12.0

Regional Affairs

Chechnya Opposes Russian Seat in UN Security Council

LD2912201793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1828 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Chechnya's Foreign Ministry intends to challenge Russia's right to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council. According to Interfax's correspondents, this was announced in a statement released in Groznyy on Wednesday.

"Time has come to subject Russia to measures taken under international law against terrorist states run by neo-fascist regimes," the statement says.

According to Chechnya's Foreign Ministry, "the Russian leadership embarked on the road of establishing totalitarian dictate aimed at suppressing people's striving for freedom; witness Russia's new Constitution, whose essence is imperial."

Chechnya's Foreign Ministry maintains that "it is necessary to promptly consider the possibility of placing all Russian nuclear facilities under international control, and letting Ukraine preserve its nuclear potential as a deterring factor."

In conclusion, the statement says that Chechnya's representatives should be given the opportunity to address a special UN session on this matter.

Nonpayments Cause Crisis for Bashkortostan Oil Sector

MK3012105093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Dec 93 p 1

[Radik Batyrshin report under the "Fuel" rubric: "Bashkortostan Oil Refineries Under Threat of Stoppage. Nonpayments Bring the Sector Into Crisis"]

[Text] Bashkortostan's oil refineries that have till this day been producing a third of Russia's petroleum products are gripped by a crisis. The suppliers of crude oil have cut back on deliveries owing to Bashkortostan refineries' enormous debts. In an interview for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Aleksandr Rykov, Bashkortostan minister of resources, described as critical the situation in the republic's oil refining sector. According to him, oil producers have cut back deliveries of crude oil from 60,000 to 18,000 tonnes a day because Bashkortostan's refiners have run up a debt of hundreds of billions of rubles to Tyumen oil producers. In its turn, the debt of Russian consumers to Bashkortostan's oil refineries—they are first and foremost state-run enterprises—runs, according to the minister, into trillions of rubles. For this reason Bashkortostan, capable of refining 120,000 tonnes a day, now refines a third of the amount.

Many oil refining units are idle today. Refineries are discussing prospects of unscheduled leave for part of their personnel. A nighttime telephone call by Bashkortostan President Murtaza Rakhimov, in the past an oil refinery director, to Yuriy Shafrannik, head of Russia's Ministry of Fuel and Energy, did not solve the problem either. Therefore, the Bashkortostan government has urgently stepped up deliveries of local high-sulfur petroleum which of course affects the quality and thoroughness of refining, hence the output of gasoline and kerosene.

"Our oil makes it possible to rule out the possibility of a total shutdown of the refineries," Aleksandr Rykov underlined. In his opinion, a way out of the crisis in Bashkortostan's key sector lies in three actions. First, stepped-up supplies to refineries of local oil. Second, according to him, official delegations of the Bashkortostan government will soon fly to Tyumen Oblast. In their talks with Tyumen oil generals it will be offered that they accept gasoline, kerosene, and other products in lieu of payment of their debts. And third, trying to make customers pay their debts in various ways.

According to the Bashkortostan minister, the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Energy, in its turn, is meeting the republic halfway by promising to provide 5 million tonnes of oil in the first quarter of next year to produce petroleum products for the state's needs.

Buryat Prosecutor Investigates Campaign Irregularities

PM2912133993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Dec 93 First Edition p 1

[RIA report under "From Our Correspondents and News Agencies" rubric: "Buryat Prosecutor's Office Investigates Use of State Funds in Election Campaign"]

[Text] The Buryat Republic Prosecutor's Office has begun an investigation into a case involving the use of state funds in the election campaign of Leonid Potapov, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet (former first secretary of the oblast CPSU committee), and Lidiya Nimayeva, member of the republic's Supreme Soviet (former ideology secretary of the oblast CPSU committee). The accusation has been made by a number of deputies. A deputies' commission has been set up to check it out.

Tambov Administration Head On Post-Election Situation

PM2912124093 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Dec 93 p 2

[Report by correspondent Yevgeniy Pisarev under the rubric "Elections in the Regions": "In Tambov the Political Pendulum Has Apparently Swung"]

[Text] Vladimir Babenko, Tambov Oblast head of administration, has met with representatives of parties and movements belonging to the Union of Democratic Organizations. The need for the meeting arose from the sociopolitical situation that has emerged in the oblast after the Federal Assembly elections and the referendum on the Constitution. The democrats suffered major losses. Pro-communist candidates made it into parliament. The mood is highly extremist, and there is no point in consoling yourself, V. Babenko said, with the thought that some of them were from the Agrarian Party of Russia. Once in parliament they will join with the Communists to form a united front.

The election results were also affected by nostalgia for the supposedly "prosperous" past. This may also explain the stunning success of Zhirinovskiy's party in the

Tambov area. "Society," V. Babenko, a doctor by profession, stated, "did not examine the sick man. Now it is very important to dispel the illusions that this sick man is fostering..."

V. Babenko expressed the fear that the Russian president, having pondered the situation in the country, may take a backward step, which would be a total disaster for the state. For his part, the oblast administration head declared his commitment to reforms and spoke of the impermissibility of restoring the old regime and reviving the soviets, which the newly fledged deputies are so keen to do. At the same time V. Babenko said that he is not inclined to dramatize the situation in the oblast, especially since many voters are already beginning to realize that they made a mistake by voting for Communists and Zhirinovskiy supporters.

The center of political life has now shifted to the regions, and therefore we must not lose the elections to the local organs of power. It is time to seize the initiative and unite society's healthy forces. In this situation the government must adjust the social aspect of reforms and alleviate the taxation burden.

V. Babenko believes that the oblast administration needs cadre changes from top to bottom. Conclusions will also be drawn with regard to the activity of the oblast agriculture administration and the newspaper TAMBOVSKAYA ZHIZN. We must learn, he said at the meeting, to work with various population strata, paying special attention to army subunits. "I was staggered," he observed, "when officers told me they would vote for Zhirinovskiy's party..."

V. Babenko's meeting with representatives of democratic organizations showed that the administration head knows whom he can rely on and whom he can cooperate with in practical work. The gamble on "experienced economic practitioners" from the former party and economic nomenklatura proved unsafe. Many of them had not renounced their nomenklatura inclinations, and basically stabbed him in the back.

Ural Deputies Set Up Assembly

PM3012101793 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Dec 93 p 1

[From "In Brief" column "based on reports from PRAVDA correspondents, ITAR-TASS, and YeAN": "Assembly of Ural Region Deputies"]

[Text] A new public association—the Assembly of Ural Region Deputies—has been founded by nine Federal Assembly deputies, including Eduard Rossel, Oleg Bogomolov, Leonid Nekrasov, and Galina Karelova. The statement they adopted says that the success of the reforms depends on consideration of specific regional features. The association is, on the one hand, to uphold the region's interests in parliament and, on the other, to elaborate specific ways and methods of implementing transformations.

New Nuclear Powered Sub Being Built in Severodvinsk

LD2912200793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1914 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Severodvinsk (the Arkhangelsk region of Russia) December 29 TASS—An undersea nuclear-powered guided-missile cruiser of a new (fourth) generation was laid down at the building berth of the center of atomic shipbuilding in the Russian city of Severodvinsk on Wednesday. The ocean-going submarine will carry the name of this city located on the Black Sea shore.

For 54 years shipbuilders of this city have built about one hundred nuclear-powered submarines. It will take shipbuilders several years to construct this nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarine.

International Affairs

Official Warns of Threat of 'Russian Imperialism'

LD2912235893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2005 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Possible appearance of the political force called "Russian imperialism" now threatens the world. This was said by Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament's Commission on Foreign Affairs, Bogdan Goryn, in an interview with Interfax-Ukraine on Wednesday.

He pointed out that this was the position of "not only Zhirinovskiy and his party but also of the modern Russian Communists." In his words, a possible union of these forces threatens the world. "The primary task is that democratic forces of our country and the whole world unite against neo-fascism," he emphasized.

On the accusation of Ukraine by the Russian Foreign Ministry of an attempt to settle the issue concerning former Soviet military prisoners in Afghanistan from the point of view of a "national approach," Goryn stated that "each state must worry about its citizens and about those who are going to become its citizens." He considered "natural and justified" the fact that Ukraine tried to establish contacts with these military prisoners.

"This issue cannot be resolved through the center in Moscow as it has always been. The centrism which continues to manifest itself within the Russian government was only a nostalgia for the old methods," he said.

Deputy Foreign Minister on CIS Summit, Russian Ties

WS2912140193

[Editorial Report] Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian at 1710 GMT on 28 December broadcasts live the 60-minute "Press Club" program featuring a discussion between Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, acting consular department head Viktor Kyryk, and Oleksandr Cholyy, chief of the Foreign Ministry's Department of Treaty and Law. Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko is not able to attend due to "circumstances beyond his control." The program is moderated by Valeriy Lapikura and political observers Valeriy Zhyhun of URYADOVYY KURYER, and Vasyl Plushch of LITERATURNA UKRAYINA.

Asked about preliminary results of the Ashgabat CIS summit, Borys Tarasyuk points out that the Ukrainian leadership signed 21 CIS agreements there, including the political declaration. The latter document stipulates that CIS members will "honor the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Commonwealth states; refrain from using or threatening to use force or economic pressure; refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of one another; and build mutual relations on the basis of partnership." According to Tarasyuk, the Ukrainian delegation took an "active" part in and "substantially contributed" to drafting the final text of the agreement. Tarasyuk underlines the importance of President Kravchuk's talks with Kazakh, Turkmen, and Georgian presidents and says that the summit gave "new meaning" to "developing bilateral relations" within the CIS.

Observer Zhyhun warns against "excess optimism" over the results of the summit, saying that the CIS Charter will be enacted as of 22 January, granting full rights only to those states which signed the charter. Thus, Ukraine will have to make a choice between integrating more closely with the CIS or "seeking ways to abandon" it. Tarasyuk agrees with the thesis that a "two-level CIS" may emerge at this stage; one level represented by the signatories to the charter and the other by the rest of the states. According to him, the Foreign Ministry is currently working on the legal aspects of this problem.

The URYADOVYY KURYER observer expresses bewilderment over the fact that Ukraine is one of three states to have consulates in Yugoslavia after the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions. According to Viktor Kyryk, the consulate's only goal is to protect the rights of Ukrainian citizens in Yugoslavia. Ukraine considered opening an embassy there but decided to "limit" relations to the opening of a consulate.

Commenting on Ukrainian-Russian relations, Borys Tarasyuk says that the Ashgabat summit "brought some relaxation" of tensions between Russia and Ukraine. This was the goal of talks between the presidents and foreign ministers. According to Tarasyuk, Ukraine "cannot but be alarmed" over "anti-Ukrainian slanders and the distortions of Ukraine's foreign policy" in Russian newspapers, adding that it is "seeking ways" to avoid "a war of words" in the mass media.

Asked about an outlook for further development of relations between the two states "in light of recent elections in Russia," the deputy foreign minister points out that a "particular diplomatic effort is made" to normalize these relations. According to him, a number of important issues were discussed in Ashgabat, including the issue of the Black Sea Fleet. Tarasyuk also held talks with Yeltsin's political adviser Migranyan and pointed out the latter's anti-Ukrainian statements. He asserts that Ukraine is working on initiating a series of negotiations with Russia. These include the signing of a Ukrainian-Russian treaty, postponed because of the Ashgabat summit. The treaty will regulate the contentious issues of the Black Sea Fleet and the demarcation of state borders. Tarasyuk maintains that although it is to predict, he can predict that 1994 will begin with a series of intensive negotiations on a wide range of issues.

Asked about Russian security guarantees for Ukraine, Tarasyuk says that Russia has expressed readiness to provide guarantees of refraining from using nuclear arms against Ukraine. Ukraine is holding talks with other nuclear powers on drafting a multilateral agreement outlining "precise" guarantees of Ukraine's national security. These guarantees should stipulate refraining

from using nuclear and conventional weapons against Ukraine, as well as from exerting economic pressure.

Commenting on the issue of foreign troops stationed in Ukraine, Tarasyuk claims that Black Sea Fleet personnel should not be regarded as a foreign army, because the fleet is subordinated to the joint command of the Ukrainian and Russian presidents. He stresses that the first meeting in months between the Russian and Ukrainian defense ministers took place in Ashgabat and was devoted to Ukrainian-Russian cooperation in the military field. The deputy foreign minister emphasizes that military-technical cooperation between the two states was never interrupted. According to him, such cooperation is "mutually beneficial" and suits Ukraine's national interests. He points out that there is no treaty regulating military-political cooperation and that in his opinion, there is "no necessity" to sign any treaty in the military sphere.

Asked why Ukraine does not subordinate its nuclear arsenal to international control, Borys Tarasyuk points out that Ukraine "has never avoided international control of its nuclear arms" which was reflected in a joint declaration by the Ukrainian Foreign and Defense Ministries in March 1993. However, the Russian-Ukrainian talks currently under way "might give us a chance to say that we do not need international observers" to resolve nuclear problems.

Speaking of progress on the issue of forming an international fund for nuclear disarmament, initiated by Ukraine, Tarasyuk says that "unfortunately" he cannot report on a "positive response" from other states. He points out that foreign states have proposed financial assistance for the reduction of Ukrainian armaments, giving preference to bilateral rather than multilateral agreements.

Zvyahilskyy Says Russia Will Supply Oil, Gas

AU3012112093 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 28 Dec 93 p 1

[Report on interview with Acting Prime Minister Yukhym Zvyahilskyy: "These Agreements Are Advantageous for Us"]

[Text] As we already reported, last week, a Ukrainian governmental delegation held two-day negotiations in Moscow. In particular, a lengthy conversation took place between Yukhym Zvyahilskyy and head of the Russian government Viktor Chernomyrdin. These negotiations were continued in Ashgabat during breaks between CIS leaders' meetings and culminated in signing an agreement between the governments of Ukraine and the Russian Federation on trade and economic cooperation in 1994. We asked Ukraine's Acting Prime Minister Yukhym Zvyahilskyy to comment upon the agreements that were reached, in particular, upon the one concerning Russian oil and gas deliveries to Ukraine.

"I believe that our delegation's trip to Moscow and then to Ashgabat resulted in advantageous agreements for Ukraine. We managed, first and foremost, to determine the amounts of Russian gas deliveries to us. Next year, we must receive from Russia 60 billion cubic meters of gas. Taking into account the fact that 28 billion cubic meters of gas must arrive from Turkmenistan and 19 billion cubic meters from Ukrainian deposits, the total amount of gas will be quite sufficient for us over the next year for all our needs.

"We also managed to reach an agreement with Russia on the following issue. In Ukraine, there are subsurface gas depositories with a total capacity of 30 billion cubic meters. In fact, only one-half of the capacity is being used. We agreed that Russia may use the available capacity; of course, it will pay for the gas storage. This is also advantageous for us.

"A preliminary agreement has been reached on supplies from Russia of 1.5 million cubic meters of scaffolding for our coal mines—its acute shortage is, today, one of the most serious problems of our coal industry. These deliveries will be made with preferential customs duty and preferential railroad transportation rates—at least one of these benefits will be granted.

"Finally, the main point—oil deliveries. Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin and I discussed and resolved the question of loading the Kremenchuk Oil Refinery, which was built for processing oil with a high sulfur content. This is precisely the type of oil extracted in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan. We agreed that Ukraine will receive from there 15 million tonnes of oil. It must be pointed out that products obtained from its processing will be of the same quality as those from Tyumen oil. However, the price will be lower, up to $75 per tonne. In our situation, when the government is counting every cent and is struggling to lower the prices of exports, this is also a very advantageous project.

"We hope and not just hope, but also believe that in 1994 the decline in production will finally be halted and our industry, first and foremost its leading branches, will begin to increase the output of products, and the market will become saturated with goods. Then it will not be difficult for us to repay our trade partners. Ukraine has every possibility of doing this."

Four Trawlers To Offset Part of Russian Fuel Debt

LD3012100293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0820 GMT 30 Dec 93

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Anatoliy Kuznetsov - TASS]

[Text] Nikolayev December 30 TASS—Ukraine decided to repay part of its fuel debt to Russia with four refrigerator trawlers; Far Eastern seamen will soon arrive to the shipyards in Nikolayev on the Black Sea to get the vessels.

The cost of the ships will be paid to the shipyards in Ukrainian currency by the the Republican Oil Company.

This major barter deal was agreed during Russian-Ukrainian talks in Moscow and Kiev initiated by the Nikolayev shipyards.

It is envisaged that Ukraine will supply Russia with 15 trawlers as payment for the fuel debt.

Earlier the Ukrainian and Russian presidents had discussed the possibility of repaying the fuel debt by the Ukrainian part of the Black Sea Fleet.

Space Agency Head Discusses Cooperation, Exports

AU2912155193 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 28 Dec 93 p 4

[Interview with Volodymyr Pavlovych Horbulin, general director of the National Space Agency, by Natalya Filipchuk: "Testing by Space"]

[Text] **Today, all states fall into just two categories: Space powers and those striving to become such. It is difficult to determine to which of the two categories Ukraine basically belongs. It occupies third or fourth place in the world in terms of its space potential but, at the same time, it has no ground infrastructure to control ordinary artificial satellites....**

With this I started my conversation with the general director of Ukraine's National Space Agency, Volodymyr Pavlovych Horbulin, who was recently elected a member of the International Astronautical Academy of Sciences. HOLOS UKRAYINY extends its sincere congratulations to him on this occasion.

[Horbulin] You must understand that it takes at least four or five years for one artificial satellite to be manufactured. Our program envisages the manufacture of two such satellites, which are particularly necessary today—one for communications purposes and the other for remote-control earth probing —as well as the related ground infrastructure for receiving, processing, and disseminating information provided by these satellites, but this requires time. Real work on all these projects only started in March 1993, when we were entered in the budget....

[Filipchuk] If this is not a secret, how much money has the state allocated for "its space"?

[Horbulin] The first estimate is 36 billion karbovantsi. When I quote this figure abroad, without mentioning the exchange rate, I see both surprise and sympathy. You are asking about satellites.... Today, for example, we have proposals at the level of a technological project within the framework of the "Ariadna" Program, in accordance with which not just one satellite, but a system of so-called low-orbit satellites is being developed. Until quite recently, it was financed by the Kiev association "ASSO-UNITI." Elsewhere in the world, work on such a scale is paid for by commercial organizations only up to the stage of manufacturing the material parts. I am glad that our state has finally realized this.

This year, for the first time, Ukraine sent an official delegation to the International Astronautical Congress, which is the most prestigious in the sphere of space research and gathers together the world's scientific and technological vanguard. We felt extraordinary interest for our state....

[Filipchuk] Perhaps it is not a matter of prestige, but of our missile launchers, which have practically no competitors within their class?

[Horbulin] Of course, it is common knowledge that we have manufactured strategic missiles. We want to explain that Ukraine's space future is of a predominantly peaceful character. Besides, it is clear today that major space projects cannot be implemented without extensive international cooperation. For example, with regard to the communications satellite, we are planning to sign a cooperation agreement with France in the very near future, on the development of an on-board relay and a network of ground stations. Quite a number of U.S. firms are seeking contacts with the design bureau "Pivdenne" [Southern] and Pivdenmash [Southern Machine Building] Plant. However, they are restrained by an overcautious attitude toward Ukraine as a state which used to manufacture SS-18's and SS-24's, and also by the fact that we are not signatories to the treaty on the nonproliferation of missile technologies. The United States has proposed that Ukraine sign a bilateral agreement on this. However, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and numerous experts in this field, such an agreement underestimates Ukraine's possibilities.

[Filipchuk] Instead, Russia has signed such an agreement, thereby violating agreements with members of the CIS. It has agreed to the U.S. proposal—to do nothing for the development of other national space programs—and has failed to notify Ukraine of its intentions. How will relations with Russia develop after this?

[Horbulin] Who knows? In principle, the Russian agreement cannot be implemented. Ukraine may well be the only state that takes care of Baykonur, which is now in bad shape. Besides, if an emergency situation occurs, for example, on the "Mir" station, Russia will be compelled to look for a control system for the "Soyuz" missile launcher, which is manufactured in Kharkiv, and also for a docking system manufactured at the Kiev radio manufacturing factory. In general, Ukraine finds itself in quite a piquant situation. Recently, the Russian Ministry of Defense launched its own artificial satellite (for defense purposes). It also allowed Germany to use the potentialitiues of missile launchers, having launched Germany's small satellite.

[Filipchuk] What have we gained from this?

[Horbulin] We have gained nothing at all. Russia is yet to pay us for the missile launcher....

[Filipchuk] Incidentally, how often do you have to sell missile launchers?

[Horbulin] Of course, our economic situation forces us to be compliant with our partners. However, it must be understood what reckless steps may lead to. We receive many proposals from Arab countries. For one delegation, which wanted to buy a so-called booster and gave us three initial parameters, I immediately estimated the range, the effective capacity, and the diameter of the missile, because I realized what it was all about.... I understand that the booster may be improved to such an extent that the missiles will not only fly up to 6,000 or 7,000 km, but even 10,000 or 11,000 and reach any target. In other words, before one takes one step, it is necessary to look 10 steps ahead and not to forget that there also exists such a notion as responsibility before the world.

National Affairs

Kravchuk Issues Decree on Storing Nuclear Material

LD2912221493 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Decree issued by President Leonid Kravchuk on 29 December]

[Text] With the aim of preventing illegal actions in relation to nuclear materials and nuclear installations which are used for peaceful purposes and with the aim of establishing legal principles of their physical protection, I hereby decree:

To establish, until the law of Ukraine on the use of nuclear energy is adopted, that in the sphere of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine will assess the state of affairs with the preservation of nuclear material, prevent criminal actions against nuclear material and nuclear installations, give recommendations as to the level of their physical protection, supervise the observance of these recommendations, and search for and retrieve nuclear material if lost.

The State Committee of Ukraine for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, in compliance with the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency and also the recommendations of the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, as issued under Paragraph 2 of this article, will approve the norms and rules concerning physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations and will supervise their observance and the state of physical protection.

The State Committee of Ukraine for the Use of Nuclear Energy and authorized bodies which carry out the construction and operation of nuclear installations and which are responsible for storage or use of nuclear material, will preserve or transport nuclear material and ensure the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations in compliance with the approved norms and rules and maintain it at the required standard.

The State Committee of Ukraine for Nuclear and Radiation Safety is charged, in compliance with Article 5 of the 1980 convention on physical protection of nuclear material, with conducting Ukraine's international relations on issues of physical protection of nuclear material.

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine will take urgent measures so that nuclear material is preserved by all enterprises and organizations which use, store, and transport it, and will establish personal responsibility for its safety and for the registration of persons who carry out work in places where such material is stored and used.

Regulations for arranging and ensuring physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations will be approved within three months.

The expediency of setting up an interdepartmental center for regulating physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations in Ukraine will be considered.

[Signed] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk

Kravchuk Counters Parliament Veto on Shipping Concern

LD2912193793 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Decree issued by President Leonid Kravchuk; date not given]

[Text] The imposition of veto by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on 24 December this year on the decree by the president of Ukraine as of 13 August 1993, No. 303, on setting up joint-stock shipping concern Blasco-Black Sea Shipping Company, brings the whole activity of Blasco to a halt. With regard to this and also to ensure state interests in international cargo and passenger transportation, and fulfilling Blasco's obligations before its partners in Ukraine and with foreign countries, I decree that the joint-stock shipping concern Blasco-Black Sea Shipping Company continue carrying out its activities in compliance with the regulations that were approved by the transport minister and the president of Blasco on 13 September 1993, which remain in force until the process of turning Blasco into a corporation and a joint-stock entity is completed. The Ministry of Transport is charged with bringing the legal founding documents of this association in line with legislation and solving the issue on its leader according to the established order. This decree becomes valid on the day of its signing. [Signed] President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk

MP Calls Decree 'Mistake'

LD2912200293 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1530 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Kiev, 29 Dec—As already reported, Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk issued a decree which annulled the decision by the Supreme Council of Ukraine of 24 December on the activity of joint-stock society Blasco (former Black Sea Shipping Company). This decision by the president evoked a sharply negative response among a certain section of people's deputies. Oleksandr Kotsyuba, member of the Supreme Council Presidium and chairman of the Commission for Issues of Legislation and Legality, pointed out that by annulling the parliament's decision the president made a mistake, which "would cost him very dear."

Government Moves To Curb Hyperinflation

LD2912211293 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has passed a resolution on ensuring the fulfillment of urgent measures to overcome hyperinflation in Ukraine. Relevant instructions were given to ministries and departments, the Council of Ministers of the Crimea Republic, oblast, Kiev and Sevastopol city state administrations. With the participation of the National Bank, the Academy of Sciences, and the Ukrainian Academy of Agrarian Sciences, it is necessary to draft envisaged enforceable enactments and other normative acts and submit them to the Cabinet of Ministers within the fixed terms. Ministers, heads of departments, and heads of state administrations have been made personally responsible for the implementation of these measures.

Sevastopol Official Protests Ostankino TV Report

LD3012114093 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 0808 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] Sevastopol, 29 December—The director of the Sevastopol City Council press service has sent a letter to the president of Ostankino TV and radio company. The author of the letter has denied the allegation concerning the introduction of a special regime in Sevastopol, heard on an Ostankino news program. "Nobody approved such a decision and could not have done so because current legislation does not envisage anything of the kind." "The disinformation that was circulated by Ostankino TV has not influenced for the better the civil and political situation in the region," states the letter sent by the director of the Sevastopol City Council press service.

Democratic Revival Party Joins Election Campaign

LD2912215293 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1530 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Kiev, 29 Dec—The Kiev city organization of the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine (KMO PDVU) has issued a statement in connection with the participation in the election of people's deputies of Ukraine on 27 March 1994. In particular, it believes that the law "On the election of people's deputies of Ukraine" approved by the Supreme Council of Ukraine is openly directed at hampering the development of multi-partyism and, therefore, the parliamentary democracy in Ukraine.

The KMO PDVU recommends that party members and supporters should take an active part in the election, even though it cannot be considered as democratic. It proposes that party members nominate themselves as party candidates and conduct the election campaign on a party basis, at the same time duplicating nominations from groups of electors and labor collectives.

Eleven people were nominated from the party as contenders for candidates for people's deputies of Ukraine. They include Aleksandr Yemets, Ukraine's Minister for Nationalities and Migration; H. Omelchenko, chief of the board of the main directorate of military counterintelligence of the Security Service of Ukraine; S. Ryabchenko, chairman of the State Committee of Ukraine for issues of science and technology; Yu. Sakhno, leader of the PDVU Secretariat; and V. Filenko, chairman of the PDVU presidium and coordinating council.

Belarus

Government Honors Pledges To Cut Conventional Arms

LD2912225193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2001 GMT 29 Dec 93

[By BELINFORM-ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Minsk December 29 TASS— Belarus has fully implemented its international obligations on the reduction of conventional weapons and equipment for the passing year of 1993, the "VO SLAVU RODINY" (For the Glory of Motherland) military newspaper published by the Belarusian Defense Ministry, reported on Wednesday.

The newspaper carries an excerpt from the order by Belarusian Defense Minister Colonel-General Pavel Kozlovskiy, which says that appropriate information and notifications have been submitted to all states—parties to international disarmament treaties and agreements, on time and in a full volume.

Shushkevich Feeling 'Quite Well,' Resumes Work

LD2912223393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2005 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Belarusian leader Stanislav Shushkevich, who has left the hospital, said he was feeling "quite well" and resumed work on Tuesday.

He said in an exclusive interview with Interfax on Wednesday that on Thursday morning he was due to record a television program, apparently to give a New Year message to the nation.

Shushkevich Sees Problems in Implementing Ruble Zone

WS3012092293 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian 16 Dec 93 p 1

[Interview with Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich by INTERFAX Vyachaslaw Zyankovich; place and date not given: "S. Shushkevich Still Hopes for the Realization of CIS Potential, But Does Not Believe in the Creation of a Currency Union With Russia"]

[Excerpts] [Zyankovich] I congratulate you, Stanislav Stanislavovich! The CIS is already two years old. What would you like to say on the occasion?

[Shushkevich] Thank you for your congratulations. I am not going to repeat myself—I and other state leaders have already spoken extensively on the positive role of the CIS. Therefore, with your permission, let us discuss our common problems.

Analyzing the situation in the Commonwealth, I involuntarily come to the conclusion that, unfortunately, not all the superstitions of the old system have disappeared. I think that they are the roots of all our misfortunes.

Within the CIS framework, we have adopted some very good resolutions. However, when you want those declarations to become substance, a braking mechanism begins to work. The old scheme comes into operation: Russia is the center and the remaining CIS members remain on the periphery.

Thus far, we are not able—or not used—to build relations according to the principles, for example, of the European Union. In fact, all relations among CIS countries come down to bilateral relations with Russia, which represents a real center with the greatest economic potential. I think that the republics with very close interests with one another are collaborating too feebly. We do not work out a general strategy or tactics for relations with Russia, and that is the main reason for the collapse of many initiatives which we expected to implement on a bilateral basis.

[Zyankovich] Can you cite some examples?

[Shushkevich] The newest one is a story about the common ruble zone. It is already known what turn was taken in the talks on this topic between Russia and the Central Asian states. Uncoordinated actions of the majority of CIS members are ruining the common economic area. I am sure that we need corrections in our activities. In my opinion, it is a problem to be addressed in the immediate future.

[Zyankovich] Apparently, heads of the Commonwealth countries should meet and determine the mechanism for coordinated action with regard to Russia...

[Shushkevich] It is obvious that such a step should have been taken. However, it is not a matter of form—are we to meet or not?

I would like to emphasize that I do not mean some state bloc to oppose Russia. Not at all! We are raising a different question—a question of a new and more perfect mechanism of mutual relations within the Commonwealth. The current situation, when CIS relations are confined solely to ties with the Russian Federation, negatively affects not only Russia itself, but the rest of the CIS as well. For example, let us return to the problem of the common ruble zone. When I become acquainted with the reasons of Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov, which prevented them from joining the common ruble zone, I begin to understand that we have very similar problems too. Russia has laid down tough terms before Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan...

By the way, regarding terms. Political talks, undoubtedly, should be guided by some code of conduct. However, the statements of some Russian leaders, in particular, of Boris Fedorov, Russian deputy prime minister and finance minister, are marked by a very malevolent nature. [passage omitted]

[Zyankovich] Thus, you are against the dominant role of Russia in the Commonwealth... However, many local politicians are convinced that the Russian market has special importance to all CIS partners of the Russian Federation and, in particular, to Belarus...

[Shushkevich] It is a mistake; what foolishness! After a year or two, the Russian market will be absolutely the same as any Western one. Russia will not stand the humiliation of importing commodities that are noncompetitive on other markets. Our industrialists should not be oriented toward the production of poor goods for sale on the Russian market because this market cannot be secured for Belarus by political methods alone.

Unfortunately, this issue has another aspect, too—our Republic's plants are not capable of producing competitive goods from Russian raw materials which are purchased at prices somewhat higher that those on Russia's internal market. It ruins our industry, and we are doing everything to change this destructive Russian policy toward the Belarusian economy.

With regard to this, I am very uneasy about the upcoming meeting of CIS state leaders. According to current news reports, Russian economic experts are trying to exclude some issues from the Ashgabat summit agenda regarding the implementation of economic union. It is a matter of great importance for Belarus to take the first step for the implementation of this project—in the first place, we are concerned about the abolishment of customs barriers and price differences.

I am sure that Russia is not interested in destroying economies of other republics of the former USSR. Otherwise, sooner or later, Russia will have to liquidate the effects of such a policy, including the seeds of civil war. On the contrary, Russia should be interested in the development of economies of the Commonwealth states. However, for the time being, a harsh market economy approach to Belarus by Russian functionaries overshadows the declarations of Russian statesmen. [passage omitted]

Official on Political, Economic Ties With Russia

PM3012123193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Dec 93 First Edition p 6

[Interview with Valeriy Tsepkalo, foreign policy and foreign economic adviser to the Supreme Council chairman, by Igor Gukovskiy; place and date not given: "Belarus: Minsk's Cooperation With Moscow Stuck Between Treaty and Action"]

[Text] The question of mutual relations with Russia has assumed particular topicality for Belarus in recent months. Especially since the signing of the Economic Union Treaty. Analyzing things said by deputies, Council of Ministers officials, and journalists and conversations among ordinary people, you get the impression that everyone has his own view of this problem. The reason for this, in the view of Valeriy Tsepkalo, foreign policy and foreign economic adviser to the Belarusian Supreme Council chairman, is that the republic's leadership lacks a clear concept for the creation of Belarusian-Russian economic union.

"In terms of treaty law our relations with Russia are developing successfully," Valeriy Vilyamovich says. "We started the ball rolling in December 1990, when a 10-year political treaty was signed for the first time in the history of the development of bilateral relations between Russia and Belarus. Admittedly it now requires urgent additional work or rewording as a result of the rapid development of events not only among the countries of the former USSR but also between Belarus and Russia.

"Nevertheless our republics have already signed 42 agreements—31 in the economic field, six in the political field, and five in the military field. Belarus has concluded more than 200 multilateral agreements within the CIS framework.

"But unfortunately there is a big chasm between the treaty process and concrete economic cooperation. I see the reason for this disparity in the lack of a concept for Belarusian economic reform and of a clear notion of the ways to escape from the crisis. In Russia, for example, you can talk about the concepts espoused by Gaydar, Yavlinskiy, Shatalin, and others. You might criticize or disagree with them, but at least they exist. But our fragile programs cannot be described as concepts.

[Gukovskiy] Is it possible that things will change with the adoption of the Constitution?

[Tsepkalo] I hope so. The Constitution is necessary because there is a need for a concentrated political will and responsibility. Today, for example, we can clearly say that in Russia the president has responsibility, nobody now obstructs him, and he is also accountable for everything. In Belarus, unfortunately, there is nobody who can say: I will assume all responsibility.

[Gukovskiy] How do you see the optimum model of economic cooperation with Russia?

[Tsepkalo] God ordained that we and Russia should be together. The two republics' economies are highly integrated. Russia accounts for 70 percent of Belarus' trade turnover. All this predetermines our republic's geopolitical and economic orientation alike. Economic union would provide an opportunity to pursue a unified credit, tax, and customs policy. This in no way signifies the creation of a single budget. But Russia, as the main economic patron in the region, will financially determine the policy which other banks, including Belarusian banks, will have to follow.

[Gukovskiy] But many people in Belarus see economic union as meaning a single budget with Russia....

[Tsepkalo] In that case the Russian president would only have to appoint his representatives in the regions which are now sovereign republics of the CIS. I agree that right now it

might be beneficial for us to have the Russian ruble. But would we then be able to talk about sovereignty?

[Gukovskiy] But is the deepening of economic integration with Russia possible without this?

[Tsepkalo] Let's start with the fact that Russia has an enormous number of production facilities producing components for Belarusian enterprises. During the lifetime of the USSR, when we had an economy unconcerned about energy expenditure, cheap energy enabled us to produce cheap tractors, cars, trucks, machine tools.... There was a demand for them, and they broke into Western markets despite anti-dumping legislation on these types of product there.

The situation has now changed, and the unified national economic complex has disintegrated. Russia is starting to supply us with energy at world prices, and Russian suppliers are setting prices for components which are beneficial to themselves. When you know you have a monopoly it is pretty easy to dictate terms. But these draconian prices find their way into the cost of the end product, which becomes uncompetitive on the world market and doesn't sell, as a result of which not only Belarusian assembly plants but also Russian suppliers suffer.

Therefore the market among enterprises must be replaced by transnational corporations, experience in creating which can be borrowed from Western countries. As is known, transnational corporations are located on the territory of multiple countries and produce components for a product produced in one of the countries. By creating a system of transnational corporations within the framework of the CIS—first and foremost in a Belarus-Russia context—the profit from the sale of the end product could be shared in line with the contribution made by each enterprise; it would only be necessary, as happens abroad, to work out the percentage structure for distributing the profit.

[Gukovskiy] Are there real contradictions between Stanislav Shushkevich and Vyacheslav Kebich which might have some kind of negative impact on the development of Belarusian-Russian relations?

[Tsepkalo] They disagree on some matters, of course. Remember the situation around the Collective Security Treaty. As is known, Kebich was a supporter of Belarus joining the collective security system, while Shushkevich pursued a policy of neutrality. A contradiction? Undoubtedly. But there was no way it could impact on bilateral relations. Shushkevich was compelled to submit to the will of the majority and sign the treaty.

Popular Front Warns Against Pro-Russia Orientation

WS3012143593 Minsk VECHERNIY MINSK in Russian 24 Dec 93 p 1

[Report by Vasiliy Romanovskiy under the "Political Zodiac" rubric: "Should Belarus Leave the CIS?"]

[Text] The Board of the Belarusian Popular Front [BPF] has issued a statement deeming the results of the Russian elections as a victory of fascist and communist extremists.

"Political strife in Moscow has been aggravated," reads the document. "The events in Russia have testified to the danger of being in this country's neighborhood. Union or concord with Russia means being hostage to unforeseen and aggressive Russian policies, as well as the unstable situation in that country.

"The BPF believes that Belarus should immediately leave the CIS. The Belarusian-Russian border should become a fully established state border... A 'common ruble zone' with the country that permanently stands on the brink of civil war is out of question. Union with Russia, which is being supported by the government, will lead us into the deadlock of murderous Russian conflicts and lead to an economic and political breakdown. Any further orientation toward Russia will bring destruction to Belarus."

Calls For Changes in Government

WS2912154693 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA in Belarusian 15 Dec 93 p 1

["Text" of "Memorandum of the Belarusian Popular Front Opposition and Democratic Deputies in the Supreme Soviet on the Power System in Belarus"]

[Text] Our position with regard to the power system in Belarus was expressed in the Belarusian Popular Front [BPF] program adopted during the Third BPF Congress on 30 May 1993, as well as in statements and notes of the BPF deputy faction in the Supreme Soviet made between 1990 and 1993. Our position on issues related to the state system has not changed.

Belarus should be a parliamentary republic with a president as head of state; the president is elected by universal suffrage and has the power to dissolve parliament and the present inefficient soviets, as well as to call new elections for representative bodies. However, the president is not the head of executive power.

Presidential elections should be held no sooner than six months after the installation of a new professional parliament and a new government.

The first step to overcome the political and economic crisis should be the resignation of the present Cabinet of Ministers and the formation of an interim government.

The second step should be the adoption of amendments to the Constitution or the promulgation of a new constitution validating early parliamentary elections for the installation of a new professional parliament.

The system of soviets, being a destructive and inefficient power structure, should be gradually liquidated and replaced by a municipal system. The election of heads of the local power bodies should be held on a universal basis and at the same time as presidential elections.

The oblasts should be liquidated and a two-level administrative system introduced.

We emphasize the fact that overcoming the political and economic crisis is impossible without the resignation of the current bankrupt government. The current government, which has ruined the economy, subjected the country to robbery, and put our sovereignty in danger cannot be allowed—while keeping a huge lobby in the Supreme Soviet—to prepare and conduct new elections (presidential, parliamentary, or local) because its purpose will be to again secure the victory of the compromised nomenklatura.

[Signed] People's Deputies of Belarus: Z. Paznyak, U. Zablotski, L. Zdanyevich, A. Trusaw, Yu. Byelyenki, M. Kryzhanowski, L. Dzyeyka, V. Alampiyew, B. Hyuntar, V. Kakowka, I. Hyermyanchuk, S. Antonchyk, V. Holubyew, Ya. Tsumaraw, S. Papkow, A. Shut, P. Kholad, H. Hrushavy, S. Slabchanka, P. Drahan, I. Syamashka (against any president), A. Spihlazaw, S. Navumchyk, A. Parul, Ya. Hlushkevich, V. Dawhalyow, A. Yanyets, M. Markyevich, M. Aksamit, H. Syamdzyanava, L. Barshchewski, I. Hyerasyuk, M. Matsyushonak, U. Sapronaw, I. Lapaukhaw, M. Kalbaska, M. Sukach, R. Vyacherski, I. Pyrkh, L. Syechka, A. Sasnow, V. Syardzyuk, V. Radamyslski, A. Kuzma, A. Shawnin, V. Ulasyenka, A. Barysyenka, N. Saldatava, L. Zvyeraw, A. Dawlyud, A. Volkaw, A. Lyatko, E. Bahawtsow, Ya. Byadulin, U. Lazarevich, R. Plotski, A. Kichkayla, U. Shawtsow, L. Tarasyenka, M. Slyamnyow, P. Palahyecha, B. Savitski, Ya. Novikaw.

Moldova

Ilascu Release Demanded; Snegur on Need for Army

AU2912202993 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Mircea Dascaliuc report from Chisinau]

[Text] Today the MOLDOVA-PRES news agency has published the following item: As a result of the efforts made by the leadership of the Republic of Moldova to save the Ilascu group, the European Union and Russia have issued a joint declaration on that issue. The document mentions that both the European Union and Russia have been closely monitoring the progress of the trial of the six culprits in Tiraspol, and they both equally doubted its legitimacy. The sentence that was passed, the declaration states, cannot be accepted, as it may negatively influence the chances of a political solution of the situation in the eastern rayons of the Republic of Moldova.

The European Union and Russia request that the Tiraspol authorities should immediately hand over the members of the Ilascu group to the legal bodies of the Moldovan state power, and asks the Republic of Moldova's authorities to establish whether the six are guilty or not according to the laws of the country.

The declaration also addresses an appeal to the parties involved in the [Dniester] conflict to examine new ways and find solutions to the issues that lie at the heart of the conflict between the authorities on the left bank of the Dniester and the central state leadership of Moldova, the item published by MOLDOVA-PRES concludes.

Also today, in Chisinau, the meeting took place of the Military College of the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Moldova. President Mircea Snegur, in his capacity as supreme commander of Moldova's Armed Forces, also attended the meeting, at the end of which he made a brief speech. Among other things, President Snegur emphasized the need to set up a national army, which, under the current historical and geo-political circumstances, would represent a guarantor of the republic's existence as a state and its sovereignty. That is the stance adopted by the leadership of the state, which, however, is not supported by certain political and social forces, Mr. Snegur said. He added that the latter forces support either the immediate union with Romania or the breaking up of Moldova and its addition to the historical territory of Russia. Obviously, they are playing a game in trying to use the combination of circumstances, Snegur assessed, but this should not and cannot influence the official position of the state leadership.

Premier Ready To Step Down Month Before Elections

LD2912205793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1913 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Moldova's Premier Andrey Sangheli said that he was ready to step down from the direct heading of the government for the period of the election campaign.

The parliamentary elections in Moldova will take place on February 27, 1994.

Sangheli (whose candidacy has been included in the ticket of the Moldova's Agrarian Democratic Party) pointed out in an interview with Interfax on Tuesday that in accordance with the law, representatives of the state power bodies could not participate in elections while remaining at their posts. He announced that due to this a special presidential decree on the discharge of government members and the state power bodies' representatives included in the tickets of political parties and movements would soon be issued.

Sangheli emphasized that he did not suspend himself as a premier since he had to lead the government until a new premier was appointed. However, in his words, he will stop performing the premier's duties exactly a month before the elections. "If any problems emerge I will participate in their settlement," he remarked.

The premier pointed out that during the election campaign he would receive no salary, not use a state car or other privileges. A deputy premier is to carry out the leadership of the government.

Sangheli said that he would fight for the victory of the Agrarian Democratic Party. However, he will also support other political forces standing for independence, territorial integrity of Moldova and civil peace. "I will always and everywhere support these aims," the premier emphasized.

IF Note: In this way Sangheli fully backs up the opinion voiced in the exclusive interview with President Mircea Snegur in yesterday's edition. We remind subscribers that the latter stated that he did not intend to repeat the mistakes made by the Russian leadership in the run up to the elections and intended to back the "logical centrists," who opposed unification with Romania.

The parliamentary elections in Moldova take place on 27 February next year.

Bank President Says National Currency Stable

LD2812133293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1311 GMT 28 Dec 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valery Demidetsky]

[Text] Chisinau December 28 TASS—President of the Moldovan National Bank Leonid Tolmach on Tuesday rejected forecasts of the fall of the rate of the Moldovan national currency, the lei, introduced last month. He said the rate of the lei is expected to be stable in the period ahead. He noted the weekly Interbank quotations indicated that the rate of the lei against the U.S. dollar rose five per cent within the past month. Still Talmach did not rule out the fall of the lei rate to half its present value in future unless the economic recession in Moldova is arrested and industrial output increased. Still bankers' efforts to shore up the lei may prove futile, Talmach said.

Experts note that the expected use of world prices on energy carriers and transport and the increase of the minimum wage will have a negative effect on the lei. In these conditions funds allocated by the International Monetary Fund and a number of Western countries to shore up the lei will not remedy the situation.

The lei will be accepted on broader areas. The president of the national banks of Moldova and Romania signed an agreement under which monetary units of the two countries can be used in currency operations by natural and legal persons. The Moldovan lei has also become a means of payment in non-state trade in the Dniester zone, whose authorities refused to recognise the lei and are keeping old Russian banknotes in circulation.

Kazakhstan

Former Deputies Protest Loss of Privileges

LD3012091293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0737 GMT 30 Dec 93

[By KAZTAG correspondent Tatyana Zhurbenko - TASS]

[Text] Almaty December 30 TASS—Lawmakers of the former Kazakh parliament, who were promised that all their privileges would be preserved after the dissolution of the parliament, realised that they had fallen on the wrong bait and are now filing various protests as the privileges are disappearing.

Lawmakers from Kazakh provinces were ordered to free before January 1 state-owned apartments in the capital of Almaty which they had been given when elected to the former Supreme Soviet.

The right for free air travel has also been cancelled.

The staff of the former parliament was promised to retain their jobs in the new legislature, but a special commission is now offering new employment for them.

Local observers say there will be no "quiet divorce" between the legislative and executive authorities.

Some lawmakers are now sending protest letters to the president, others request the Constitutional Court to probe the "unlawful dissolution of the parliament". The third are collecting signatures for registration as candidates to the new legislature.

Tajikistan

Rakhmanov Reviews Events in Supreme Council Speech

LD2912213893 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 1600 GMT 28 Dec 93

[Address to the Supreme Council by Council Chairman Imamali Rakhmanov in Dushanbe on 28 December—live or recorded]

[Text] Esteemed deputies and dear guests, the 18th session of the Supreme Soviet is coming to an end. The leadership of the republic will study with extreme attention and care all those critical views, observation, and constructive proposals made at the session by you—the people's deputies—and will draw the relevant conclusions.

Before speaking on the issues and tasks which will determine the future development of our people and country, I would like to look back on the path we have covered and briefly address the achievements and failures during the last one year.

We all know very well the scale and deadly consequences of the civil war. The spiritual consequences of the war is similarly grave. Separation and estrangement took place between the oblasts and rayons. Ethnic and tribal hatred and hostility rekindled. The seeds of disrespect and mistrust were sown among the generations. The social and ethical values of the past which up until yesterday were throwing light in our path and were the source of pride to each one of us lost their value.

Apart from this the value and respect for a human being decreased too. This is why that the present crisis are not only economic, social and political but also moral, spiritual and psychological. These crisis as for as their gravity is concerned it is no less than the economic crisis.

Now lets think for a while what government we had inherited and where we have started from. In such circumstances, the leadership saw its political task and its citizen debt in telling the people openly about the true situation in the country; and to see to the reality with open eyes and with a sense of responsibility; to seek a solution for national salvation, putting an end to the devastating civil war, the repatriation of refugees, the restoration of peaceful life and the restoration of the destruction caused by the civil war.

Today, although there may not be improvements in the living standards of the people and although we may be faced with great economic difficulties; we have fulfilled our top priority job as far as ending the fratricidal war, preserving the integrity of the beloved homeland and ensuring unity, peace, and tranquillity of the people. In this difficult path which we have chosen to build a law-governed, secular and democratic state: All the people have supported us. Today we are all offering thanks that our persecuted people are breathing freely in all corners of the republic and are living in tranquillity.

At the same time, one of our main achievements has been to ensure the military and political security of the republic. The situation on the border is still unstable; individual armed groups are occasionally violating it, firing at the border guards, or resorting to plunder and other [words indistinct].

However, these operations which are sometimes knowingly or unknowingly described by the foreign mass media as [word indistinct] cannot be called the continuation of the civil war. Today we have taken all measures to ensure stability along the borders.

Thank God that now people are engaged in peaceful labor, and that the majority of refugees, both inside and outside the country, have returned to their permanent places of residence and to their jobs. Government departments, especially the law enforcement bodies, despite all serious shortcomings which exist in their daily work and which cause discontent among the people, are constantly and regularly working to ensure the security and safety of the society.

The most important result of our work and activities during the past one year has been that all the positive trends in the republic are continuing irreversibly. The

most important thing during the past one year has been to put together the material and spiritual basis to achieve such a state. This basis will be increasingly, if slowly, strengthened and expanded.

Of course, our political ideal is national unity. As I have said in my statement on the occasion of United Nations Day: We will negotiate with all political and social organizations and movements which are ready to cooperate with the leadership of the country to ensure national peace, restore and develop the national economy and to take the republic out of the grave economic crisis.

In order to advance in this road leading to national unity we are ready to negotiate and talk [with the opposition] in whatever level and composition. To comprehensively tackle this issue, the Supreme Soviet established a special commission whose activities have already bore positive results.

We are ready to widen the scope of our present negotiations with the opposition forces and to examine with a full sense of political responsibility on the negotiating table all those issues whose solution will assist the cause of complete stability in our society.

We do not want to resolve any fundamental issue facing our society by force and through armed struggle. Our aim and objective is construction and that is it.

It is worth mentioning that the issue of the refugees' provision and repatriation to their permanent places of residence was the focus of our attention. International organizations and especially the United Nations are constantly paying attention to this issue too. They are assisting us with the provision of material assistance for its just resolution. I express thanks for their support and practical assistance.

In this connection, we need the political and material support of the [word indistinct] international and Islamic organizations. I think they too realize that lack of stability and uncertainty in Tajikistan—the majority of whose citizens are Muslims—cannot remain without any effect on the Islamic countries.

The goodwill of our foreign neighbors in respect of complete stability in Tajikistan, apart from great political importance, cannot be devoid of spiritual importance. It is a cause for satisfaction that during my talks with Afghan President Professor Borhanoddin Rabbani, both in Kabul and in Dushanbe, we had similar views on the subject.

Esteemed people's deputies, as the political process in the countries of the world proves, one of the main factors of social and political stability in society is a constitution and laws that will respond to the requirements of time. Unfortunately, so far we have not reached this level of political maturity. Some important sections of the republic's constitution and other laws adopted on its basis have become outdated and do not conform with the standards of international law. Therefore, today, for us, the most urgent task is to prepare and adopt a new constitution for our country.

The 18th session of the Supreme Council had approved [as heard] the composition of a new Constitutional Commission. Some time ago, the Presidium of the Supreme Council formed a working group from among the experts and politicians headed by esteemed Abdulmajid Dostiyev, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, to prepare the draft constitution. In order to assess the important aspects of the constitution, our experts have visited a number of foreign countries including the United States of America, Turkey, and Switzerland, and have gained some experience in this regard.

The constitution is basically a legal document. At the same time it is the most basic political, social, economic, cultural, and ethical document that will reflect the achievements and failures of a country, in the direction of national development as well as the ideals of its society.

The constitution is a legal document that will bring into the framework of the law the direct participation of the people in choosing the form of political sovereignty, the establishment and foundation of the supreme state authorities, as well as their responsibilities vis-a-vis the people. The constitution will also determine the rights and freedoms of the citizens and will regulate the scope of its implementation.

The issues that have been mentioned ought to be enshrined in our constitution, taking into account specific economic, social, political, cultural, national, and religious conditions. In the present stage of the transformation of our society, for us the fundamental task is to establish a democratic, law-governed, and secular state.

The state authorities are hopeful that the concept of such a state, which we regard as our social ideal, will be enshrined in the first chapters of the new constitution of Tajikistan. Here, I would like to shed light on one important subject that is at the center of the world community's attention, and especially at the center of public opinion of the civilized and developed countries of the world. By this I mean ensuring human rights, which will constitute one of the most important pillars of the constitution of Tajikistan. The right to live, to associate freely, the equality of everyone before the law, and the sense of responsibility of each individual, are all the points that have been included in the constitutions of the majority of states in the world.

The main issue is the implementation of the constitutional rights of the citizens in practice, which depends on the specific conditions of communities, the historic and spiritual traditions of the country, and the level of cultural and political development of the people.

For example, we can take the issue of political democracy, one of whose known forms is political pluralism. It

is only natural that if the newly-formed state of Tajikistan wants to find a place in the ranks of developed and civilized countries, it ought to support values respected by the world.

Political pluralism is one of these values that we accept. It is not a secret that nowadays open and secret discussions and debate are taking place on the subject of the forms of state administration, the adoption of the Constitution and the parliamentary elections.

Here, I would like to express my personal view on these subjects. First of all, I would like to say that we have to some extent made mistakes in finding a solution to these most important issues in the political life of our republic. Now the talk is more on the presidential and parliamentary form of administration. I trust that the supporters of both forms of state administration can bring decisive and convincing proof in support of their arguments. However, in my opinion both systems should be put forward before a general referendum. Only people can determine the form of state authority.

Personally I am in favor of a strong presidential form of administration. I would like only to stress one aspect of it, that in the conditions of a transition period, a strong presidential administration will make possible the solution of many main issues. It is natural that the president should also be elected in a general election. I have said this before and once again reiterate that I have never turned my back on being elected by the people and I am ready for it.

We should also elect a new parliament. Our future parliament should be a professional parliament and a smaller one as far as numbers are concerned. It would be ideal if the referendum for adopting the new constitution, the forms of state administration, and the election of deputies to the new parliament could take place at the same time. This will save both funds and the valuable time of the people. In view of all these, it would have been better to have assigned some specific proposals to the relevant commissions of the Supreme Council in today's session.

Now I would like to say a few words about the local state administration.

Everybody knows that the legal forms of the state and local administration have basically changed in many independent states. Similarly, putting in order all the pillars of sovereignty from the top to the bottom are very important issues for us. The working group and the Constitutional Commission have to think thoroughly in this regard. The entire activity of the state is closely connected with the regular activity of local authority. Therefore, the time has come when we have to seriously change the position and development of establishing state and administration authorities in localities until the adoption of the constitution. A special commission should be established out of the people's deputies and specialists in order not to allow complacency or to rush a solution to this issue.

As you are aware, a number of important and practical tasks had been discussed at the 16th session of the Supreme Council that are clear to everyone. Unfortunately, they have still not been implemented to the extent that our present life demands. Foremost, I mean the economic tasks. In order to put this in context, we have to answer one principal issue: Where are we going; and if we know where we are going, by what ways and means are we going to achieve our aims?

I have to firmly point out that the only way that leads the whole of humanity to progress is the market economy. There is no other way. But we have to realize that this is a difficult way to economic development, which cannot be constructed in one or two years. That is why, first of all we have to establish the necessary economic basis and at the same time we have to think about the timely and effective measures of social security of the population. Every change and economic transformation has one aim and that is to improve the lives of the people.

The point of paramount importance in this matter is the recognition of the different forms of ownership that make the basis of the market economy. One should not have the mistaken view that market economy means the total privatization of state ownership. In all the known forms of a market economy, first, public ownership exists and second, the state has not lost its economic role. That is why those who cannot differentiate between the market economy and the [word indistinct] and between ownership and entrepreneurship, and who are resorting to deception are basically committing a crime.

On the other hand, we have to implement the right monetary and financial policy. Those decisions that have been adopted at the 18th session [of the Supreme Soviet] in the fields of economy, the National Bank, monetary policy and others, have to help us in resolving a number of our problems.

The leading authorities of the republic are duty-bound to take appropriate measures to enhance the prestige [words indistinct]. Ultimately we need to think seriously about the effective means and methods of land and water reform. This destiny-making economic issue should be solved stage-by-stage, taking into account the resources of the republic. Here, I cannot shed light on all the important aspects of this issue and there is no need for it. This should be done by the government. The government is duty-bound to prepare and assess stage-by-stage the specific programs for Tajikistan's transition to a market economy and to ensure their implementation.

One of the significant achievements of Tajikistan and its people following their independence has been the entrance of the republic into the international arena in a well-deserved manner. Despite all propaganda by our political enemies aimed at discrediting the legitimate government of Tajikistan, world public opinion did not desert Tajikistan. All international organizations, and first of all the United Nations and the CSCE, as well as the majority of the developed and civilized countries of

the world, not only have recognized us officially but are also continuously rendering their assistance.

I have felt their attention while delivering my speech via the rostrum of the UN Organization. Therefore, it has been made possible for us to act with pride in the international arena and to find our deserved place in the ranks of the peoples and countries of the world.

In order to achieve this, first of all we must have a full concept of foreign policy in order to clearly figure out what the real situation in the world is, and in which direction and what manner the activity of our state in the international arena is conducted. The concept about which we are talking has to be shaped using the rational forces of the republic, especially the specialists of the newly established Institute of the World Economy and International Relations. I have also to point out that the Academy of Sciences needs complete restructuring, especially in the sections that study the social sciences. It is necessary that the themes and the main directions of scientific research have to be reexamined [words indistinct] in accordance with the practical needs of our republic. I think that such measures will be in the interests of the national economy as well as in the interests of science itself.

During preparations of the concept of foreign policy of our country, we have to take into account that Tajikistan belongs to five political zones according to its geographical location, its geopolitical position, and its economic interests.

The first zone is the Commonwealth of Independent States, which despite its difficulties during the first years of its creation [words indistinct] has inclinations toward (?all-round development).

The second zone is Central Asia, which at present is moving toward political and economic unity.

The third zone is the environment [words indistinct] of the neighboring Persian-speaking states, that although may not have reached a common political or economic unity, are attracted to each other not only by historical, religious, and cultural solidarity but also by the real prospects of national development.

The fourth zone is the circle of influence of the Muslim countries of the east, which are linked to each other, not only by common religion, traditions, and spiritual customs, but also by the possibilities and needs of national development.

Finally, the fifth zone is the international community, whose inward and outward solidarity is strengthening more and more and is slowly and constantly moving toward a single humane civilization.

Everyone knows that the aim of each state's policy is ultimately the protection of its national interests. Therefore, the art of statesmanship worldwide is to find a reasonable and just balance between various interests of the states.

The newly independent Tajikistan, which entered the arena of world relations only two years ago, has insufficient experience in the field of international activity, whether politics or trade. That is why, while determining the main directions of our foreign policy, especially the priority of this or that measure or international initiative, we have to take into account the interests or needs that we have or will have in the above mentioned zones. Of course, since we also enter zones that have regional characteristics, it is why we must have a regional policy for instance, in Central Asia. However, one should not allow regionalism because it only leads to separation and to unpleasant political discord.

Here, I would like only to describe the principles of the relations of our republic with Russia and with Uzbekistan, which are vitally important for us. According to (?historical chronicles), the Tajik and Russian peoples had close trade and cultural relations since the Middle Ages and the influence of its civilization plays an extraordinary and important role in the destiny of the Tajik people. No one citizen of Tajikistan can today deny this fact. Nowadays too, Tajikistan and Russia belong to one common geopolitical and political-economic environment and enjoy more than ever before all-round relations.

The geographical, political, and cultural position of Tajikistan, as the southern gate of the European countries on the border of the southern and Central Asia will provide favorable possibilities to Russia in order to have relations with these states via Tajikistan. At the same time, Russia, through which Tajikistan has learned about European civilization and culture, will keep this role in the future too. In addition, for our republic, Russia has an unrivaled position in implementation of the economic reforms in Tajikistan and cooperation with the countries of the West and East.

Tajikistan has signed an agreement with Russia on establishing the single ruble zone, which can undoubtedly play a decisive role in stabilization of the economic situation of our republic.

The following two factors promote the development of cooperation between Tajikistan and Russia:

The first factor is the issue related to the Tajik-Afghan border, which in view of its strategic importance has been declared the border of the CIS, and which is protected by the border guards and the joint peacekeeping forces.

I have to say that these forces are by no means deployed against the Islamic State of Afghanistan. During the fruitful meetings with Professor Borhanoddin Rabbani in Dushanbe, I have pointed this out particularly.

The second factor is the multi-dimensional economic integration of our economy with the national economy of Russia, which existed since the beginning of the establishment of our republic. As you are aware, I have just returned from Ashgabat. The regular summit

meeting of the heads of the CIS took place there. The main conclusion of the above-mentioned meeting—which was very successful—was the restoration, broadening, and shake up of economic relations within the framework of the economic union, which had been signed earlier. In general, the CIS, despite occasional difficulties, is moving toward political and economic maturity.

Tajikistan, which is a full member of the CIS, has taken an active part in this hopeful task.

I have to say that for us Tajiks, the friendly, firm and long-lasting relations with Uzbekistan are also a historical demand as well as the desire of the people.

Dear people's deputies, in conclusion, I would like to attract your attention to a number of important issues of our present-day life. It should be pointed out that we are living in a new, sensitive stage of radical changes in society. That is why the 18th session of the Supreme Council has adopted a number of decrees and laws that could lay the basis for the development and strengthening of government activities of the republic, economy, banking, education, and administrative bodies.

But the implementation of decrees and laws in the field of the economy is connected to the activity of the government and its members.

We have elected Abdulmadjid Ahadovich Samadov, as chairman of the Council of Ministers. We hope that the [word indistinct] leadership of the Council of Ministers and its members is completely changed. Its main aim should center on increasing production, ensuring constant work of the industrial and construction enterprises, agriculture, and its auxiliary establishments. The other thing that I would like to add is that Samadov has to get rid of the disease among members of the government, which means putting an end to the disease of intervention [words indistinct].

I would like to repeat that unless the members of the government, [words indistinct] members of the leading state structures are engaged in these works [words indistinct], there will never be an improvement in government activity for the living standards of the people.

Beginning with the leadership of the Council of Ministers to the heads of ministries and enterprises, everybody has to understand his responsibility and has to meet the present demands of our people. In order to implement in practice the decisions of the state and government authorities, we have to establish a supervisory body under the apparatus of the head of state.

Another thing, dear comrades, is that there is nothing to hide. If we have to find out how the decisions of the government of the republic, the decisions and laws adopted by the Presidium of the Supreme Council during the past year are being implemented in the regions [words indistinct].

I would like to point out, in particular, that one of the main reasons for developing such unpleasant phenomena, such as regionalism, has risen is because of the incorrect policy of placement of the cadres. Maybe it would be appropriate if we had to add a clause to our constitution, which would prohibit the establishment of parties and organizations on the basis of regions that finally leads to regionalism.

Tajikistan is the single homeland of us all. Therefore, it is necessary that the competent, conscientious, and responsive cadres of the nation are to work in all the regions of the republic, irrespective of their nationality and place of birth.

We will lead such a placement of cadres in the future in whatever region, rayon, or oblast; it will make no difference whether it is being agreed or not. Dear friends, the people of Tajikistan are looking to us with hope. Let us use all of our power, knowledge, and efforts in order to justify this hope of our people. On the other hand, I am fully confident that our toiling and persecuted people will change their own fate. [Words indistinct] the decree of the Supreme Council has been adopted. Once again I would like to point out, and yesterday with the members of the government at the introduction of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, I have said: Dear comrades, let us begin with ourselves, many leaders of the rayons, oblasts, and sometimes the heads of the ministries, departments, and committees of the republic have two-three positions. This has been prohibited in all laws. Whom are we going to deceive? [Words indistinct] the heads of the rayons and farms are trying to appoint their relatives as the leaders of law enforcement bodies. To my mind, after the session the Presidium of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers of the republic will put an end to these works starting from tomorrow.

These were my brief remarks and observations with which I wanted to declare the session of the Supreme Council closed.

In the end, taking this opportunity, allow me to congratulate all of you and the noble people of Tajikistan on the occasion of the arrival of the new year 1994, and to wish you health, prosperity, and success. Thank you for your attention. [applause]

Curfew in Dushanbe, Other Cities Canceled

LD3012124193 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 1200 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan has issued a decree on abolishing the evening curfew in the cities of Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tyube, Kulyab, and Kaleninabad.

The decree says: In view of the stabilization of the situation and appeals by citizens, as well as on the occasion of the New Year, 1994, the evening curfew is to be abolished on the territories of the cities of Dushanbe,

Kurgan-Tyube, Kulyab, and Kaleninabad from 0000 hours on 31 December 1993.

[Signed] Imamali Rakhmonov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan

Leninabad Oblast Chief Relieved of Post

LD3012133793 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Russian 1000 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] The extraordinary session of Leninabad Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, which announced a break in its work on 23 December, continued its work yesterday. Administrative issues were discussed at its meetings. Abdujamil Homidov, chairman of Leninabad Oblast Executive Committee of Soviet of People's Deputies was relieved of his post because of mistakes he made in his work.

By recommendation of the Council of Minister of the Republic, which is supported by the Supreme Soviet Presidium, the people's deputies elected Solehkhuja Mahmudov as chairman of the Leninabad Oblast Executive Committee. He has worked as a first deputy chairman of Leninabad Oblast Executive Committee.

Present at the session were Abdujalil Samadov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan, Abdulmajid Dostieyev, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the republic and the heads of a number of the ministries and departments of the republic.

Islamic Fighters Claim Successes in Shurobad Rayon

LD3012152993 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0600 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] Reports coming from the Al-Badr front indicate that severe clashes took place yesterday in Shurobad Rayon, Kulyab Oblast. A correspondent of the KHORASAN news agency quoting military sources in the Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan reports that these operations, which took place yesterday afternoon in one of the posts situated in [words indistinct], continued for more than six hours. As a result, at least 23 communist troops have been killed and a number of them wounded.

Following these clashes, the Tajik mojahedin have made some advances toward [name indistinct]. The Khorasan correspondent adds that now more than half of Shurobad Rayon is controlled by the mojahedin.

Uzbekistan

Karimov Reports on Economy, Rejects Dual Citizenship

LD2912230693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1913 GMT 29 Dec 93

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature; prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin, edited by Boris Grishchenko]

[Text] President Islam Karimov on Tuesday made a report to parliament on reforms in the republic.

The achievements made by Uzbekistan were the result of peace and stability, he said. But "processes in neighboring countries exercise a strong influence" on the social and political situation in the republic." He expressed concern over the results of the last parliamentary election in Russia, where "chauvinistic groups are rearing their heads."

Karimov reaffirmed his negative attitude to the idea of dual citizenship. "The introduction of dual citizenship would give rise to inequality between the native population of the republic and the ethnic groups having the citizenship of two countries. In addition, it would weaken their patriotic spirit with regard to the republic where they live," he said.

IF [INTERFAX] Note: Dual citizenship was a key issue at negotiations between Karimov and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev early in December. Kozyrev insisting that the Uzbek leadership ensure all rights for the "Russian-speaking population," including the right to dual citizenship.

Karimov once again stated his intention to pursue an economic policy coordinated with those of other Central Asian states. He said that he would visit Kyrgyzstan early next year, and that soon after that Uzbekistan would be visited by President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan.

As Uzbekistan's main economic task Karimov named privatization, both in industry and agriculture.

He paid considerable attention to the introduction by Uzbekistan of its own currency. He rejected "destabilizing" rumors that sum coupons would be abolished and that banknotes of 5,000 and 10,000 sum coupons would be removed from circulation.

He said the sum coupons would be replaced by a permanent currency around next July.

IF Note: The current parliament session approved a budget for next year. It also passed laws on elections to the Oliy Madjlis (the new parliament), on the taxation of individuals' property, and on income taxes for Uzbek and foreign citizens and stateless persons. The elections to the 150-seat Oliy Madjlis will be held next summer, after the term of the present 500-seat Supreme Soviet expires. The new law allows only political parties and governmental bodies to nominate candidates to the new parliament and prohibits members of the Armed Forces, officers in the Interior Ministry and national security service, clergy and members of religious political parties from running for parliament. Civil servants are allowed to run, but they will have to leave their posts if they are elected.

Supreme Council Session Concludes Work

LD2912202593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1828 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] The session of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet finished its work in Tashkent on Wednesday. At the session deputies ratified a number of international documents. Among them is a treaty on establishment of an economic union within the CIS, agreements on friendship and cooperation with Uzbekistan and France, an agreement on establishment of the Inter-State EuroAsiatic Coal and Steel Community and an agreement on urgent measures for defense of victims of armed conflicts.

There are also agreements on aid to refugees and on state aid to the families of servicemen who perished in Afghanistan.

The deputies also adopted a resolution on joining the Convention on Security of International Civil Aviation.

The session declared the Day of Uzbek Educators to be observed on the first Sunday of October and the Day of Defenders of the Motherland, on January 14.

Former Officials Facing Criminal Charges

LD2912214293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1828 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Criminal proceedings are to be instigated against former Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Karakalpakstan (a republic within the composition of Uzbekistan), Davlat Shashmetov. This was decided at the session of the Uzbek parliament on Wednesday.

Uzbek Prosecutor General Buritosh Mustofaev announced to the deputies that Shashmetov had abused his powers and had concluded illegal agreements with foreign companies on selling of cotton. This caused to the republic damages of some 70 Mn rubles. According to the prosecutor general, the case was transferred to the Uzbek Supreme Court.

The deputies also agreed with instigation of criminal proceedings against three former Uzbek people's deputies who had committed crimes.

Oil, Gasoline Purchases From CIS To Be Reduced

LD2912112093 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Uzbekistan will reduce the volume of its purchases of oil and petroleum products from the CIS countries by a minimum 15 percent next year. The Russian Information Agency reports that the republic's government believes that, if it is used economically, the volumes purchased will be perfectly sufficient for stable work within the national economy.

Armenia

Fighting Continues in Northern Karabakh

NC2912155693 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1400 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] Defense Army's press service reported that the situation remains tense in the Karabakh conflict zone. Over the last day, the Karabakh Army units have been waging heavy battles all along the war front. The situation is even more complicated along the Mardakertskiy front, where the Azerbaijani Army has used its substantial numerical superiority to occupy a number of heights and seize the village of Matagis.

The Karabakh formations managed to halt all the enemy attacks to the east and southeast of the NKR, and in many places they managed to force the enemy back deep into its own territory.

The representative of the NKR Defense Army Command denied the Azerbaijani reports alleging that the Karabakh Army has suffered huge losses. According to the battlefield data on the morning of 29 December, two fighters were killed and nine others were injured on the Karabakh side on 28 December. The Azerbaijanis lost more than 60 soldiers and a number of armored cars.

The Azerbaijani Army resumed their intensive shelling of the Karabakh positions all along the front this morning. The enemy used military helicopters in the Gadrutskiy-Martuninskiy sector, and they bombed the Karabakh defensive positions.

The Azerbaijani Army also launched intensive operations against Armenia's border regions today. The Defense Ministry's press service reported that a number of settlements in Noyemberyanskiy Rayon and Noyemberyan came under artillery shelling from Kazakhskiy Rayon at (?1100) today. Idzhevan and border settlements in Idzhevanskiy Rayon came under tank and artillery shelling from Kazakhskiy Rayon at 1630. Berd Rayon center and a number of villages in Armenia's Tavushskiy Rayon came under artillery shelling from Azerbaijan's Tauzskiy Rayon. The Armenian side refrained from retaliating.

It appears that Azerbaijan, which has intensified its aggressive operations over the last 10 days, intends to drag Armenia into a large-scale military conflict.

Border Towns, Villages Shelled

LD2912205493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1828 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Azeri gunmen started shelling Armenian border towns and villages on December 29.

A spokesman for the Armenian Defense Ministry told Interfax that the town of Noemberian and the nearby villages were shelled at 13:00 and the town of Ijevan and the nearby villages, at 13:30. Some shells also fell on the town of Berd and villages of the Taush district.

No military targets are said to have been hit. The Armenian troops did not respond.

The Defense Ministry believes that while it has stepped up hostilities in Karabakh, Azerbaijan is trying to drag Armenia into a large scale conflict.

Karabakh Forces Said Repulsing Attacks

NC3012144193 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1400 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] The situation in the Karabakh conflict zone remains tense. The Azerbaijani troops have missed no chance to probe the weak points in the defensive positions of the Karabakh forces and break through them to penetrate deep into Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Defense Army's press service reported that the attacks by the Azerbaijani armed formations against Mardakert and Akhbulun region in Martuninskiy Rayon during the day on 29 December were repulsed. The Karabakh formations encircled and destroyed a 50-man enemy group near the strategically important Ushgiyal height, near Mardakert. In addition, 45 Azerbaijani soldiers were killed in Martuninskiy Rayon. Five persons were killed on the Karabakh side.

The Azerbaijani troops resumed their attacks in the north and southeast this morning. According to reports received at 1000 today, the Karabakh forces were successfully halting all the enemy attacks. We have no information about military operations after 1000.

Our attempts to obtain information about the situation in Armenia's border regions have been to no avail.

Azerbaijan Recruits Battalion of Russian 'Mercenaries'

NC3012142793 Yerevan SNARK in English 0901 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] Yerevan, December 29 (SNARK)—The authorities of Azerbaijani Army has formed a Russian Battalion, where the mercenaries, recruited in Russia, fight against Karabakh. Professor Suren Zolyan, the secretary of Special Commission of Armenian Supreme Soviet on the Questions of Karabakh, said to SNARK that this is a dangerous case of creating the military formations according to the nationality and it may sow a dissension among the nations.

Zolyan expressed the hope that the Russian authorities don't approve the participation of their citizens in Karabakh war. "The last proof of it is the statement of Foreign Ministry of Russia, which condemns the participation of the mercenaries in military action in Karabakh."

Government Control Increased in Northern Regions

NC3012143793 Yerevan SNARK in English 0901 GMT 30 Dec 93

["The Power Is Strengthened in Northern Regions of Armenia"—SNARK headline]

[Text] Yerevan, December 29 (SNARK)—The authorities of Armenia strengthen the power in the northern regions of Armenia. Press-Center of Armenian Government informs SNARK according to the decision [of the] Ministries' cabinet Aram Kocharyan, who worked in Defence Ministry and Ministry of Internal Affairs, is nominated as a representative of the Government in five northern regions of Armenia.

Yesterday Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the Armenian President, received the mayor of Vanadzor, the third city in Armenia according to size. During last ten days in Vanadzor there were two crowded meetings with the request to retire the authorities of the republic.

Zhirinovskiy Reportedly To Visit in Jan

NC3012134293 Yerevan SNARK in English 1501 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Yerevan, December 29 (SNARK)—In January the leader of the Russian Liberal and Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovskiy is on the intentions to visit Armenia, the "YERKIR" Yerevan news-paper issued today. The Intellectuals Council of Armenia invited Zhirinovskiy to visit Armenia just after the first session of the Duma.

Crisis Not To Affect 'Life-Support Enterprises'

NC3012140793 Yerevan SNARK in English 1318 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Yerevan, December 29 (SNARK)—The capital of Armenia lives without the electricity—no gas deliveries to Armenia because of the last week two explosions at the gas pipe-line. The explosions took place on the territory of Georgia. The Yerevan residents have the electricity only an hour per day. Some parts of the town are without the light for several days.

The trustworthy sources inform the Armenian Government is discussing the question connected with the temporary full halt in the work of all the industries but the life-support enterprises.

Azerbaijan

Nagorno-Karabakh Reports on Fighting, Casualties

LD2912204593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1828 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] The heavy hostilities between the Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces continue in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army's press center announced to Interfax that the Azerbaijani troops undertook one more attempt to break through the Karabakh defense in the northern Mardakert and eastern Martunin regions of Nagorno-Karabakh.

According to Stepanakert, armored equipment and MI-24 military helicopters were utilized during the attack. However, the press center affirms that the attacks were resisted. There have been losses suffered by both parties. The precise number will be announced later.

A representative of the Karabakh command told Interfax that the Azerbaijani formations had planned to carry out continuous attacks. In his words, Azerbaijan's large population allows Baku not to take into consideration the number of those killed and to send more and more formations for attacks, including reserve forces.

According to preliminary information from Stepanakert, the number of Azerbaijani servicemen killed over the last 10 days was put at 640-650. The loss of Karabakh forces was put at 32.

100 Azerbaijani Troops Said Killed

LD3012130293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1135 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] "About a hundred Azerbaijani soldiers were killed last Wednesday in the Mardakert and Martunin districts in the north of Nagorno-Karabakh," the defense ministry press service of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic told Interfax.

According to Stepanakert, a group of 50 enemy soldiers was surrounded and destroyed by Karabakhs at the strategic Pushkin Yal height near Mardakert. Five Karabakh servicemen were killed.

The press service claims that the Azerbaijani attacks on the approaches to Mardakert and in the east of Karabakh's Martunin district were repelled.

On Thursday morning the Azerbaijani troops resumed the offensive, their onslaught being contained by Karabakhis, according to reports received at 10:00 Moscow time.

As was reported by the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry, Azerbaijanian army units, having fought back the enemy's onslaught, launched an offensive and occupied a number of heights from where they shelled Ter Ter, a regional center bordering on Karabakh, and villages in the Geranboisky district.

The Armenians' attempts to advance in the Beilagan and Agdam directions in Azerbaijan were to no avail, say reports from Baku. Having sustained heavy losses, the Armenians were compelled to return to their former positions.

The defense ministry also reported the shelling of frontier Azerbaijani areas from Armenian territory. In the small hours of Thursday, villages in the Kazakh and Tauz districts were shelled and casualties inflicted.

In a statement circulated in Baku, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry refuted Stepanakert's and Yerevan's assertions that the Azerbaijani army contained Afghan mujaheddin and called on the world community to take political and economic sanctions against the aggressor.

Aliyev Visits Sumgait, Vows To Liberate Land

NC2912201993 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1640 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Excerpts] The new fiber-optic telephone exchange system, built with the efforts of the Azerbaijani Communications Ministry and Turkey's TELETAS firm, was inaugurated in Sumgait yesterday. Our correspondent Ramiz Mesedehesenli reports:

[Begin recording] [Mesedehesenli] The leadership and the representatives of the residents of Sumgait welcomed the Azerbaijani officials who had come to take part in the inauguration of the telecommunication system [5-second break in reception] Thousands of residents of this large industrial city had poured into the streets to express their deep respects to the head of the state. [passage omitted]

Later, President Geydar Aliyev addressed thousands of city residents who had gathered in front of the museum.

[Begin Aliyev recording] Esteemed people of Sumgait, I came to your city to inaugurate the new automatic international telephone exchange in the city. [10-second break in reception] This is a city that represents all the regions of Azerbaijan. There are people here from every rayon and city of Azerbaijan. Therefore, all Azerbaijan is represented and united here. One of the greatest distinguishing marks of Sumgait is that since the Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan it was the first to accept the refugees. [passage omitted]

I call on the refugees: Esteemed compatriots, you are in a difficult position. We are working to stop Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijan, and to (?recover) our occupied land through peaceful means. We are making use of all the possibilities, the possibilities that could be derived from the international organizations and big powers. During my latest visit to France I held numerous talks on this subject, and I invited the French president to get involved in this issue. Some days ago, I provided detailed information, issued a statement, and launched a protest at the meeting of the heads of CIS countries in Ashgabat about Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijan and calamities suffered by Azerbaijan as a result of this aggression. I requested that the Armenian armed forces, the Armenian occupiers, withdraw from our lands. I also told them—and I am now telling you and all the Azerbaijani people, the people of Sumgait, our compatriots evicted from the occupied lands —that if our demands are not fulfilled we will liberate our lands at all costs, at the cost of our blood and lives, and we will ensure the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani Republic, and, the day will come when you, my dear brothers and sisters, will return to your lands where you were born, to Kelbadzhar, Lachin, Shusha, Agdam, Fizuli, Dzhebrail, Zangelan, Kubatly, to your own homes, to your own gardens, and you will live and shape your lives on your own lands. You can be sure of this. We will never accept, we will never be reconciled with the Azerbaijani lands remaining under the occupation of the Armenian armed forces. That day will come, we will witness the day when you will return to your own places. [passage omitted]

I want to inform the refugees that we must liberate those lands with your help. Undoubtedly, your women, husbands, and children have to live here. But, the young, those who can bear arms should enter the ranks of the army and should bear arms for the liberation of their own lands, cities, and rayons. It does not befit you to live in degradation here. I am inviting you to this task. Lately, in the last month, the Armenian armed forces have constantly attacked the positions presently defended by Azerbaijan. However, I can inform you that these attacks are being repulsed. The Armenian armed forces are suffering enormous defeats and are retreating. They are suffering losses. And Azerbaijan's own brave sons, our soldiers and the officers in our Army, are displaying heroism. I also call on you to take part in this task. You must now be together with our soldiers and officers who are repulsing Armenian armed forces' attacks on those borders. You must be there, and fight there. You must return to your own lands and homes by fighting there, by repulsing the attacks of the Armenian troops, and by breaking through their lines. I am inviting you to fulfill this glorious and sacred task.

People of Sumgait, dear brothers and sisters, dear compatriots, esteemed citizens, I wish health and happiness to you all. On the occasion of the new year, I wholeheartedly congratulate you and wish you great successes in the new year. Our greatest desire is for war to end in 1994, Azerbaijan to free itself from this misfortune, regain its territorial integrity, and everybody to return to his home. You can be sure that we will attain this by joint effort. Therefore, unity, fraternity, friendship should be the guiding principles of our people, republic and our lives. I invite you to unity, to heroism, and to fighting to defend your lands. Thank you. [end recording]

Comments on Army

LD2912230493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1913 GMT 29 Dec 93

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin, edited by Boris Grishchenko]

[Text] President Geydar Aliyev said that the country did not nurture plans to capture territories but would do its best to liberate its own lands.

He told a group of Azerbaijan's national heroes and families of servicemen who had died in fighting with Armenia that the national army has proved "its capability to provide reliable protection for the security and territorial integrity of the country." The president

emphasized that Azeri citizens of every ethnic origin were defending the country. "The ethnic variety increases the strength of Azerbaijan's peoples," he said.

Aliyev said that last month none of the Armenian army's offensives had been a success. He recalled, however, that a large area of Azerbaijan was still occupied and a million of Azeris were had fled their homes.

IF Note: According to Aliyev and other officials, Karabakh forces are still holding over 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory.

Aliyev also said that the country's leadership was using every opportunity to reach a settlement.

By the latest reports of the Azeri Defense Ministry, the army had been beating off Karabakh attacks in the north and southeast of the war zone.

Meanwhile, military sources in Stepanakert report Azeri offensives in the same areas.

The Yerevan authorities are still denying participation of the Armenian regular army in the hostilities and attribute the increased activity of Azeri troops to the involvement of Afghan mojahedin in the war.

IF Note: Aliyev and Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan have failed in their efforts to reach a better understanding of each other's position in the Ashgabat talks last Friday that were mediated by Turkmenian President Saparmurad Niyazov. Following that Aliyev and Ter-Petrosyan made tough confrontational statements at the meeting of CIS heads of state.

Armenia Accused of 'Mud Slinging' Campaign

LD3012135793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1135 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] A spokesman for Azerbaijan's President has accused Armenia of mounting an anti-Azerbaijani campaign in media.

"One glaring example of such anti-Azerbaijani mud slinging in the media," according to him, is a report "about so-called involvement of Azerbaijanis in explosions along a gas pipe-line going through the Marneul region in Georgia to supply fuel to Armenia." The last such blast occured on December 18.

The spokesman claimed that this section of the gas supply route was controlled by Armenian troops and was protected by explosives dug in the ground by Armenians. In one incident, Georgian gas workers were heavily injured as a result of a blast.

Thanks to prompt actions by authorities in the neighboring Kazakh region of Azerbaijan, the wounded received urgent medical aid there and were brought back to Georgia.

What happened was "on the one hand an unprecedented act of sabotage perpetrated by Armenia on the territory of sovereign Georgia, and on the other hand, a humanitarian action by Azerbaijan toward the victims of that brutality," the spokesman concluded.

Georgia

Defense Ministry Elaborates on Coup Denial

LD3012102293 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0300 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] Offices of the Georgian Ministry of Defense have reported that allegations made by various information agencies and media are absolutely groundless.

According to the offices of the Ministry of Defense, a meeting between the deputy defense and security ministers was held on 27 December. A number of moot points were settled. However, [word indistinct] agency, referring to the reports from the press center of the Ministry of Security, has spread allegations that Defense Minister Gia Karkarashvili has led his units out to the Tbilisi Sea [reservoir on the outskirts of Tbilisi where Tengiz Kitovani and Tengiz Sigua were based in autumn 1991 before attacking and ousting Zviad Gamsakhurdia] where the opposition has been gathering.

The press center of the Georgian Ministry of Defense states on its part that Gia Karkarashvili remains at his office, and rumors about preparations for a coup are absolutely groundless and are being spread intentionally.

Security Ministry Issues Statement

LD3012115493 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1100 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] Tbilisi, 30 Dec—A statement was today handed to an IBERIA correspondent at the press center of the Georgian Ministry of Security. The statement reads as follows:

"The Georgian Ministry of Security has been addressed by news agencies who want to learn what comments will be given and what actions will be taken by the Ministry of Security regarding a 24 December incident [as received].

The press center of the Ministry of Security is authorized to state that the Ministry of Security refrains from making any comments regarding the incident until a competent conclusion has been received from a government commission created in connection with the incident. The ministry's stance was expressed clearly and unequivocally in a 25 December statement by the press center of the Ministry of Security."

Azerbaijani Interior Ministry Delegation Visits

NC3012140993 Yerevan SNARK in English 1318 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Tbilisi, December 28 (SNARK)—The delegation from Azerbaijan headed by Z. Dunyamaliyev, the first

deputy of the internal affairs minister of Azerbaijan, have visited Georgia. The goals of the visit are to strengthen relations between the internal affairs departments of both republics and to familiarize with situation in Kvemo-Kartly, the region where Azerbaijani population lives. It is explained with the fact that last time there were alarms about hard criminal situation on the national ground in the region. Valerian Gogolashvili, the press-secretary of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, said to SNARK the Georgian part informed Azerbaijan's representatives that there is no any national opposition between the Georgians and Azeris. With the aim to normalize the situation the head of Georgia issued ukase about the defence of the highways only by Georgian Road Police. Besides, it is supposed in the local police to organize special staffs, which will mainly consist of the local population. Zurab Kervalishvili, the Vice-Premier of Georgia, has received the Azerbaijani delegation. The guests visited Marneulinskiy region, where mostly Azerbaijani population lives, and they are going to visit Bolnis and Dmanis regions.

Budget Proposals for First Quarter of 1994 Approved

LD2912235693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2005 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] The Georgian government today approved the modified version of budget proposals for the first quarter of 1994, which were rejected two weeks ago.

The present version of the document envisions a budget deficit slashed by more than twice compared to the previous one. The expenses amount to 2,140,054,000,000 coupons, while incomes total 1,282,528,000,000 coupons. Therefore, the budget deficit reaches 857,526,000,000 coupons, or 40.4 percent.

Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze told the government meeting that this version of the document was "closer to reality" in comparison with the old one, although "its implementation is still under question." At the same time, he pointed out that Georgia "needs a budget, and that is why we must adopt these proposals."

The draft budget is to be submitted for consideration by the Georgian parliament.

Committee Chairman on New Legislation

LD3012115693 Tbi'isi IBERIA in Georgian 1110 GMT 30 Dec 93

[Text] Tbilisi 30 Dec—According to the IBERIA news agency, Temur Basilia, chairman of the Finance and Budget Committee of the Supreme Council, held a news conference the Oval Hall of the Georgian Supreme Council yesterday. The news conference was dedicated to the issue of the Supreme Council passing the legislation on taxes. Basilia thanked the speaker and the government for support. Speaking about the adopted laws, he explained that a packet of the adopted laws will promote the development of entrepreneurship and the establishment of principles of market economy in Georgia. An average rate of taxes is 20 percent, while a 35 percent tax has been fixed for banks. A 10 percent tax has been fixed for enterprises producing material goods. It has been decided to set up a strict tax inspection, which will be given priority in tax collection.

At the end of the news conference, Temur Basilia said that monetary reform was planned for the very near future.

Estonia

Velliste on Terms for Accepting Withdrawal Date

WS3012141593 Tallinn BNS in English 1033 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Tallinn, Dec 29, BNS—The Estonian-Russian summit depends to a larger extent on the results of a new round of bilateral talks scheduled for the second half of January, Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste said in an interview with the HOMMIKULEHT newspaper.

With negotiations entering a critical stage, the question is now whether or not Defence Minister Juri Luik should be allowed to continue to lead the country's delegation, he said. The minister says that much will now depend on what the Russians have to say.

If the talks fail or are allowed to drag on, there will be no justification for one of the sides to maintain a higher level delegation that the other, Velliste said.

More importantly, he said, Estonia wants to get a definite timetable of Russian troop withdrawals including the demilitarization of port city of Paldiski and pullout of Russian weapons.

If these conditions are accepted, Estonia will agree to the deadline of August 31, 1994 for Russian troop withdrawals, the Estonian official said.

One other problem, he said, is the question of retired servicemen which must be resolved in a way that will help lay the basis of bilateral relations rather than strain them.

The minister says this will ensure international stability and help Estonia focus on the question of a free trade agreement with the European Union as a way of rapprochement with Western Europe. Velliste hopes such an agreement will be signed on terms beneficial to Estonia.

Preparations for Dismantling Naval Reactor Begin

MK2912141093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Dec 93 p 3

[Unattributed report under the "NEGA Reports" rubric: "Estonia"]

[Text] This Christmas week the naval training base of the Baltic Sea Fleet in Paldiski began receiving deliveries of equipment required for dismantling its training nuclear reactor. Radioactive waste that poses the greatest hazard to the environment will be the first to be removed. Deliveries of the dismantling equipment are expected to be completed in January 1994.

Purchase of Israeli Radar Equipment Considered

WS3012110993 Tallinn BNS in English 1033 GMT 29 Dec 93

[Text] Tallinn, Dec 29, BNS - Estonia considers as one possible option buying radar equipment for its border forces from Israel, Prime Minister Mart Laar said in a press conference after Tuesday's meeting of the Cabinet.

"The Israeli offer for dry land observation equipment is to be seriously considered," Laar said. He said the Cabinet had given the director general of the Border Guard Department the authority to further work on the Israeli offer. This, however, doesn't mean that Estonia had already decided on the Israeli equipment, Laar added.

The prime minister said a special government working party was set up to deal with the purchase of equipment for the country's border forces. The working party is to submit its proposals by January 15.

Laar pointed out as a major problem the need to choose between a number of offers by manufacturers of coast monitoring equipment.

Offers for border guard radar equipment have come from manufacturers from Israel, Italy, France, Sweden and the United States.

The Israeli company Elbit offers a complete monitoring network, which includes coast observation sections. According to information obtained by BNS, the project costs about 22 million U.S. dollars. The Israeli company has said it would agree to payment by long-term crediting.

Elbit offers 15 Raytheon radars for Estonia's Baltic Sea coast, 4 radars of the same type for Lake Peipsi, which makes up much of the country's border with Russia, as well as 4 Loris infra-red cameras by the Inframetrix company for the sea coast and 4 Iris infra-red cameras by the same manufacturer for Lake Peipsi. The whole system would be run from 5 local and one national command center.

Estonian border officials have pointed out that no communication devices come together with the equipment. There is also no part foreseen for Estonian companies in the project. At the same time officials say the Israeli equipment can be regarded as costing relatively little.

BNS has obtained information that Israel also offers to Estonia electromagnetic sensor systems for the land border.

Prime Minister Mart Laar told reporters the Israeli-made equipment was mobile.

The former head of the Border Guard Department, now head of the Tallinn City Government law enforcement commission, Andrus Oovel, in an interview with BNS said the only Israeli offer to be considered seriously was the land border sensors.

Oovel has visited Israel to learn about the equipment used by the country's border forces.

Other manufacturers offering electronic border equipment to Estonia include Alenia from Italy, Thomson-CSF of France, a joint project of Siemens and Cardion, as well as Celsius Tech of Sweden and SAT of France.

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